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Abstract
This dissertation studies economic consequences of factor mobility in three different
contexts. The first chapter deepens understanding of the effect of immigration on
native wages in a setting where offshoring also takes place. It does so by relaxing
restrictive assumptions of existing theoretical models on the nature of offshoring and
showing that if a greater share of native than immigrant tasks is offshored, offshoring
reinforces the impact of immigration. Using spatial approach and instrumental vari-
able strategy to address potential endogeneity, empirical results show that the U.S.
commuting zones that experienced greater offshoring change featured a magnified
effect of immigration on wages of low-skilled native workers.
The second chapter contributes to the economics literature by showing that im-
migrants can affect trade not just with their countries of origin, but also certain
third party countries, and investigating which immigrants do that as well as the
likely channels. The study provides evidence of both an inter-ethnic spillover effect
(through the role of common spoken non-native language and geographic proximity)
as a well as a special role of ethnic ties (through additional effect of common native
language). The magnitude of the trade promotion effect of some third party country
immigrant groups is comparable to the trade promotion effect of immigrants from
trading partner country.
The third chapter examines determinants of international differences in agricul-
tural labor productivity. In particular, it focuses on the role of farm size distribution
and policy distortions. The findings suggest that international labor productivity
differences are mostly explained by differential input quantity and quality, while av-
erage farm size and farm size distribution do not have a significant effect conditional
on input quantity and quality. This suggests that even if there is misallocation in
the form of suboptimal input use in poor countries with smaller farms, it is likely
less severe than suggested by hypotheses that assume larger farms are overall more
productive. Additionally, price distortions analyzed do not appear to explain either
farm size or productivity differences.
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INTRODUCTION
The impact of factor mobility on economic outcomes is a vital class of inquiry
in the economics discipline. This dissertation studies economic consequences of fac-
tor mobility in the contexts of economic effects of immigration on native worker
wages (Chapter 1) and trade (Chapter 2) as well as the effects of factor allocation
across sectors and establishments on agricultural labor productivity (Chapter 3). In
the three distinct chapters, this dissertation contributes to economic literature by
providing novel insights by challenging some of the prevailing assumptions of exist-
ing studies–such as those on task intensity of offshoring in Chapter 1, on direction
and causes of trade promotion in Chapter 2, and on causes of international agricul-
tural productivity differences in Chapter 3–as well as by creating new datasets and
employing appropriate identification strategies that allow asking new questions and
answering old questions with more detail and rigor.
How does immigration affect labor market outcomes of American workers? How
does offshoring–the relocation of parts of the production process overseas–change na-
tive wages? Is the effect of immigration affected by the extent of offshoring? These
questions are of high significance for understanding domestic repercussions of glob-
alization, including both economic and political economy aspects. Yet studies that
consider both processes together are very scarce, and Chapter 1 of my dissertation
is directed at filling this gap. Focusing on wage outcomes, Chapter 1 starts from
recognizing a key insight from the canonical task-based model of the labor market
(Peri and Sparber (2009))–an exogenous labor market shock can potentially impact
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native wages via two distinctive channels: (i) by changing aggregate labor supply
and (ii) by impacting how natives are sorted into or out of tasks where they have
comparative advantage.
By definition, both immigration and offshoring of tasks increase the supply of
workers engaged in production. Immigration also pushes natives to perform tasks
in which they have greater comparative advantage. More nuanced, however, is the
question of how offshoring can impact the sorting of natives and immigrants into
tasks. Specifically, by expanding on existing models (e.g., Ottaviano, Peri and Wright
(2013)) and relaxing some of their restrictive assumptions (such as complete task
offshoring and specific location on a spectrum with natives and immigrants), the
paper shows that offshoring can push natives into tasks where they have greater
comparative advantage if it is immigrant task intensive–offshores a greater share of
immigrant tasks than native tasks. Conversely, it can push natives into tasks where
they have less comparative advantage if it is native task intensive. The key novel
insight is that if offshoring is native task intensive, by decreasing average native
comparative advantage compared to immigrants, it raises immigrant wage share,
which intensifies native wage response to immigration. In sum, whether immigration
effect on wages is positive or negative, it is reinforced by offshoring if it is native
task intensive and mitigated if offshoring is immigrant task intensive. Identifying
the nature of offshoring and how it affects native wage response to immigration in
the United States is left to the empirical analysis.
Empirically, Chapter 1 focuses on commuting zone outcomes and analyzes a pe-
2
riod of high immigration and offshoring exposure growth, 1990 to 2000, in the U.S.
The level of analysis choice reflects empirical evidence of strong cross-industry and
cross-occupation mobility with limited mobility between commuting zones, which
could confound wage effect with employment effect. Using plausibly exogenous
Bartik-type instruments for immigration and offshoring based on historical settle-
ment patterns and pre-existing industrial composition, respectively, the paper shows
that greater levels of offshoring exposure change increase wage elasticity of compet-
ing natives in response to low-skilled immigration. Furthermore, empirical results
provide evidence that the channel of influence is consistent with the theory, i.e., off-
shoring increases immigrant wage share. The study extends the literature by show-
ing that immigration and offshoring affect native workers in a way that is interactive
rather than mutually orthogonal, and by providing a theoretical model with relaxed
assumptions on the nature of offshoring that helps understand the joint impact of
the two processes.
Chapter 2 examines the role of immigration in trade promotion. The early works
on immigration-trade connection analyzed it through the Heckscher-Ohlin Model,
which featured production factor trade and commodity trade as substitute processes,
implying movement in the opposite directions for migration and trade (Mundell
(1957)). Since the seminal work of Gould (1994), however, the empirical evidence of
positive effect of immigration on trade has prompted literature studying immigrants
as trade facilitators. Yet this literature has virtually exclusively focused on trade
with immigrant country of origin. In this chapter, I show that immigrants can also
affect trade with other (third party) countries, and investigate which immigrants do
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that as well as the likely channels.
Specifically, I explore the role of geographic and linguistic proximity to trading
partner country, as these factors reflect business networks, foreign market informa-
tion and communication facilitation as potential mechanisms of trade facilitation.
Geographic proximity measure for a country pair is based on sharing a common
border. Linguistic proximity is operationalized through a number of measures, in-
cluding sharing the same native, spoken and official languages as those in the trading
partner country. Importantly, since the various linguistic and geographic proximity
measures are correlated, I take steps to disentangle the role of each one–the effects of
cross-country ethnic spillovers (through native language), the inter-ethnic spillovers
through geographic proximity and the separate roles of the same spoken and official
languages.
The analysis in the study indicates evidence of both ethnic (evidenced by special
importance of native language) and inter-ethnic (evidenced by the importance of
spoken non-native language) trade promotion spillover effects to third party coun-
tries. In fact, the magnitude of trade promotion for immigrants proximate by both
geographic and linguistic measure is close to that of immigrants from trading partner
country. By highlighting and thoroughly investigating a heretofore scarcely explored
direction of immigration-trade link, this paper accentuates potential importance of
immigration in trade promotion discussions and importance of trade-related effects
in immigration policy considerations.
A different question of no lesser importance is addressed in Chapter 3. In-
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ternational differences in agricultural labor productivity are dramatic and signifi-
cantly larger than non-agricultural productivity differences. In fact, the gap is about
two times larger in agriculture (Caselli (2005), Gollin, Lagakos and Waugh (2014),
Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2014)). Additionally, countries with larger average
farm size tend to be characterized by higher labor productivity. Since more produc-
tive labor is key to higher standards of living and most of the world’s poor working
adults make a living through agriculture (Castaneda et al. (2016)), understanding
the reasons for the productivity gaps and increasing agricultural labor productivity
in low-income countries could have tremendous impact on poverty reduction.
Because factor mobility is expected to equalize factor returns absent market dis-
tortions, large gaps in returns to labor in agriculture and non-agriculture as well as
between large and small farms may be caused by factor misallocation. Addition-
ally, incentive-distorting government policies have been suggested as potential cause
for misallocation. In fact, Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2014) argue that as much
as 3 quarters of the differences in agricultural labor productivity between top and
bottom quintiles of countries in terms of per capita income can be attrubited to
policy interventions and market distortions that lead to fewer large, more productive
farms and more small farms; in particular, one-quarter of the variation is explained
by crop-specific price distortions in poor countries that favor small farms. Because
smallholders constitute the majority of farmers and are poorer, and since the role
of smallholders in structural transformation is a broader question in development
economics, it is particularly important to investigate what role farm size plays in ex-
plaining international differences in agricultural productivity; I also examine whether
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incentive distortion indicators examined in the literature explain labor productivity
differences, through farm size or directly.
Using panel data on agricultural output, input quantity and quality as well as
proxies for total factor productivity for a large number of countries, I find that aver-
age farm size and farm size distribution do not affect labor productivity conditional
on input quantity and quality. This suggests that even if there is misallocation
in form of suboptimal input use in poor countries with smaller farms, it is likely
less severe than suggested by hypotheses that assume larger farms are more pro-
ductive TFP-wise. Additionally, policy distortions examined in the literature, such
as nominal (NRA) and relative (RRA) rates of assistance to agriculture and price
distortion/farm size correlation, do not appear to explain a non-trivial amount of
variation in productivity. In particular, I find that is it is unlikely that low-income
countries on the whole subsidize smaller farms, as there has not been a negative
relationship between crop-level nominal rate of assistance and average farm size for
the crop in lowest income quintile countries since the 1990 World Census of Agricul-
ture. Additionally, it does not appear to be the case that agricultural productivity
differences between high- and low-income countries are explained by poor countries
misallocating labor to agriculture through subsidies, as both NRA and RRA tend to
be higher in rich countries; also, neither NRA nor RRA have a direct effect on labor
productivity. Most of the international variation in agricultural labor productivity is
explained by input quantity and quality, which may or may not signal misallocaiton.
Overall, Chapter 3 suggests need for caution in interpreting ostensible correlation
between average farm size and agricultural labor productivity as evidence of innate
6
advantages of larger farms that poor countries are unable to make use of due factor
misallocation caused by policy and institutional barriers.
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CHAPTER 1
THE INTERACTIVE EFFECT OF IMMIGRATION AND
OFFSHORING ON U.S. WAGES
1.1 Introduction
The effects of immigration1 and, more recently, offshoring on the domestic labor
market have been subject to growing academic and policy interest, which is likely to
continue in the future. Part of the reason is the rapid increase in offshoring and im-
migration over the past three decades, combined with falling employment and wages
of the low-skilled American workers in manufacturing. As of 2014, out of all work-
ers employed by U.S. (multinational) manufacturing companies directly or through
affiliates over 30% were located abroad, up from 18% in 1990 (Figure 1.1). During
the same time period, the share of non-college educated workers in manufacturing
who are of immigrant origin doubled, going from 9% to 18% (Figure 1.2). Contem-
poraneously, total manufacturing employment of native (non-immigrant) workers
without college degree decreased from 15.4 million to less than 9 million (Figure
1.3), and wages of the same group decreased in real terms and relative to higher-
educated workers (Figure 1.4). These rapid and significant changes spurred a rich
and growing literature investigating the consequences of immigration and offshoring
for American workers, particularly the low-skilled.
1Here, we focus on low-skilled immigration, and, for brevity, generally refer to low-skilled immi-
gration when we say “immigration,” unless otherwise specified.
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An important aspect of the growing knowledge about the consequences of these
processes is the increasing understanding of the heterogeneity of impact depending
on native and foreign worker characteristics, occupation and industry type, as well as
other factors. In this study, we show that an important source of the heterogeneity
of immigration effect on wages of low-skilled natives is the extent of offshoring ex-
posure.2 The key insight is that since the pattern of specialization between natives
and immigrants affects immigration impact on native wages, offshoring, by differ-
ently affecting native and immigrant workers and thereby shifting the specialization
pattern, can also affect the wage impact of immigration.
To understand why offshoring may influence immigration wage consequences for
natives, it is instructive to first understand how immigration affects natives on its
own. The two main channels through which immigration is found to impact wages of
natives are factor supply (which operates in a similar fashion to what we term price
effect here) and productivity, which operate differently in different specifications and
can be individually or both at play. The extent to which an increase in immigrant
labor affects native wages through factor supply channel depends, among other as-
pects, on the degree of substitutability between the two types of workers in question,
with relatively more negative effect on wages of workers who are the closest substi-
tutes in production. This proximity is most commonly empirically proxied by skill
level of workers or task content of jobs performed. The degree of similarity between
2This is superficially similar but substantially different from a contemporaneous work by Burstein
et al. (2017), who investigate the role of (potential) tradability within the U.S., as opposed to actual
exposure to offshoring in affecting native wage response to immigration, and who examine a very
different economic mechanism.
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skills workers possess is usually measured through the level of education completed
(Card (2001)) or education-experience cells (Borjas (2003)); skill-wise more similar
workers (who tend to be low-skilled given that immigrants tend to be dispropor-
tionately low-skilled) generally see negative, although small, wage effects (Altonji
and Card (1991), Borjas (2003), Card (2001), Longhi, Nijkamp and Poot (2005)).
Similarity between tasks performed is measured in terms of whether occupation en-
tails heavy use of manual, routine, communication (or, relatedly, interpersonal) or
abstract (or, relatedly, cognitive) tasks (Peri and Sparber (2009), Peri and Sparber
(2011)). Among the low-skilled in the U.S., immigrant and native workers tend to
concentrate in jobs requiring completion of different tasks. In particular, immigrants
tend to work in more manual- and less communication-intensive occupations, and
when the share of immigrants increases, natives tend to increase concentration in
tasks in which they have comparative advantage, which limits the downward wage
pressure (Peri and Sparber (2009)). Thus, native wages depend on both ratio of
overall low-skilled factor input in production to high-skilled and task concentration
of immigrants and natives (in particular, the extent of comparative advantage), both
of which are affected by immigration. Importantly, in a way explained in detail in
Section 1.2, the size of these two effects is positively related to immigrant wage share.
Immigrant wage share, in turn, depends on both immigrant share in employment and
immigrants’ task specialization/comparative advantage.
The latter, namely average comparative advantage of immigrants (and natives),–
and this is generally overlooked in the literature–can be altered by offshoring, as
the latter affects immigrant in addition to native labor, potentially differentially and
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in an a priori unknown way. Conceptualizing offshoring as trade in tasks (along
the lines of Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008)(GRH)), we highlight the fact that
the tasks offshored may be native- or immigrant-task intensive (proportionately more
native vs. immigrant tasks may be offshored), which will shift comparative advantage
patterns, potentially affecting immigrant wage share and native wage elasticity with
respect to immigration.
Most of the existing offshoring literature considers only the effect of offshoring
on natives. It stresses that since offshoring leads to some tasks3 being performed
abroad, while others are performed at home, workers who previously performed
the tasks now done abroad switch to different tasks within the firm or switch
firms/industries/locations/become unemployed. Other workers are forced to com-
pete with workers whose task were offshored, putting downward pressure on wages.
On the other hand, if (enough) of the gains from cheaper offshoring accrue to firms
rather than foreign workers, the higher productivity of labor composite has a positive
effect on wages, making the overall effect theoretically ambiguous.
The empirical literature is generally consistent with manufacturing offshoring
generally having greater impact–sometimes positive, more often negative–on wages
of low- or middle-skilled workers, those in most routine, least interactive occupations
and those in the middle or at the low end of the wage distribution (Ebenstein et al.
(2014), Oldenski (2014), Tempesti (2015), Olney (2012) in the U.S.; Baumgarten,
3Importantly, as we note later, a fraction of a task of a specific kind can be offshored, since there
is no natural definition of a task, and it can be defined more broadly or more narrowly; additionally,
a fraction of a task can be conceived of as a fraction of the number of repetitions of the same task.
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Geishecker and Görg (2013), Geishecker and Görg (2008) in Germany; Hummels
et al. (2014) in Denmark), suggesting that these are the workers “whose jobs” are
being offshored or competing workers. Interestingly, Ebenstein et al. (2014) find that
offshoring to low-income countries decreases native wages and offshoring to high-
income countries increases them, while Olney (2012) finds the opposite to be true,
yet the effects are greatest on the competing workers (in most routine occupations in
the former case and in lower wage percentiles in the latter) in both papers. Studies
focused not on wages but employment also find greater, but mainly negative, effects
on the competing workers (Harrison and McMillan (2011), Wright (2014)), as do
studies that look at labor task composition, which is shifted to more skilled, non-
routine and interactive occupations (Baumgarten (2015), Carluccio et al. (2015)).
Thus, taken separately, immigration and offshoring literatures suggest that both
processes affect native wages through changes in the factor supply ratio and produc-
tivity/comparative advantage.4 Due to the similarity of the effects of the two pro-
cesses, it is natural to ask whether joint analysis leads to new insights. Three papers
stand out as having looked at the effects of immigration and offshoring together, both
theoretically and empirically. Barba Navaretti, Bertola and Sembenelli (2008) use
Italian firm-level data and find that offshoring decreases the share of unskilled work-
ers in domestic employment and immigrant share of employment, suggesting that
offshore workers are closest substitutes for unskilled natives and immigrant workers.
A more closely related study to ours is that by Ottaviano, Peri and Wright (2013),
4Additionally, (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008)) show that a price effect of offshoring (of
a different kind than in this paper) can also take place.
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who extend Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) framework, modeling task alloca-
tion among natives, immigrants and offshore workers in such a way that immigrants
specialize in low-complexity tasks, offshore workers perform the intermediate tasks,
and natives specialize in most complex tasks. Due to this assumption, an increase
in offshoring leads to an increase in native task complexity, a decrease in immi-
grant task complexity, and lower relative productivity of immigrant workers (this is
a crucial assumption, and our results in large part depend on relaxing it). The em-
pirical results obtained by examining industry-time variation suggest that offshoring
decreases immigrant and native employment shares, but does not significantly af-
fect wages. Immigration, on the other hand, decreases offshoring employment share,
but does not affect native employment share or wages. This suggests that offshore
workers, in a way, isolate natives from competition with immigrant workers; signifi-
cantly, the empirical result considers all native workers together, without separating
those most likely affected–the less-skilled natives. Another closely related study is
by Olney (2012), who also extends GRH framework, but by modeling immigration
as an increase in low-skilled labor supply in addition to offshoring. An important
assumption in the latter paper is that offshoring increases effective labor supply of
a given factor, with no difference in the extent of offshoring between native and im-
migrant jobs within the factor. Empirically, the paper exploits state-industry-year
variation to simultaneously estimate the effects of low- and high-skilled immigration
and of offshoring to low- and high-income countries on wages of natives along wage
percentile spectrum, but not how/whether the two interact.
Additionally, in a purely theoretical paper with occupational choice between
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“worker” and “entrepreneur,” Unel (2017) obtains a similar insight to Ottaviano,
Peri and Wright (2013), in that lowering of offshoring costs “downgrades” tasks per-
formed by immigrants and “upgrades” tasks performed by natives; the paper also
predicts that immigration increases the number of entrepreneurs, firm productivity
and welfare, while having no effect on entrepreneur/worker inequality. In a stochas-
tic growth model, Mandelman and Zlate (2016) use structural estimation to show
that in a general equilibrium context, offshoring increases job polarization by affect-
ing mainly middle-skilled jobs, while low-skilled immigration decreases wages of the
low-skilled workers.
Lastly, it is also useful to address a contemporaneous study that looks not at
immigration and offshoring but immigration and tradability, and which we consider
complementary to our work. The paper by Burstein et al. (2017) finds that “a local
influx of immigrants crowds out employment of native-born workers in more relative
to less immigrant-intensive nontradable jobs, but has no such effect within tradable
occupations.” The proposed mechanism is that within tradables, adjustment occurs
more through output rather than prices. In particular, occupations are “traded”
across regions within the U.S. In contrast, our paper asks what happens to the
effect of immigration when offshoring increases. The different assumptions under-
lying each paper and the different questions asked provide rather different insights.
Burstein et al. (2017) focus on immigration-induced native employment (and, to a
lesser extent, wage) changes at the occupational level within region as affected by
a more permanent characteristic of tradability. In contrast, we concentrate on how
native wage response to immigration changes due to actual/imputed offshoring ex-
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posure, reflecting substantial occupational mobility among natives (Kambourov and
Manovskii (2008)) in the spatial approach taken, but not investigating it as the sub-
ject of primary interest. Thus, the two papers provide somewhat different insights
about somewhat different determinants of the way immigration affects native labor
market outcomes.
In sum, existing literature does not directly consider the impact of offshoring on
the wage response of natives to immigration. We tackle this hitherto unaddressed
issue here. We theoretically formalize the approach by following the literature in
using general GRH framework, but deviating from it in how we do it. In particular,
we build on Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) and Ottaviano, Peri and Wright
(2013) by modifying/extending them in two ways: in the full version of the model,
we do not assume that tasks that are offshored are offshored completely and we
do not posit the location5 of tasks most affected by offshoring, letting the empir-
ics speak to that instead.6 The model in the paper has two factors of production,
one being high-skilled labor7 and the other–low-skilled labor composite, the pro-
duction of which includes tasks performed by low-skilled native workers, low-skilled
immigrants, whose comparative advantage differs across tasks, and offshore workers,
with the share of offshore workers varying across tasks. By increasing the supply
of low-skilled workers, and hence overall input of low-skilled worker tasks (with the
5Location, here, means the place on the spectrum of tasks that are performed by immigrants
and natives. In case of Ottaviano, Peri and Wright (2013), the analog is task complexity spectrum.
6In the appendix with a special case of the model, we follow the literature in assuming full
offshoring of tasks and utilizing the location of offshored jobs. This simpler setting produces similar
insights to the main model.
7We are primarily interested in the other factor.
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other factor being fixed), immigration decreases marginal product of low-skilled la-
bor composite, which has a negative effect on native wages. On the hand, with more
tasks completed by immigrants, natives specialize in tasks where they have greater
comparative advantage, which positively affects wages. Both effects are reinforced
by immigrant wage share, as is the net effect–native wage elasticity with respect to
immigration (assuming one channel sufficiently dominates the other). Offshoring can
either increase or decrease immigrant wage share by affecting native tasks relatively
more or less than immigrant ones; it may, thus, increase or decrease native wage
elasticity with respect to immigration.
To address the question empirically, we use geographic and time variation across
U.S. commuting zones in exposure to immigration and offshoring to investigate the
presence, extent and nature of the potential interactive effect of the two processes on
native wages. We primarily focus on the manufacturing sector, because it has experi-
enced far greater offshoring exposure and exposure increase than non-manufacturing,
while seeing similar levels of immigration exposure change. Plausibly exogenous
Bartik-type (Bartik (1991)) instruments, based on past settlement patterns for im-
migration (Card (2001)) and on pre-existing industrial composition for offshoring,
address the problem of immigration and/or offshoring being potentially related to
local labor demand shocks that affect wages. We find that low-skilled immigration,
on average, decreases wages of low-skilled natives, while offshoring increases them.
The results also reveal a robust negative interactive effect of low-skilled immigra-
tion and offshoring on the wages of low-skilled natives in manufacturing, whereby a
negative effect of immigration is reinforced by offshoring. Additionally, offshoring is
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associated with an increase in immigrant wage share, providing support for native
task intensive offshoring as the channel for the interactive effect. The results hold
for wages of the middle- and low-skilled workers, and those in most routine, most
manual, least abstract, less cognitive and less communication-intensive occupations.
They are robust to including controls for local labor demand shocks, import compe-
tition, demographic variables, and using alternative definitions of immigration and
offshoring.
The findings here provide first evidence that offshoring may be exacerbating the
negative effect of low-skilled immigrants on low-skilled natives in local labor markets,
with supporting theory and evidence. They suggest that since immigration and
offshoring effects are not independent, they are more accurately understood when
studied together. The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 1.2 provides
a theoretical model, Section 1.3 discusses empirical specification and data, while
Section 1.4 presents results and Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Theoretical model
1.2.1 Part A: Immigration
We propose a simple task-based model of the labor market and investigate the role
of offshoring as a determinant of the native wage impact of low-skill immigration.
To illustrate the intuition of the model in a simple setting and because there is
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relatively little offshoring outside of the manufacturing sector, there is only one
sector in the model. We begin with a setting in which there is only native and low-
skilled immigrant employment. Specifically, let aggregate output Q be a function of
a composite low-skilled labor input Y ,8 and an exogenously given level of high-skilled
labor input H,9 henceforth normalized to unity:
lnQ = α ln Y + (1− α) lnH,
where one unit of the composite low-skilled labor input Y is the result of the com-
pletion of a unit each of a continuum of tasks y(i), i ∈ [0, 1]. We assume that
α(∈ (0, 1)) is the share of low-skilled labor input in aggregate output.
Task y(i) can be completed either by native low-skilled workers n, or immigrant
low-skilled workers m:
y(i) = n(i)/an +m(i)/am(i).
Thus, each low-skilled task can be accomplished by an units of native work or am(i)
units of immigrant work. We assume that the ratio B(i) = an/am(i) is continuously
differentiable and monotonically increasing in i, and consequently natives have com-
parative advantage in low index tasks, while immigrant workers have comparative
advantage in high index tasks.
8We can also think of tasks in Y as those that are more manual and routine and less abstract,
communication-intensive and cognitive-intensive–tasks more likely performed by low-skilled immi-
grants and offshore workers, and by natives that compete with the two latter types of labor.
9We are primarily interested in the low-skilled labor in the Y factor, and H plays little role. It
could also be conceived of as a composite of exogenous inputs.
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Let wn and wm denote native and immigrant wages. Define the threshold task I
as:
I ≡ {i|wmam(i) = wnan}.
It follows that the unit cost of task i is minimized for i ≤ I by hiring only native
workers, and for i > I by hiring only immigrant workers. Summing across all tasks
i ∈ [0, 1], the unit cost of the composite low-skilled labor input is thus:
c(wn, wm) = wnanI + wm
∫ 1
I
am(i)di
= wn
(
anI +B(I)
∫ 1
I
am(i)di
)
≡ wnφ(I) (A1)
Note that φ(I) < an whenever I < 1. Thus φ(I) denotes the cost savings achieved
by hiring immigrant workers. This is analogous to the productivity effect of offshoring
defined in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008).
Let M and N denote the exogenously given supply of low-skilled immigrants and
native workers. Given the threshold task i, it follows that total labor supply is equal
demand for immigrants and natives if and only if
N = Y anI, M = Y
∫ 1
I
am(i)di.
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Define σ as the share of low-skilled immigrant workers:
σ = M
M +N .
It follows, therefore, that the threshold value task is determined whenever σ is given,
since by definition
σ
1− σ =
∫ 1
I am(i)di
anI
.
Now let θ denote the immigrant wage share:
θ ≡ wm
∫ 1
I
am(i)di/c(wn, wm) =
wmM
wmM + wnN
= B(I)M
B(I)M +N . (A2)
Since B(I) is monotonically increasing in I, the wage share of immigrants is strictly
increasing in the threshold I, at constant supply of immigrant and native workers.
All else equal, as I increases, immigrant workers become more specialized in tasks in
which they have comparative advantage, while native workers spread out and begin
to take on some high index tasks in which they have less comparative advantage. As
the relative wage of immigrant workers
wm
wn
= B(I)
increases with I, the relative wage share of immigrant workers also increases.
The immigrant wage share, or equivalently, one minus the native wage share, plays
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an important role in what follows. First, the threshold task elasticity of immigration,
where xˆ = dx/x denotes proportionate change, can be expressed as:
Iˆ
σˆ
= − θ1− σ . (A3)
Thus, the threshold task is more responsive to changes in immigrant supply when
the immigrant wage share is high. The same is true for the output elasticity of
immigrant supply:
Yˆ
σˆ
= θ1− σ . (A4)
Intuitively, the more immigrant workers specialize in tasks where they have compar-
ative advantage, the higher their impact on the allocation of tasks as well as the
supply of composite labor input Y .
These intuitions carry over to the responsiveness of the native wage with respect
to immigrant inflow as well. To see this, note that with competitive input markets,
workers are hired until the marginal product of the composite labor input equals
marginal cost:
p ≡ αY α−1 = wnφ(I), (A5)
where p denotes the competitively determined price of the composite labor input.
Making use of (A1) and (A5),
wˆn
σˆ
= pˆ
σˆ
−
ˆφ(I)
σˆ
.
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Simply put, the native wage impact of an increase in the share of immigrant
workers depends on the interplay between the price effect, pˆ/σˆ, and productivity
effect ˆφ(I)/σˆ. Naturally, the former depends on the output impact of immigration,
since from (A5)
pˆ
σˆ
= (α− 1) Yˆ
σˆ
.
The productivity effect can also be derived using (A3), giving
φˆ(I)
σˆ
= ε θ
2
1− σ ,
where ε = dlnB(I)/dlog(I) > 0 parameterizes the size of the productivity effect of
immigration. Taken together, we have:
wˆn
σˆ
= (α− 1 + εθ) θ1− σ . (A6)
We summarize these findings as follows:
Proposition 1. The native wage impact of low-skilled immigration is negative
(positive) if (and only if) the productivity effect is small (large) relative to the price
effect. In both cases, if the difference between productivity parameter ε and price
effect α− 1 is sufficiently large, a higher immigrant wage share magnifies the native
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wage impact of low-skilled immigration, all else equal.
Thus, low-skilled immigration may increase or decrease the native wage, depend-
ing on the relative size of the price and productivity effects. A higher immigrant
wage share magnifies both the price effect and the productivity impact of immigra-
tion. The balance of the two depends on whether the price or the productivity effect
dominates.
Of course, the immigrant wage share itself is endogenous. Our next task is to
demonstrate that the nature of offshoring, in the sense of whether offshoring is native
or immigrant tasks intensive, is a key determinant of the immigrant wage share.
1.2.2 Part B: Immigration and Offshoring
We next assume that a fraction of any task in Y can be offshored. Unlike most
models (notably, (Ottaviano, Peri and Wright, 2013)), we do not assume full off-
shoring of tasks and do not posit a particular location of the “more offshorable”
tasks along the i spectrum; instead, we allow for the possibility of full offshoring and
for any particular location of offshored tasks with respect to natives and immigrants.
This makes the model more flexible and generalizable (as well as, arguably, more
realistic), with some of the assumptions of the existing models being special cases
of this one (we provide one illustrative example of a special case of the theoretical
model in Appendix). Specifically, the production of task i can be written as
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(1− βs(i))y(i) = n(i)/an +m(i)/am(i), (B1)
where βs(i) - fraction of task offshored, β <= 1 is common to all tasks and s(i)
indicates heterogeneity in offshorability across different tasks. The threshold task
between natives and immigrants is still given by
wmam(I) = wnan, (B2)
which, again, means wm
wn
= an
am(I) = B(I).
A potential division of tasks between natives, immigrants and offshore workers is
graphically illustrated in Figure 1.5. The right axis represents the unit cost of per-
forming a task. The cost of producing any task with native labor is wnan, represented
by the flat solid line. The cost of producing with immigrant labor decreases with
i, as immigrant labor becomes more productive (am(i) decreases). The intersection
represents the threshold task above which immigrant labor is used domestically and
below which native labor is used. The left axis measures the share of task offshored.
For the sake of example, the share of task offshored, βs(i), is represented by the
parabola-like line bounding shaded areas. The figure is deliberately drawn to have a
greater share of tasks offshored in the middle of the i spectrum. If we think of i spec-
trum as equal but reverse of the “complexity” scale in Ottaviano, Peri and Wright
(2013), the figure is consistent with greater offshorability of middle-complexity jobs.
As drawn, the figure also features a greater extent of offshoring of native tasks than
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immigrant ones. However, this need not be the case, as offshoring function βs(i) can
take any form (with values between 0 and 1). Figure 1.6 represents another possi-
bility, where offshorability increases with i index and a greater fraction of immigrant
tasks (than native) is offshored.
Let now the unit labor cost abroad woao be a fraction (1-γ) of the local labor
cost (e.g., as a result of Nash bargaining). Then the unit cost of task i, c(i), is
(1− γ)min{wnan, wmam(i)} = woao(i), γ ∈ (0, 1) (B3)
The unit cost of Y, summing across all tasks, is
P = Cy =
∫ 1
0
c(i)di = wn[
∫ I
0
(1−βs(i)γ)andi+B(I)
∫ 1
I
(1−βs(i)γ)am(i)di] ≡ wnφ(I, β)
(B4)
Note that φ(I, β) < an whenever there is some immigration and/or offshoring.
Thus φ(I, β) denotes the cost savings achieved by hiring immigrant and offshore
workers.
Labor market clearing is now given by
N = Y
∫ I
0
(1− βs(i))andi, Y
∫ 1
I
(1− βs(i))am(i)di = M, (B5)
which can also be written as
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N∫ I
0 (1− βs(i))andi
= Y, M∫ 1
I (1− βs(i))am(i)di
= Y,
from which it is evident that both effective labor supply of natives and effective labor
supply of immigrants, as well as the labor composite, are expanded with greater
offshoring.
The ratio of immigrant to native labor is now given by
σ
1− σ =
∫ 1
I (1− βs(i))am(i)di∫ I
0 (1− βs(i))andi
= M
N
. (B6)
From (B6), we can obtain the relationship between proportionate changes in im-
migrant wage share, threshold task and offshoring :
σˆ
(1− σ) = −(
1
ζθ
)Iˆ + (On
N
− Om
M
)βˆ, (B7)
where Iˆ = dI/I, βˆ = dβ/β, Om = Y
∫ 1
I βs(i)am(i)di, On = Y
∫ I
0 βs(i))andi, and
ζ =
∫ I
0 (1−β(s(i)))di
I(1−βs(I)) , the share of native tasks offshored divided by the share of the
threshold task offshored. Note that without offshoring, ζ = 1, the second term above
is 0 and we are back to the result with just immigration. Alternatively expressed,
(B7) gives
−Iˆ = θζ[ σˆ1− σ − (
On
N
− Om
M
)βˆ],
which can be used to assess the effect of offshoring on threshold task:
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Iˆβˆ
= (On
N
− Om
M
)ζθ.
Thus, threshold task is increasing in offshoring exposure if a relatively larger
share of native than immigrant tasks is offshored. Using (B5), proportionate change
in Y can be expressed as
Yˆ = −1/ζIˆ + On
N
βˆ (B8)
or, using (B7),
Yˆ = θ σˆ1− σ + (1− θ)
On
N
βˆ + θOn
M
βˆ. (B9)
Thus, both higher immigrant and offshore shares increase the labor composite.
Proportionate change in productivity term, using (B4), can be epxressed as
φˆ = εθ˜Iˆ − Ωβˆ, (B10)
where ε = B′(I)I
B(I) , θ˜ =
B(I)
∫ 1
I
(1−βs(i)γ)am(i)di
φ(I,β) , Ω =
1
φ(I,β) [
∫ I
0 (βs(i)γ)andi +
B(I)
∫ 1
I (βs(i)γ)am(i)di]. Turning to the change in native wages, since p ≡ αY α−1 =
wnφ(I, β), change in native wages depends on both the change in the labor composite
and the productivity term:
wˆn = (α− 1)Yˆ − φˆ
= [(α− 1)θ + εθ˜θζ] σˆ1− σ + [Ω + (α− 1)((1− θ)
On
N
+ θOm
M
)]βˆ. (B11)
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Consequently, change in native wages in response to greater immigrant labor share
is
wˆn
σˆ
= [(α− 1) + εζθ˜] θ1− σ . (B12)
The first term in the square brackets represents the price/labor supply effect and
the second–productivity effect. The native wage response to immigration can again
be summarized by restating Proposition 1, except whether the productivity effect is
sufficiently large or small now also takes into account ζ and θ˜:
Proposition 1. The native wage impact of low-skilled immigration is negative
(positive) if (and only if) the productivity effect is small (large) relative to the price
effect. In both cases, if the difference between productivity parameter ε and price ef-
fect α− 1 is sufficiently large, a higher immigrant wage share magnifies the native
wage impact of low-skilled immigration, all else equal.
Turning to the effect of offshoring, from (B11) we have
wˆn
βˆ
= Ω + (α− 1)((1− θ)On
N
+ θOm
M
), (B13)
where Ω represents the positive productivity effect and the rest – negative labor
supply effect. Similar to the effect of immigration, the direct effect of offshoring is
summarized below:
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Proposition 2. The native wage impact of offshoring is negative (positive) if
(and only if) the productivity effect is small (large) relative to the price effect.
Lastly, the potential interactive effect is slightly more complicated. First, we
point out that the relationship between immigrant cost share and offshoring (based
on the definition of θ) can be expressed as
∂θ
∂β
= θ(1− θ)ε 1
B(I)
Iˆ
βˆ
= (On
N
− Om
M
)[ζθ2(1− θ)ε 1
B(I) ].
The term in square brackets is positive, while the sign of the first term depends
on whether offshoring is more native or immigrant task intensive. Thus, offshoring
increases immigrant wage share if it offshores a relatively larger fraction of native
jobs than immigrant ones, leading us to the following inference:
Proposition 3. If offshoring is native (immigrant) task intensive, it increases
(decreases) the immigrant wage share. This reinforces (mitigates) the negative wage
impact of immigration if the productivity effect is sufficiently small relative to the
price effect; alternatively, this reinforces (mitigates) the positive wage impact of im-
migration if the productivity effect is sufficiently large relative to the price effect.
We represent the main elements of the proposition in the table below:
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Immigration Effect
Dominating Effect Price (α− 1 ε) Productivity (α− 1 ε)
Immigration Effect Negative Positive
Interactive Effect
Native task intensive (On
N
> Om
M
) Reinforcing (-) Reinforcing (+)
Migrant task intensive (On
N
> Om
M
) Mitigating (+) Mitigating (-)
The table shows that whether the effect of immigration is (sufficiently) positive or
(sufficiently) negative, native task intensive offshoring reinforces it. However, the
sign of the interactive effect (also the sign of the coefficient on the interaction term
in the empirical results) will be negative if it reinforces the negative effect and posi-
tive if it reinforces the positive effect. Analogously, it will be positive if it mitigates
the negative effect and negative if it mitigates the positive effect. In what follows,
we take this question to the data.
1.3 Empirical Methodology
In the previous section we provided an explanation for how immigration and off-
shoring may affect native wages within the context of a single-sector economy where
natives, immigrants and offshore workers can all perform tasks in one of the two
composite labor inputs (where low-skilled workers are concentrated). In particular,
the insights from the previous section suggest that the wage consequences of immi-
gration and offshoring depend on the relative sizes of respective productivity and
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price10 effects. Additionally, Proposition 2 suggests that native wage elasticity of
immigration increases in offshoring exposure if offshoring is native task intensive. In
the empirical analysis, we want to estimate the effects of changes in immigration and
offshoring on wages of native workers likely to be in Y, as well as whether greater
offshoring has an effect on native wage elasticity of immigration. Additionally, since
the effects derived in the theory section apply to the low-skilled labor, we are in-
terested in seeing whether immigration and offshoring change the ratio of high- to
low-skilled labor wages. Lastly, since the channel through which the interactive ef-
fect is posited to take place in the model is the effect on immigrant wage share, we
estimate whether offshoring increases or decreases immigrant wage share.
Spatial Approach
There are several decisions that need to be made when choosing the empirical
methodology for estimating the wage effects of immigration and offshoring on natives.
One important decision is the level of analysis. The observation levels that have been
used in either immigration or offshoring literature include individual worker, occupa-
tion, industry, geographic area (spatial approach), and a combination of geographic
area and worker category (by skill/education).
Of the papers that jointly analyze the effects of immigration and offshoring, Olney
10which, here, works in a similar fashion to a labor supply effect in other setting, in that it is
generated by lower marginal productivity of the low-skilled labor composite.
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(2012) is the one that focuses on wage outcomes. It uses BEA11 2-digit level NAICS12
industry data across both manufacturing and non-manufacturing to construct state-
industry offshoring exposure measure.13 It then combines it with low- and high-
skilled immigrant shares in state-industries and uses annual data (2000-2006) to test
the separate effects of high- and low-skilled immigration and offshoring to high- and
low-income countries on wage outcomes for natives at different wage percentiles.
The second paper closest to this one, Ottaviano, Peri and Wright (2013), also uses
annual BEA industry-level employment data (4-digit manufacturing-only industries)
and combines it with immigrant share data, but does not incorporate a geographic
component. It is primarily interested in employment outcomes, but does test for
wage effect, of which it finds none for either offshoring or immigration (using annual
2000-2007 data).
The third most relevant study is Burstein et al. (2017). Their level of analysis is
commuting zone-occupation, with decadal changes in the outcomes of interest and
immigration. However, instead of estimating the effects of offshoring in addition
to immigration, they investigate the importance of “tradability,” which is a more
permanent characteristic and does not reflect actual trade or offshoring.
In contrast to these studies, here we take the spatial approach, looking at the
effect of changes within a labor market (commuting zone) in immigrant share and
11Bureau of Economic Analysis.
12North American Industrial Classification System.
13using proportionality assumption that state’s share of (national) industry GDP translates to
the corresponding share of offshore employment in the industry. It is a similar assumption to what
we use here, except for the geography level and aggregation across industries.
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offshoring exposure, as well as the interaction of the two on wage changes for native
workers in manufacturing. Spatial approach is arguably more suited for studying
wage effects after labor reallocation than either industry or state-industry (as well
as occupation) approaches. To some extent, labor adjustment in response to labor
demand shocks includes some switching of occupation, industry and work location,
but, in practice, mostly the former two dimensions. In the United States, mobility
responses to labor demand shocks are very limited spatially (Blanchard et al. (1992),
Glaeser and Gyourko (2005)), especially for the less-skilled workers (Bound and
Holzer (2000), Notowidigdo et al. (2011)). On the other hand, mobility between
narrowly defined industries and occupations has been relatively high and rising,
particularly for low-skilled workers, who switch at much higher and slightly higher
rates than high-skilled between occupations and industries, respectively (Kambourov
and Manovskii (2008)). The broader the industry definition, the less the inter-
industry mobility (Kambourov and Manovskii (2008)), and mobility between large
sectors is especially difficult (Artuç, Chaudhuri and McLaren (2010)). Thus, for
analysis of wage outcomes, industry-level analysis (as in Ottaviano, Peri and Wright
(2013)) is likely both too narrow, in that the wage effect of immigration and offshoring
would likely be mitigated by employment response out of and into the industry,
and too broad, in that reallocation within industry but between geographic areas is
limited. State-industry (as in Olney (2012)) and CZ-occupation (as in Burstein et al.
(2017)) analysis would help the latter problem but still be subject to the former. In
the spatial approach we take, labor mobility response is mitigated to better identify
the wage effect. This is also consistent with the model of one large sector in a closed
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labor market with large occupational mobility that we posited in the model.
To minimize potential labor mobility effect even further, we choose commuting
zones as the geographic area of analysis because they have the advantage of being
defined in way that tries to capture the local labor market, rather than being merely
an administrative unit, such as a state or a county. They are large enough that most
competition among workers happens within CZs, but small and plentiful enough
that there is enough of them to exploit inter-area variation and to exclude many
non-competing workers. In this way, CZs are preferable to other areas that are
frequently used—states, cities, metropolitan areas and counties.
In additional to concerns about the employment effect, an important aspect of es-
timation is whether the estimated effect is relative or absolute. Dustmann, Schönberg
and Stuhler (2016) discuss three main types of empirical specifications to estimate
the effect of immigration on native workers—pure spatial approach, national skill-
level approach, and mixture approach. While the latter two estimate relative wage
effects (compared to other native education-experience groups), the pure spatial ap-
proach estimates the total wage effect on a particular native skill group. Since, we
are interested in the absolute wage effect (with relative wage effect as a secondary
question), the spatial approach is the most appropriate from this point of view also.
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1.3.1 Specification
For the reasons outlined above, empirical specification follows the pure spatial
approach, similar to that discussed in Dustmann, Schönberg and Stuhler (2016).
Here, low-skilled immigrant share is out of low-skilled, rather than total labor, as the
theoretical model studies the importance of immigrant labor within the low-skilled
labor composite,14 and first difference of offshoring is added.15 The specification has
the following form:
∆ln(wagezg) = bg + bimmg ∆immsharez + boffg ∆offexpz + zg,
where ∆ is decadal change (1990-2000), ln(wagezg) is the average manufacturing
(log)wage of natives of group g (skill group, task intensity group, etc.) in commuting
zone z, immsharez16 is the immigrant share of domestic (low-skilled) labor in the
commuting zone, offexpz is the offshoring exposure in CZ (defined further below),
and zg are potentially heteroskedastic errors.17
To estimate the potential interactive effect, we modify the equation above, ob-
14It is worth mentioning that the results are similar with either measure.
15Additionally, since there are only two periods and first difference is taken, there is no additional
group-specific time trend (other than the constant).
16defined as MzMz+Nz , where M and N are immigrant and native numbers in CZ, respectively.17Errors could also be potentially correlated–for example, within state. In practice clustering
errors within state led to lower standard errors, suggesting a potentially negative correlation within
clusters. On the other hand, the number of census divisions, at 9, is too small. We, therefore, do
not cluster standard errors.
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taining
∆ln(wagezg) = b˜g+b˜immg ∆immsharez+b˜offg ∆offexpz+ηg(∆immsharez∗∆offexpz)+˜zg.
Thus, bimmg , boffg , and ηg are the main coefficients of interest in analyzing the joint ef-
fect of immigration and offshoring on native wages. There is a number of estimation
concerns to address, including measurement, potential endogeneity, and robustness.
Measurement
The measures of immigration and offshoring should be such that they adequately
estimate the effects of the two processes on native wages and are sufficiently close to
the relevant expressions in the theory section. Equation (B12) expresses native wage
elasticity with respect to immigrant share. In the empirical specification above, wage
is still estimated as a percent change, while the change in immigrant share is in the
form of percentage points, thus making it not identical but similar to the relevant
expression in the theory section. This way of defining immigrant share change is
more in line with the literature, and the alternative of a “percent change” in the
share would be subject to a severe scale effect. Potential endogeneity of this measure
is addressed further below.
Measuring offshoring is more challenging. Offshoring refers to conducting part
of the production process abroad. This has normally been done either through ana-
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lyzing intermediate imports or employment of affiliates of multinational enterprises,
or, in some cases, by defining occupational “offshorability”–job characteristics that
make it easier or more feasible to perform abroad without significant loss of quality.
We use a measure of offshoring rather than offshorability here, as using information
on actual offshoring employment changes arguably brings one closer to measuring
what we understand as offshoring than characteristics that suggest potential off-
shoring, or “offshorability.” Perhaps the most common measure of the latter is an
index by Blinder and Krueger (2013), and the evidence for presence of any labor
market consequences of it is mixed: Blinder and Krueger (2013) do not find evidence
that any of the measures of offshorability they consider affect wages or probability
of layoff, while Goos, Manning and Salomons (2014) look at the effects of routiness
and offshorability on labor demand, and find that the former decreases labor demand
but the latter has no independent effect when controlling for routiness; in contrast,
Burstein et al. (2017) find that tradability of occupations affects how natives respond
to immigration. Relatedly to the latter, it has been shown that certain job charac-
teristics that are associated with offshorability (such as routiness and interactivity)
influence the effect of imputed/actual measures of offshoring exposure on labor mar-
ket outcomes; that is, rather than being used as measures of offshoring themselves,
they are used as measures of vulnerability to offshoring (or other shocks) in addition
to other offshoring measures, which is similar to what we do here (when we measure
effects for occupations with varying task intensities).
Since change in β in the theoretical model represents increase in the share of
employment offshored, we operationalize this by using employment by affiliates of
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multinational enterprises to find offshoring exposure measure (as do Ottaviano, Peri
and Wright (2013) and Olney (2012)), rather than intermediate input share. Except
for a few firm-level studies and “offshorability” measures, offshoring exposure is usu-
ally derived from industry-level data, which is then proportionally allocated either
to occupation or region. In our case, CZ level offshoring exposure is calculated as
a the sum of national industry-level offshoring exposure weighted by local industry
share in manufacturing; specifically, offshoring exposure is defined as
Offexpzt =
∑
u
[Duz,t
Dz,t
∗ Out
Ddt +Out
],
where Out is offshore employment in industry u in year t, and Duz,t is domestic em-
ployment in industry u and commuting zone z.18
Endogeneity
Immigrant choice of location may not be exogenous to labor market conditions, as
low-skilled immigrants, unlike natives, are quite mobile (Cadena and Kovak (2016)),
and move to locations of positive labor demand shock. To address this problem, we
use the shift-share instrument throughout, which allocates immigrant flow to specific
CZs based on preexisting immigrant enclaves and national level immigrant flows by
18This is an imperfect measure and relies on the proportionality assumption (similar rates of
offshoring for industries in different locations), but is common in the literature (including Olney
(2012)).
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origin group, before aggregating over origin groups (similar to Ottaviano, Peri and
Wright (2013)). Specifically, the instrument for immigrant share is constructed as
follows (for those without bachelor’s degree). First, predicted number of immigrants
from each large region of origin (out of 10 regions) in year t (we end up mostly
looking at 1990-2000, partly because the instrument is no longer strong after 2000)
is calculated based on the share of all immigrants from region r in CZ z in 1980 and
growth rate in the group r in the rest of the country (z−); these numbers are then
summed over all regions, i.e.
Mˆzt =
∑
r
Mˆrzt =
∑
r
[Mrz,1980 + (Mrtz− −Mr,1980,z−)Mrz,1980
Mr,1980
].
Validity of this instruments relies on it affecting immigrant share change, but not
other factors that may affect wages.
Because offshoring exposure change may be both due to national industry-level
offshoring change as well as CZ industrial composition change, endogeneity concerns
of a different kind than in the case of immigration may arise. Here, a productivity
shock at the CZ level that is not industry-specific is not expected to be correlated with
offshoring exposure change. However, if a negative CZ-industry productivity shock 1)
leads to lower industry employment, 2) happens in a low-offshoring (high-offshoring)
industry and 3) the industry is large enough to affect overall wages, then higher
(lower) offshoring would be spuriously correlated with lower (higher) wages. Because
of the above concern, we instrument for offshoring using initial period industrial
distribution, so offshoring exposure change is only driven by national industry-level
41
offshoring exposure change. Specifically,
̂Offexpzt = ∑
u
[Duz,t=1990
Dz,t=1990
∗ Out
Ddt +Out
].
Consequently, instrumented offshoring exposure change is driven by national
industry-level offshoring changes, which are likely uncorrelated with local labor
market area demand shocks.19 They can, however, be potentially correlated with
industry-level import competition change or productivity shocks, which we address
below. Lastly, to instrument for the product of immigration and offshoring, we use
the product of their instruments.
Robustness Checks
In addition to the main specficiation, we conduct several robustness checks, in-
cluding additional controls and alternative definitions of immigration and offshoriong.
First, since cheaper offshoring may be a result of tariff reduction or industry specific
shock, it may be correlated with increased imports of final goods, and greater off-
shoring exposure change may be associated with greater import penetration; for this
reason, in robustness checks, we include import penetration controls. Specifically,
we focus on imports from China, and use import penetration change estimates from
19Because after 1999 offshore employment is provided using NAICS classification and before–SIC
(Standard Industrial Classification), we convert NAICS-based estimates into SIC industries.
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Acemoglu et al. (2016), defined as ∆IPCZzt =
∑
d
Lzd,1991
Lz,1991
∆IPdt, where Lzd,1991Lz,1991 is the
industry d share of CZ employment in 1991, IPdt is industry d import competition
change (1991-1999), ∆IPdt =
∆MUCd,t
Yd,91+Md,91−Ed,91 , where ∆M
UC
d,t is change in imports
from China over the period (1991-1999) in industry d, and the denominator is the
initial absorption measure (ind. shipments+imports-exports). We use the instru-
ment based on imports from China on the part of 8 other high income countries
(from Acemoglu et al. (2016)).
Next, in case CZ offshoring exposure change is correlated with local labor de-
mand shocks because of initial industrial composition,20 we include control for labor
demand shocks using a “Bartik” instrument (from Basso and Peri (2015)). Bar-
tik control for growth in labor productivity (labor demand) predicts productivity
growth based on national industry-level growth and initial composition; it is defined
as Bartikzt =
∑
d(shareemplzd,1970∆lnwagedt), where share
empl
zd,1970 is the initial employ-
ment share of industry d in commuting zone z and ∆lnwagedt is the national wage
growth from 1970. Lastly, we control for a number of demographic factors, although
they may be endogenous due to push factors out of manufacturing being correlated
with wages and also demographic characteristics, which is why we do not include
them in the main specification.
Another robustness check entails using an alternative definition of offshoring–
employment of majority-owned enterprises, since employment of all affiliate (includ-
ing arm’s-length) enterprises may be overestimating the total change in offshoring
20For example, if industries that experience large offshoring increase also experience large labor
productivity shocks.
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exposure (although, in practice, the two measures are very close), and trade with
arm’s-length affiliates may be different than with majority-owned ones. Additionally
and relatedly, additional robustness check uses parent-based industry classification
(instead of affiliate-based used in the main specification) to measure offshoring. The
effect may be different if the local industry is engaging in offshoring rather than being
offshored; in practice, a lot of offshoring is intra-industry when industry definition is
sufficiently coarse and parent- and affiliate-based measures are very close.
The next robustness check uses an alternative definition of immigration change,
one standardized by initial employment. One potential criticism of using immigrant
share change is that it includes native worker number in the denominator, which
may be affected by local demand shocks that also affect wages. An alternative
approach is to define ∆imm_standz = ∆Mz/(Mz,t−1 + Nz,t−1), a change in the
number of immigrants divided by lagged employment to take out potential native
outflow, although, as mentioned, native mobility response to labor demand shocks is
generally limited.
We primarily focus on manufacturing since it is subject to overwhelmingly greater
extent of offshoring, but we broaden the scope in the last three variations on the main
specification. Specifically, we use immigrant share change with respect to the entire
CZ employment, rather than manufacturing, as this way movement (of natives) out of
manufacturing is less likely to confound interpretation. Additionally, we investigate
whether wage effects for the entire CZ are different compared to just manufacturing.
Lastly, we incorporate non-manufacturing offshoring in measuring offshoring expo-
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sure to see if the results are robust to a much broader measure of offshoring.
Native vs. Immigrant Task Intensity of Offshoring
Since the channel through which offshoring may enhance the effect of immigra-
tion on native wages is through increasing immigrant wage share, we test for this
explicitly. Specifically, we look at whether offshoring impacts change in immigrant
wage share:
∆immwagesharez = bo + γo∆offexpz + oz, (B14)
where immwagesharez is the immigrant share of all low-skilled labor payments.
1.3.2 Data
Measures of wages by education level, wage percentiles, and by task characteris-
tics are calculated based on data from the U.S. Census and American Community
Survey (from IPUMS). We focus on hourly wages, imputed by dividing annual earn-
ings by the product of the number of weeks worked and usual weekly hours of work,
to avoid capturing employment intensity effect. The universe of individuals includes
workers with positive income, aged between 18 and 65, not in group quarters and
working at least 30 hours a week (not part-time workers). Cognitive and communica-
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tion task intensity of occupations is from O*NET. “Communication” task intensity
score for the occupation is the average population-weighted percentile (among oc-
cupations) of the importance of “Oral Comprehension,” “Written Comprehension,”
“Oral Expression,” and “Written Expression” in the occupation; the analog for “cog-
nitive” score is calculated using questions on several cognitive abilities.21 Manual,
routine, and abstract task intensity of occupations is from Autor and Dorn (2013),
who use Dictionary of Occupational Titles to calculate relevant occupational scores.
Specifically, data on EYEHAND (eye, hand, foot coordination) requirements op-
erationalizes manual task intensity score, STS (adaptability to work requiring set
limits, tolerances, or standards) and FINGDEX (finger dexterity)–routine score, and
DCP (direction, control, and planning of activities) and GED-MATH (quantitative
reasoning requirements)–abstract score.
The time frame for empirical estimation is 1990-2000, because this was a period of
large growth in immigration and offshoring, both in terms of employment shares and
numbers, driven by macro-level, locally-exogenous factors (additionally, instrument
for immigration, crucial for analysis, is no longer strong after 2000). Immigrant
shares within CZs are calculated using data from U.S. Census for 1980, 1990, and
2000, and from American Community Survey beyond 2000 (all from IPUMS). Public
Use Microdata Area-based data is aggregated up to CZs.22
Raw offshoring data comes from Bureau of Economic Analysis Activities of Multi-
21“Fluency of Ideas,” “Originality,” “Problem Sensitivity,” “Deductive Reasoning,” “Inductive
Reasoning,” “Information Ordering,” “Category Flexibility,” “Mathematical Reasoning,” “Number
Facility” and “Memorization.”
22using crosswalk from Autor and Dorn (2013).
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national Enterprises, 23 where it is provided at the industry level. The main specifi-
cation uses all non-bank affiliate employment based on affiliate industry; the latter
is provided at the most disaggregated level, which allows most accurate crosswalk
between NAICS-based offshoring in 2000 and SIC-based industries used in 1990, em-
ployed for the instrument. In robustness checks we also use offshoring calculated
from parent-based industries and only majority-owned (which tends to not change
results).
1.3.3 Descriptive Statistics
Figure 1.1 shows change in manufacturing, non-manufacturing and overall off-
shoring exposure over time. The graph makes it clear that at a sectoral level off-
shoring is mainly a manufacturing sector phenomenon. Whereas manufacturing off-
shoring exposure grew from 18% in 1990 to 22% in 2000 and over 30% in 2014,
non-manufacturing offshoring share at the same points was 3%, 5% and 9%. The
difference is likely because a lot of services are local and/or require interpersonal con-
tact, and thus cannot be offshored without severe loss of quality. This is the main
reason for focusing on the manufacturing sector. Importantly, while many manufac-
turing industries saw offshoring exposure growth between 1990 and 2000, this process
did not affect all industries equally, and there is a large variation in offshoring change
over this period (Table 1.1), with some industries even seeing a decline (petroleum,
23BEA data before 2009 is for non-bank majority owned affiliates; all vs non-bank makes a trivial
or no difference in employment values in large manufacturing industries.
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for example, which saw new sources opening in the U.S.). This varying change in
offshoring exposure growth across industries is likely unrelated to CZ-level shocks,
creating an opportunity to exploit it for identification purposes.
Figure 1.2 shows that immigrant share for all skill levels is higher in manufactur-
ing, and while it increased overall, it did so slightly more in manufacturing. Table 1.2
shows native and immigrant shares of domestic employment. Total immigrant share
of employment increased from 0.07 in 1980 to 0.09 in 1990, 0.13 in 2000 and 0.17 in
2014. Meanwhile, the share of foreign-born in manufacturing increased from 0.08 in
1980 to 0.11 in 1990, 0.16 in 2000 and 0.19 in 2014. Thus, immigration increase was
largest in the 1990s and especially in manufacturing, further motivating the selection
of the sector and time frame for analysis.
Figure 1.3 illustrates the change in employment numbers rather than shares. To-
tal domestic manufacturing employment went from 20.6 million in 1990 to 19.2 in
2000 and 14.9 in 2014. On the other hand, offshore employment increased from 4.6
million in 1990 to 5.5 in 2000 and over 6.6 in 2014. A somewhat different pattern is
observed for immigration. Total (low-skilled) immigrant employment in manufactur-
ing increased from less than 2 million to 2.5 between 1990 to 2000, but decreased to
2 million by 2014, despite the fact that immigrant share of domestic manufacturing
labor grew throughout. Since we are interesting in studying the effect of immigra-
tion-driven increase in immigrant share in manufacturing, this reinforces the idea
that studying increase in immigration in manufacturing is more appropriate before
2000 than after. The likely reason behind the decrease in immigrant employment
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in manufacturing after 2000 is that despite continued immigration into the country
(as shown in the growth in immigrant number in non-manufacturing), trade shocks,
primarily driven by China entering the WTO, together with technological change de-
creased demand for both domestic and immigrant workers. Interestingly, while the
number of workers in manufacturing without college education decreased since 1990,
the number of those with college education remained virtually the same (Figure 1.3)
suggesting jobs losses primarily affected the low-skilled, decreasing native low-skilled
share of all manufacturing jobs even further (Figure 1.7).
We next illustrate the geographic distribution of offshoring and immigration ex-
posure in 2000 as well as change in exposure from 1990 to 2000 (Figure 1.8, Figure
1.9, Figure 1.10, Figure 1.11). The figures show that there is a great deal of variation
in geographic exposure to immigration and offshoring: whereas Appalachia saw large
increases in both immigration and offshoring, Southwest mainly experienced large
increase in immigration and several commuting zones in the Northwest and Rockies
were subject to growing offshoring exposure only,24 while some CZs throughout the
country saw little change in either. This provides useful geographic variation to ex-
ploit for empirical analysis. It is also useful to note that the geographic correlation
between immigrant share change and offshoring exposure change is close to 0, at
-0.007, which is consistent with the two processes being driven by different non-local
factors, and one process not significantly affecting the other.
24Offshoring exposure change was much more decentralized than what was documented for trade
by Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013) who showed trade exposure grew above the median rate mainly
in the Midwest and areas east and northeast of Midwest.
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Lastly, Table 1.3 shows average decadal changes in the variables used for re-
gressions. It is notable that the wages of those with at most high-school education
increased by only about 1% (the table shows changes in log wages), while wages of
those with some college education increased by 4% and those with completed college
education–9%. Most cognitive-intensive, communication-intensive and abstract oc-
cupations also saw slightly higher wage growth than others. We should also note that
wages of those in most manual intensive occupations–those at greatest competition
with low-skilled immigrants–increased at less than half the rate of those in least man-
ual intensive ones (4% compared to 9%). On the other hand, workers who are seen
as closest substitutes for offshore workers–those in the most routine occupations–saw
changes generally not different from those in least routine occupations (at 7%). We
approach the question of causal effect of immigration and offshoring on wages of
various native groups in the next section.
1.4 Results
We begin by presenting OLS and 2SLS results for the main specification without
and with the interaction term. Column 1 in Table 1.5 shows that without instrument-
ing immigration exposure change does not have a statistically significant effect on
wages of natives with less than bachelor’s degree, while offshoring tends to increase
them. In column 2 we show 2SLS results, using the instruments for immigration and
offshoring described earlier (with the first stage shown in Table 1.4). First stage Wald
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F-statistic of 152.5 suggests rejecting weak instrument hypothesis. As is common in
the literature, 2SLS results suggest that OLS estimate of immigration effect on native
wages is likely upward-biased, as it decreases from statistically insignificant -0.05 to
significant -.5 in 2SLS. This means a 0.5 percent decrease in low-skilled native wages
for a 0.01 point increase in low-skilled immigrant labor share (or 1 percentage point
increase in percent of immigrants in low-skilled labor). This also suggests that price
or labor supply effect, which is negative, dominates the positive productivity effect.
To compare our estimated result to the literature, the average elasticity of native
low-skilled workers with respect change in immigrant share in Longhi, Nijkamp and
Poot (2005) meta-analysis is -0.2; it does, however, include all immigrants (inclusive
of high-skilled) and incorporates studies using small geographic areas, which tend
to see lower impact due to outmigration, as well as studies that do not instrument
for immigrant share. In any case, the estimated coefficient here is not statistically
different from -0.2, suggesting that the average estimated effect is in line with general
findings in the literature of a negative but small effect of immigration on wages of
low-skilled natives.
In contrast to immigration, the coefficient on offshoring becomes more positive,
increasing from 0.3 to 0.6 (the difference not being statistically significant), further
testifying to the productivity effect being dominant for offshoring. Given that Olney
(2012) is the closest study to this one in terms of estimating the effect of offshoring
on native wages, and it finds a positive effect of offshoring to low-income countries
but the opposite for high-income, the result is consistent with change in offshoring
to low-income countries dominating change in offshoring to high-income countries,
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which is possible, given that offshoring to low-income countries increased by more
than offshoring to high-income during the period.
Column 3 in Table 1.5 adds the interaction term. Interpreting OLS specification
results with caution, since we know at least immigration share variable is likely en-
dogenous, we observe that the coefficients on both immigration and offshoring are
positive. The coefficients on the level terms are not very informative, however, since
they estimate the effect of one variable, when the other is 0, which rarely happens,
since per descriptive statistics in Table 1.3, 0 is almost 2 standard deviations below
offshoring change mean and 1.5 standard deviations below immigration mean. In
this specification we are primarily interested in the interaction term, which is nega-
tive, at -9, and highly statistically significant. Column 4 provides 2SLS results with
the interaction term. First stage Wald F-statistic of 52.7 suggests the instruments
are strong. The coefficient on the interaction term is again negative, but is larger
in magnitude, at -32, which means that with a 0.01 increase in offshoring exposure
change the effect of immigration on native wages decreases by 0.32. Given the neg-
ative effect of immigration found in the specification without the interaction term,
offshoring making the effect of immigration more negative is consistent with model
scenario of offshoring reinforcing the effect of immigration via increasing immigrant
wage share.
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1.4.1 Independent Immigration and Offshoring Effects
We next look at the effects of immigration and offshoring at the same time on
wages of natives by education level. The upper panel of Table 1.6 illustrates that the
effect of immigration is most negative on those least educated. Wages of natives with
at most high school education decrease by around 0.7 percent for a 1 percentage point
increase in low-skilled immigrant share of CZ employment. For the same immigrant
share change, wages of natives with less than college education decrease by 0.5. The
effect becomes progressively less negative with higher education, and the coefficient
is negative and insignificant for those with some college education and positive and
insignificant for those with completed college education. This is consistent with
immigrants with less than college education being closest substitutes for natives
with high school education or less and price effect dominating. In contrast, offshoring
increases wages of those with less than college education by 0.6 and those with high-
school or less by 0.7, with no effect on those with some college or above. This, again,
indicates that productivity effect dominates for offshoring, and that offshoring more
strongly affects the low- and medium-skilled workers, who are likely to be part of the
factor whose tasks are being offshored.
In panel B of Table 1.6 we turn to a different proxy for skill–wage percentiles. A
one percentage point increase in low-skilled immigrants’ share of employment leads
to 1.2 percent reduction in 10th wage percentile, 0.6 percent reduction in the 25th
percentile and an increase of 0.4 and 0.5 in 75th and 90th percentiles, indicating,
again, negative price effect dominating for the low-skilled. The positive effect on
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the high-skilled is likely a result of the favorable change in factor ratio. Offshoring
exposure increases wages of 25th and 50th percentiles among natives, corroborating
the presence of the strongest effect on the low- and medium-skilled.
We next look at how task characteristics of workers affect the way they are
impacted by immigration and offshoring. Panels C and D present results by routine,
manual, abstract, cognitive and communication intensity. It is evident that the
most routine, most manual, least abstract, cognitive and communication-intensive
occupations are more strongly affected by immigration, seeing an effect size of about
-0.6 to -0.7. This is consistent with workers in jobs with these task intensities being
more likely to compete with immigrant workers, which echoes findings from Peri and
Sparber (2009) and Peri and Sparber (2011). These task intensity groups are also
most subject to the effect of offshoring, which ranges from 0.6 to almost 1, which
is consistent with the literature findings of greatest offshoring effect on the most
routine, although the sign in other empirical works varies and is often negative at
least on some types of offshoring (Ebenstein et al. (2014),Baumgarten, Geishecker
and Görg (2013)), suggesting productivity effect on most routine workers dominates
in the context studied here but maybe not in others.25
25It is worth pointing out that part of the reason for the positive effect of offshoring may also be
the selective employment effect, where the least productive workers (hence, the lowest paid) drop
out of manufacturing.
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1.4.2 Interactive Effect
Table 1.7 tests whether offshoring reinforces, mitigates or has no impact on how
immigration impacts native wages for different native groups. The upper panel shows
estimation results for the specification with the interaction term by education level.
It reveals that there is a negative interactive effect on groups with less than college
education. The point estimate of the interaction term is -0.32 on average for those
with less than college education. This means that for a 1 percentage point increase
in offshoring the effect of immigration becomes more negative by 0.32; consequently,
going from offshoring exposure change of 1 standard deviation below mean (0.02)
to 1 standard deviation above (0.08) decreases immigration effect from 0.55 (1.19-
0.32*2) to -1.37 (1.19-0.32*8). Figure 1.12 illustrates the extent to which interactive
effect matters graphically–it shows the effect of immigration on wages of natives
with less than college education ranges from positive and significant to negative and
significant, depending on the extent of offshoring. The interaction term is even more
negative for those with less than high school education and less negative for those
with some college, but is not statistically significant for college graduates.
Similar estimates arise from using wage percentiles as skill proxies, with the in-
teraction term coefficient decreasing from -40 to -24 going from 10th to 90th. These
results are further reinforced in the lower two panels. The interactive effect of off-
shoring and immigration on the most manual occupations is almost twice that on
the least (-42 compared to -23). Slightly smaller but still large differences are present
between least and most routine and least and most abstract occupations. Similarly,
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the most cognitive and communication-intensive occupations are least subject to the
negative interactive effect.
Table 1.8 demonstrates one consequence of the unequal effects across skill/wage
spectrum. The table presents effects on the ratio of 90th to 10th wage percentile,
the spread between the tails; 75th to 25th percentile, the spread in the middle; 90th
to 50th, upper-tail spread; and 50th to 10th, lower tail spread. A monotonically
more negative effect of immigration on lowest skilled workers as measured by wage
percentile leads to increasing polarization. Additionally, the last column shows the
effect on the ratio of wages of college-educated to non-college-educated workers. By
all 5 measures, (low-skilled) immigration increases polarization, the lower tail more
so than the upper tail. Offshoring, on the other hand, slightly decreases the spread,
particularly in the upper tail. When it comes to the interactive effect of immigra-
tion and offshoring (lower panel), offshoring tends to increase the extent to which
immigration increases polarization, but mainly for the upper tail, as well as the wage
difference between those with college education and those without.
1.4.3 Additional Results and Robustness Checks
Offshoring Task Intensity
The negative interactive effect suggests that offshoring reinforces the negative
effect of immigration, consistent with the model prediction in case of offshoring in-
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creasing immigrant wage share. It is useful, then, to asses whether offshoring does
seem to increase immigrant wage share, which we address in Table 1.9. The results
tend to confirm this prediction. We look at the effects of offshoring on immigrant
wage share in manufacturing and all industries (since later on we also use immigrant
share with respect to all CZ employment) separately, and estimate the impact for
different subgroups of the low-skilled, with and without instruments for offshoring.
The results suggest that a 1 percentage increase in offshoring exposure increases im-
migrant wage share by between 0.2-0.5 percentage points, depending on specification.
Additional Controls
Since the instrument for offshoring is based on local industrial composition and
national industry-level changes in offshoring exposure, it may fail the exclusion re-
striction if national industry-level offshoring exposure is correlated with factors that
may also affect wages. In particular, there is a potential problem if greater import
exposure/competition change is positively correlated with offshoring change and also
affects native wage changes. This may happen, since factors that promote import
competition such as lower wages or higher productivity in a given industry abroad or
lower tariffs within and industry may stimulate both offshoring and non-offshoring
imports. On the other hand, improvements in communication technology may be
more important for trade in tasks, where control over the production process abroad
and coordination with tasks performed at home are paramount, than for trade in fi-
nal goods. Since import competition tends to decrease native wages (Ebenstein et al.
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(2014)), if instrumented offshoring were to be positively correlated with it, it would
be downward biased, and the actual positive wage effect of offshoring would be even
greater. More importantly, the interaction term estimate would also be biased. To
test this, we explicitly control for import competition in the first panel of Table 1.10.
The results are very similar to those in Table 1.7, which does not control for imports,
suggesting that it is unlikely that omitting import competition biases results. The
cofficient on the import competition variable itself is generally negative and small,
and is only marginally statistically significant for the college-educated natives.
Another possible reason for the instrument exclusion restriction to fail is if na-
tional industry-level offshoring exposure change is correlated with industry-level pro-
ductivity shocks. If the correlation is positive, since higher labor productivity leads
to higher wages, offshoring estimate from previous specifications would be biased
upwards, and the interaction term would be biased as well. To address this issue, we
add labor demand shocks proxy, a “Bartik” instrument as in Basso and Peri (2015),
in the second panel of Table 1.10. The results, again, remain similar. The coeffi-
cient on Bartik instrument itself is positive and highly statistically significant, as is
expected from a positive demand shock instrument.
Next, in Table 1.11, we include a variety of demographic controls, including av-
erage age, share male, black, single, college educated, Asian and Hispanic. Higher
average age, share male, college educated, and Asian tend to increase wages, while
share Hispanic tends to decrease them. The main outcome of interest, becomes
slightly smaller, but is comparable in magnitude and is still highly statistically sig-
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nificant. However, since manufacturing saw a significant labor exit during the period
of analysis, and exit out of manufacturing is non-random, with demographic inci-
dence that also has repercussions for wages, it is possible that one or more of these
variables are endogenous, which is why we do not include them in the main specifi-
cation. This point also highlights the fact that even though mobility between large
sectors and between CZs is limited, it does exist, as does movement into unemploy-
ment, so the estimated wage effects are after these potential adjustments.
Alternative Offshoring Measures
Next, since there is more than one way to define relevant offshore employment,
we explore whether using alternative measures makes a difference for the results.
In particular, since we include all non-bank employment, inclusive of arm’s length
affiliates, this may not be most representative of more narrowly defined offshoring–
imports from majority-owned affiliates (although in practice the two measures pro-
duce similar offshoring exposure estimates). We use the latter definition and present
results in the first column of the upper panel in Table 1.12; the estimates indicate
that the interactive effect is similar to that in the main specification.
Another possibility is that attributing affiliates to industries based on affiliate
industry classification may be different from parent-based industry classification. In
theory, parent-based classification is more closely associated with industry engaging
in offshoring rather than being offshored. In practice, at the 2-digit SIC level of
analysis, a lot of offshoring is intra-industry, and affiliate-based measures are very
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close to parent-based. Column 2 of Table 1.12 shows that this alternative definition
produces similar results to the main specification.
Alternative Immigration Measure
The next robustness check entails using an alternative definition of immigration,
one that uses a change in the number of immigrants divided by lagged employment to
take out potential native outflow; the issue with the latter is that it may be correlated
with negative labor demand shocks that also affect wages (and not are not fully
captured by “Bartik” labor demand shock instrument), although native outflow is
generally limited at the level of analysis used here (and was more limited before 2000
than after). The third column of the upper panel of Table 1.12 shows that the sign of
the coefficient on the interaction term is maintained, and it increases in magnitude,
but the estimates become more noisy and are not statistically significant; part of
the reason for the latter may be that it is the immigrant labor share change that
interacts with offshoring (per the theoretical model), rather than the standardized
change calculated here. Nevertheless, although noisy, this result is generally in line
with the other results.
Lastly, in the lower panel of Table 1.12 we use measures of immigration, wages
and offshoring that include non-manufacturing industries. The first column of the
lower panel uses immigrant labor share in the entire commuting zone. While mo-
bility between non-manufacturing and manufacturing is limited, it may still play a
role in equilibrating local labor markets, and immigrant labor share in the entire CZ
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may matter differently (than within manufacturing); additionally, immigrant share
in manufacturing is generally very similar to overall CZ share, and using the latter
may decrease the problem of native outflow from manufacturing. The coefficient on
the interaction term is slightly larger in size than in the main specification and is
statistically significant, corroborating the main results. In column 2 of the lower
panel we look at the effects on overall commuting zone wages, not just those in man-
ufacturing, since part of the adjustment to trade and immigration shocks is switching
to jobs outside of manufacturing. Here, too, the main results are echoed. Lastly, we
calculate a measure of offshoring based on all the industries, not just manufacturing.
While the results become very noisy, perhaps because non-manufacturing offshoring
cannot be measured as accurately, the sign and size of the coefficient remains com-
parable to previous results.
1.5 Conclusion
The labor market implications of immigration and offshoring have been of inter-
est to researchers, policy makers and the public for quite some time. While there
is a fair amount that is known about the impacts of the two and is not controver-
sial, other consequences are debated and some important questions have not been
addressed at all. An important aspect of the growing knowledge about the conse-
quences of these processes is the increasing understanding of the heterogeneity of
impact depending on native an foreign worker characteristics, occupation and indus-
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try type, and other factors. In this study, we show that an important source of the
heterogeneity of immigration effect is the extent of offshoring exposure. By analyzing
the effects of immigration and offshoring jointly, looking at the effects on workers of
different skill levels and task specialization, and focusing on local labor market area
effects, we provide a novel contribution to the literature–we find a negative interac-
tive effect between immigration and offshoring, whereby greater levels of offshoring
exposure reinforce the negative effects of low-skilled immigration on the low-skilled
native workers. The effect is especially salient for those least educated, those in the
lowest wage percentiles, and those in the most routine, most manual, least abstract,
less cognitive and less communication-intensive occupations in manufacturing (and,
tentatively, across all industries within the commuting zone). In estimation, we use
plausibly exogenous instruments that rely on pre-period immigrant settlement pat-
terns and industrial composition, and the main results are robust to controlling for
local labor demand shocks and import competition as well as to alternative def-
initions of immigration and offshoring shocks. In addition to evidence of negative
interactive effect of immigration and offshoring on native wages, we provide estimates
of the average immigration and offshoring effects on native wages, with immigration
decreasing and offshoring increasing low-skilled wages, but with little effect on the
high-skilled. Potential economic mechanisms behind the empirical results can be
understood using the theoretical model developed.
The theoretical model developed provides potential explanation for both the av-
erage effects of immigration and offshoring and the interactive effect. Specifically, a
task-based model that allows complete and incomplete offshoring of native and im-
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migrant tasks provides several insights. First, increase in low-skilled immigrant labor
increases the composite low-skilled labor input, which, in turn, decreases marginal
product of labor and composite labor price, and consequently, native wages. At the
same time, immigrant labor leads to more specialization on the part of natives in
tasks in which they have comparative advantage, increasing wages. The balance of
the latter productivity effect and the former price effect determines the net effect of
immigration on low-skilled native wages. Empirical results suggest the price effect
dominates. This net effect is reinforced by higher immigrant wage share. Labor
wage share, in turn, is a function of relative wages, which depend on average com-
parative advantage of immigrants compared to natives. If offshoring affects natives
relatively more than immigrants, it reduces average comparative advantage of na-
tives and increases average immigrant comparative advantage and wage share. This
way, offshoring increases the elasticity of native wage response to immigration, pro-
ducing the negative interactive effect estimated. As an additional confirmation of
this mechanism, we find empirically that offshoring is likely native task intensive, as
it increases immigrant wage share. Lastly, the model shows that the average effect
of offshoring on native wages depends on the relative magnitudes of its price and
productivity effects, with the empirical results suggesting the latter dominates.
These findings suggest that there are reasons for researchers and policy makers
alike to analyze the effects of immigration and offshoring together, rather than sepa-
rately, and to take into account the extent of one when predicting the impact of the
other. In particular, whereas we find that immigration reduces wages of low-skilled
natives and offshoring reinforces this effect on average across all commuting zones,
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the theoretical model suggests that this need not be the case for every individual
commuting zone: immigration can increase native wages in a given CZ if the pro-
ductivity effect dominates there, while offshoring may mitigate immigration effect in
some CZs if it is more immigrant task intensive there. This study provides both the
estimates of how immigration and offshoring interact in affecting wages of low-skilled
workers on average across all commuting zones, and the rational for why this effect
may be heterogeneous across different labor markets.
It is worth acknowledging one of limitations of the model and empirical analysis,
which is that while we assume no employment effect, it is part of the adjustment to
labor supply and trade shocks. Hence, the role employment (especially, exit out of
labor force) plays in the interactive effect of offshoring and immigration on native
labor market outcomes warrants being part of a more comprehensive analysis. We
leave this question for future research.
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Table 1.1: Offshoring Exposure: Affiliate Industry-Based (Emp. in ’000)
Indname SIC Domestic Employment Offshoring Exposure
1990 2000 1990 2000
Food 200 1453 1546 0.24 0.32
Tobacco 210 40 29 0.59 0.68
Textiles and Apparel 220.5 1682 1114 0.05 0.12
Wood & Furniture 240.5 1217 1336 0.04 0.05
Paper and Allied 260 631 603 0.21 0.22
Printing and Publishing 270 1552 1521 0.02 0.07
Chemicals 280 864 830 0.4 0.43
Petroleum 290 113 108 0.68 0.35
Rubber and Plastics 300 883 1060 0.15 0.14
Glass and Stone 320 523 525 0.16 0.14
Primary Metals 330 723 689 0.09 0.13
Fabricated Metals 340 1483 1568 0.1 0.09
Industrial Machinery 350 1922 1893 0.23 0.23
Electrical Equipment 360 1557 1508 0.31 0.36
Transportation Equipment 370 1798 1568 0.33 0.39
Instruments and Related 380 966 792 0.17 0.18
Other Manuf. 390 512 448 0.11 0.14
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Table 1.2: Employment Number and Share by Education and Origin
All Industries Manufacturing
1980 1990 2000 2010 2014 1980 1990 2000 2010 2014
Share
All Native 0.935 0.908 0.867 0.835 0.831 0.921 0.893 0.841 0.812 0.813
Foreign 0.065 0.092 0.133 0.165 0.169 0.079 0.107 0.159 0.188 0.187
HS Native 0.932 0.891 0.826 0.765 0.760 0.918 0.878 0.809 0.763 0.763
Foreign 0.068 0.109 0.174 0.235 0.240 0.082 0.122 0.191 0.237 0.237
Lcol Native 0.761 0.693 0.629 0.558 0.541 0.816 0.749 0.69 0.613 0.607
Foreign 0.052 0.07 0.098 0.116 0.114 0.069 0.089 0.128 0.139 0.137
Scol Native 0.946 0.935 0.916 0.895 0.894 0.937 0.928 0.908 0.894 0.894
Foreign 0.054 0.065 0.084 0.105 0.106 0.063 0.072 0.092 0.106 0.106
Col Native 0.174 0.215 0.238 0.276 0.29 0.104 0.144 0.152 0.198 0.207
Foreign 0.013 0.021 0.035 0.05 0.054 0.011 0.018 0.031 0.049 0.05
MA Native 0.871 0.888 0.842 0.821 0.810 0.818 0.825 0.745 0.689 0.701
Foreign 0.129 0.113 0.158 0.179 0.190 0.182 0.175 0.255 0.311 0.299
Employment (millions)
All All 84.7 101.2 116.3 117.7 122.9 22.0 20.6 19.2 14.4 14.9
Native 79.2 91.9 100.8 98.3 102.1 20.3 18.4 16.2 11.7 12.1
Foreign 5.5 9.3 15.5 19.4 20.8 1.7 2.2 3.1 2.7 2.8
Lcol Native 64.4 70.2 73.2 65.7 66.5 18.0 15.4 13.3 8.8 9.1
Foreign 4.4 7.1 11.4 13.7 14.0 1.5 1.8 2.5 2.0 2.0
Col Native 14.7 21.8 27.7 32.5 35.6 2.3 3.0 2.9 2.8 3.1
Foreign 1.1 2.1 4.1 5.9 6.6 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.7
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Table 1.3: Regression Tables Descriptive Statistics (1990-2000 Change)
Variable N Mean SD Min Max
Wages (HS or Less) 741 0.01 0.07 -0.5 0.24
Wages (Some College) 741 0.04 0.06 -0.66 0.59
Wages (Less than College) 741 0.03 0.06 -0.55 0.35
Wages (College) 741 0.09 0.09 -0.47 1.04
Wages (Masters) 710 0.08 0.2 -1.95 2.38
Wages (10th percentile) 741 0.05 0.09 -0.47 0.73
Wages (25th percentile) 741 0.04 0.07 -0.63 0.51
Wages (50th percentile) 741 0.03 0.07 -0.63 0.35
Wages (75th percentile) 741 0.05 0.07 -0.64 0.46
Wages (90th percentile) 741 0.09 0.08 -0.54 0.56
Wage Polarization (90th/10th) 741 0 0.08 -0.68 0.53
Wage Polarization (75th/25th) 741 0 0.04 -0.3 0.15
Wage Polarization (90th/50th) 741 0.02 0.03 -0.14 0.18
Wage Polarization (50th/10th) 741 -0.02 0.05 -0.41 0.38
Wages (College/No College) 741 0.02 0.04 -0.25 0.37
Wages (Least Manual) 741 0.09 0.07 -0.45 0.69
Wages (Most Manual) 741 0.04 0.08 -0.84 0.42
Wages (Least Routine) 741 0.07 0.08 -0.52 0.57
Wages (Most Routine) 741 0.07 0.08 -0.61 0.84
Wages (Least Abstract) 741 0.04 0.07 -0.68 0.44
Wages (Most Abstract) 741 0.05 0.07 -0.39 0.47
Wages (Least Cognitive) 741 0.01 0.08 -0.75 0.32
Wages (Most Cognitive) 741 0.03 0.08 -0.54 0.69
Wages (Least Communication) 741 0.04 0.08 -0.68 0.45
Wages (Most Communication) 741 0.05 0.1 -0.55 1.16
Immigrant Share (Below College) 741 0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.11
Immigration Instrument 741 0.04 0.05 -0.01 0.21
Offshoring Exposure 734 0.05 0.03 -0.25 0.37
Offshoring Instrument 737 0.03 0.02 -0.24 0.23
Offshoring (Majority Owned) 734 0.06 0.03 -0.23 0.32
Offshoring (Parent-Based) 734 0.04 0.03 -0.29 0.40
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(continued)
Import Competion 722 0.43 0.38 -0.02 7.62
Import Competition Isntrument 722 0.33 0.28 -0.47 4.28
Stardardized Immigration 722 0.07 0.06 -0.02 0.30
Bartik Labor Demand Shocks 722 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.08
Average Age 741 1.69 0.47 -0.56 4.47
Share Male 741 -0.01 0.01 -0.08 0.04
Share Black 741 0.01 0.01 -0.08 0.15
Share Single 741 0.01 0.02 -0.07 0.16
Share College Educated 741 0.04 0.02 -0.10 0.15
Manufacturing Empl. Share 741 -0.04 0.02 -0.24 0.09
Share Asian 741 0.02 0.01 -0.07 0.09
Share Hispanic 741 0.03 0.03 -0.20 0.31
Note: all wages are for native workers.
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Table 1.4: First Stage
Dimmshare Doffexp Dimmshare Doffexp Dinteraction
Immigration Instrument 0.661*** 0.0191 0.898*** -0.0470 0.00658
(0.0556) (0.0480) (0.109) (0.0965) (0.0188)
Offshoring Instrument 0.331* 1.300*** 0.598*** 1.226*** 0.0548**
(0.130) (0.127) (0.156) (0.140) (0.0195)
Immigration Inst. # Offshoring Inst. -6.418* 1.786 0.771
(3.192) (3.357) (0.691)
N 737 734 737 734 734
R-sq 0.65 0.31 0.66 0.31 0.46
F-Stat, Inst. 71.6 58.5 74.0 44.8 15.7
Standard errors in parentheses
Weighted by lagged CZ employment.
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.010, *** p<0.001
Table 1.5: Immigration and Offshoring Effects of Native Wages (< BA)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Immigration Change -0.0509 -0.462+ 0.388 1.189*
(0.191) (0.250) (0.256) (0.521)
Offshoring Change 0.319* 0.576* 0.873*** 2.295***
(0.160) (0.265) (0.131) (0.691)
Immigration Ch.#Offshoring Ch. -8.894*** -32.03*
(2.651) (14.16)
N 734 734 734 734
R-sq 0.03 0.10
Wald F-stat of 1st Stage 152.5 52.7
Standard errors in parentheses
Weighted by lagged CZ employment.
The dependent variable is change in wages of natives with less than Bachelor’s
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.010, *** p<0.001
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Table 1.6: Offshoring and Immigration Effects on Native Wages
Panel A. By Education
High School or Below Below College Some Col. College
Immigration Change -0.663* -0.462+ -0.185 0.384
(0.288) (0.251) (0.186) (0.241)
Offshoring Change 0.698* 0.576* 0.164 -0.0412
(0.290) (0.265) (0.215) (0.234)
Panel B. By Wage Percentile
p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
Immigration Change -1.172** -0.579+ -0.0314 0.398+ 0.504+
(0.430) (0.321) (0.280) (0.232) (0.287)
Offshoring Change 0.481 0.686* 0.602* 0.258 -0.0552
(0.385) (0.299) (0.288) (0.250) (0.200)
Panel C. By Task Intensity
Manual Routine Abstract
Least Most Least Most Least Most
Immigration Change -0.0427 -0.632* 0.0376 -0.715* -0.639* 0.266
(0.272) (0.271) (0.268) (0.333) (0.275) (0.222)
Offshoring Change 0.215 0.814** -0.120 0.950* 0.622* -0.0868
(0.281) (0.300) (0.191) (0.369) (0.313) (0.177)
Panel D. By Task Intensity (Least/Most Intensive Third)
Communication Cognitive
Least Middle Most Least Middle Most
Immigration Change -0.709* 0.238 0.187 -0.676* -0.127 0.146
(0.311) (0.255) (0.246) (0.293) (0.252) (0.214)
Offshoring Change 0.785** -0.161 -0.195 0.804** 0.302 0.114
(0.300) (0.272) (0.159) (0.298) (0.236) (0.182)
Standard errors in parenthesis
Weighed by lagged CZ employment. The number of observations is 734 in each regression.
+ p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** p<0.010 *** p<0.001
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Table 1.7: Offshoring and Immigration Effects on Native Wages (with Interaction)
Panel A. By Education
High School or Below Below College Some Col. College
Immigration Change 1.136+ 1.189* 0.968** 1.119**
(0.626) (0.521) (0.354) (0.418)
Offshoring Change 2.573** 2.295*** 1.365** 0.725
(0.815) (0.691) (0.475) (0.524)
Immigration Ch.#Offshoring Ch. -34.92* -32.03* -22.38* -14.28
(17.16) (14.16) (9.163) (9.971)
Panel B. By Wage Percentile
p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
Immigration Ch.#Offshoring Ch. -40.12+ -35.96* -35.72* -29.93** -24.44*
(22.18) (17.73) (15.38) (11.48) (10.87)
Immigration Change 0.896 1.274* 1.809** 1.940*** 1.764***
(0.787) (0.646) (0.579) (0.518) (0.437)
Offshoring Change 2.634* 2.616** 2.519*** 1.865*** 1.257*
(1.054) (0.845) (0.736) (0.561) (0.524)
Panel C. By Task Intensity (Least/Most Intensive Third)
Manual Routine Abstract
Least Most Least Most Least Most
Immigration Ch.#Offshoring Ch. -23.23* -41.96* -29.57+ -39.80* -31.34+ -20.68+
(11.06) (19.69) (15.88) (16.39) (16.66) (11.01)
Immigration Change 1.234** 1.447* 1.481* 1.419* 0.975 1.331**
(0.427) (0.724) (0.617) (0.634) (0.611) (0.435)
Offshoring Change 1.126* 3.202*** 1.803* 2.950*** 2.304** 1.023*
(0.535) (0.933) (0.768) (0.795) (0.803) (0.515)
Panel D. By Task Intensity (Least/Most Intensive Third)
Communication Cognitive
Least Middle Most Least Middle Most
Immigration Ch.#Offshoring Ch. -26.99 -29.55** -18.11 -28.72+ -30.47* -21.24+
(18.36) (9.281) (11.36) (16.91) (12.32) (10.97)
Immigration Change 0.682 1.761*** 1.120** 0.804 1.443** 1.240**
(0.676) (0.411) (0.429) (0.620) (0.509) (0.429)
Offshoring Change 2.234** 1.425** 0.777 2.346** 1.937** 1.254*
(0.852) (0.496) (0.526) (0.804) (0.612) (0.521)
Standard errors in parenthesis
Weighed by lagged CZ employment. The number of observations is 734 in each regression.
+ p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** p<0.010 *** p<0.001
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Table 1.8: Offshoring/Immigration Effects on Wage Polarization
9010 7525 9050 5010 Col/Lcol
Immigration Change 1.264*** 0.490*** 0.194*** 0.795*** 0.354***
(0.242) (0.100) (0.0397) (0.171) (0.0617)
Offshoring Change -0.530+ -0.311* -0.320*** -0.0615 -0.309**
(0.288) (0.121) (0.0910) (0.157) (0.109)
With Interaction
9010 7525 9050 5010 Col/Lcol
Immigration Ch.#Offshoring Ch. 24.46+ 7.890 7.655* 10.54 9.778*
(14.55) (5.757) (3.620) (8.079) (3.845)
Immigration Change 0.00315 0.0833 -0.200 0.252 -0.150
(0.540) (0.234) (0.148) (0.304) (0.161)
Offshoring Change -1.843** -0.735** -0.731*** -0.627 -0.834***
(0.711) (0.280) (0.190) (0.391) (0.209)
Standard errors in parenthesis
Weighed by lagged CZ employment. The number of observations is 734 in each regression.
+ p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** p<0.010 *** p<0.001
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Table 1.9: Offshoring Effect on Migrant Wage Share
OLS 2SLS
HS SCOL LCOL HS SCOL LCOL
Overall Across CZone
Offshoring Change 0.265+ 0.208* 0.227* 0.342 0.252* 0.293+
(0.146) (0.0854) (0.112) (0.235) (0.107) (0.167)
N 734 734 734 734 734 734
R-sq 0.03 0.10 0.05 0.03 0.09 0.05
Manufacturing Sector Only
Offshoring Change 0.230 0.187+ 0.234 0.485 0.301* 0.485+
(0.180) (0.0983) (0.151) (0.307) (0.152) (0.248)
N 734 734 734 734 734 734
R-sq 0.02 0.03 0.03 . 0.02 .
Standard errors in parenthesis
Weighed by lagged CZ employment.
+ p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** p<0.010 *** p<0.001
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Table 1.10:
Robustness Checks: Import Competition, Labor Demand Shocks
With Imp. Competition
High School or Below Below College Some Col. College Col/LCol
Immigration Change 1.115+ 1.144* 0.892** 1.042** -0.160
(0.604) (0.487) (0.308) (0.380) (0.155)
Offshoring Change 2.543** 2.255** 1.316** 0.772 -0.793***
(0.852) (0.710) (0.471) (0.534) (0.223)
Immigration Ch.#Offshoring Ch. -34.33* -31.01* -20.86* -13.67 9.503*
(16.97) (13.61) (8.185) (9.128) (3.868)
Import Competition 0.00226 -0.00136 -0.00805 -0.0363+ -0.0149+
(0.0269) (0.0236) (0.0183) (0.0206) (0.00892)
With Bartik Labor Demand Shocks
High School or Below Below College Some Col. College Col/LCol
Immigration Change 0.813 0.886+ 0.705* 0.884* -0.104
(0.583) (0.462) (0.280) (0.346) (0.159)
Offshoring Change 2.200** 1.962** 1.103** 0.593 -0.729***
(0.772) (0.641) (0.426) (0.509) (0.221)
Immigration Ch.#Offshoring Ch. -31.80* -28.85* -19.29** -12.35 9.035*
(15.76) (12.52) (7.314) (8.302) (3.744)
Bartik LD Shocks 3.615*** 3.084*** 2.244*** 1.889+ -0.669
(0.949) (0.815) (0.655) (1.072) (0.430)
Import Competition -0.00440 -0.00705 -0.0122 -0.0398+ -0.0137+
(0.0250) (0.0223) (0.0175) (0.0213) (0.00794)
Standard errors in parenthesis
Weighed by lagged CZ employment. The number of observations is 734 in each regression.
+ p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** p<0.010 *** p<0.001
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Table 1.11: Robustness Checks: Demographic Controls
With Imp. Competition
High School or Below Below College Some Col. College Col/LCol
Immigration Change 0.731* 0.627* 0.285 0.447 -0.156
(0.318) (0.257) (0.235) (0.396) (0.156)
Offshoring Change 1.310* 1.117* 0.430 0.149 -0.499*
(0.546) (0.457) (0.371) (0.460) (0.232)
Immigration Ch.#Offshoring Ch. -19.95** -16.46** -8.243+ -2.485 7.030*
(7.746) (5.989) (4.399) (6.603) (3.165)
Change in Avg. Age 0.0100+ 0.0157** 0.0226*** 0.0162* -0.000776
(0.00568) (0.00501) (0.00557) (0.00683) (0.00327)
Change in Share Male 0.795*** 0.695*** 0.535*** 0.117 -0.282**
(0.174) (0.152) (0.145) (0.181) (0.0937)
Change in Share Black 0.298+ 0.154 -0.0285 0.301 0.0414
(0.165) (0.131) (0.121) (0.184) (0.0864)
Change in Share Single -0.301 -0.123 -0.0164 -0.365 -0.0993
(0.257) (0.212) (0.184) (0.252) (0.120)
Change in Share College Grad. 0.269 0.398* 0.449** 0.626** 0.0625
(0.215) (0.168) (0.140) (0.209) (0.111)
Change in Share Asian 0.677 1.054* 1.260** 2.116*** 0.325
(0.551) (0.469) (0.480) (0.606) (0.230)
Change in Share Hispanic -1.120*** -0.882*** -0.439** -0.558* 0.213+
(0.273) (0.211) (0.169) (0.264) (0.113)
Standard errors in parenthesis
Weighed by lagged CZ employment. The number of observations is 734 in each regression.
+ p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** p<0.010 *** p<0.001
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Table 1.12: Robustness Checks: Other
Majority-Owned Parent-Based Standard. Imm.
Immigration Ch.#Offshoring Ch. -27.27+ -24.69+ -45.52
(15.12) (12.95) (41.27)
Immigration Change 1.344+ 0.573 0.512
(0.741) (0.520) (1.089)
Offshoring Change 1.685* 1.663* 1.816
(0.772) (0.821) (1.504)
CZ Immig. Share CZ-Wide Wages W/ Services Offshoring
Immigration Ch.#Offshoring Ch. -38.38** -24.98** -45.77
(13.12) (9.600) (49.51)
Immigration Change 1.241* 0.525 -0.132
(0.483) (0.354) (0.693)
Offshoring Change 1.894*** 1.498*** 2.650
(0.529) (0.384) (1.721)
Change in Share in Manuf. 0.511** 0.361*
(0.170) (0.150)
Standard errors in parenthesis
Weighed by lagged CZ employment. The number of observations is 734 in each regression.
+ p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** p<0.010 *** p<0.001
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Appendix: Theoretical Model Special Case
Whereas the model in the main part of the paper is more flexible and gener-
alizable, we can also obtain analogous insights from modeling offshoring in a more
standard way–where an offshored task is offshored completely. To see this in the
most transparent way, consider the offshoring of a range of tasks performed originally
by native workers [0,∆n], and a range of tasks originally performed by immigrants
[1−∆m, 1], where ∆m > 0, and ∆n > 0. We show that whether native or immigrant
tasks are offshored directly determines whether native workers adjust to offshoring
by shifting to tasks that have relative comparative advantage in. In particular, the
analogue of (A2) with offshoring is:
σ
1− σ =
∫ 1−∆m
I am(i)di
an(I −∆n) , θ =
wm
∫ 1−∆m
I am(i)di
wm
∫ 1−∆m
I am(i)di+ wnan(i)(I −∆n)
. (C1)
By inspection, the offshoring of native tasks shifts the threshold task to the right,
allowing immigrants to specialize more in tasks where they have comparative advan-
tage, while the opposite applies to native workers. The offshoring of immigrant tasks
is analogous. Furthermore, offshoring allows more native workers and immigrants to
be devoted to the remaining tasks. The result is an increase in the employment of
the composite labor input, as can be seen below:
Y = N/(an(I −∆n)), Y = M/
∫ 1−∆m
I
am(i)di. (C2)
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Finally, let wo(i) denote the wage cost of a unit of task i selected to be offshored. To
account for the cost savings of offshoring, assume henceforth that
wo(i) = (1− γi) min{wnan, wmam(i)}, γi ∈ (0, 1),
where γi denotes proportional cost savings.26 Introducing these changes into the
model, the native wage can be express as
wn = P/φ(I,∆n,∆m), (C3)
where
φ(I,∆n,∆m) ≡
(
anI +B(I)
∫ 1
0
am(i)di−
∫ ∆n
0
γiandi−B(I)
∫ 1
1−∆m
γiam(i)di
)
,
(C4)
where, once again, the native wage depends on a price effect and a productivity
effect. The price effect depends directly on the employment of the composite labor
input Y in (C2). The productivity effect φ(I,∆n,∆m) depends on the range of tasks
natives specialize in, I, as well as the cost savings of offshoring ∆n and ∆m that spill
over to benefit native workers (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008)). Using the
results above and following the steps from the offshoring model in the main part of
26Note, cost savings are allowed to differ by taks, but the main results are the same if they are
constant across tasks.
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the paper, it can be shown that
wˆn
σˆ
=
(
α− 1 + εθ˜
) θ
1− σ (C5)
wˆn
∆ˆn
= (α− 1)(1− θ) ∆n
I −∆n − εθ˜
∆n
I −∆n θ + Ωn∆n (C6)
wˆn
∆ˆm
= [(α− 1 + εθ˜)θζm∆m + Ωm∆m] (C7)
where, ε = dB(I)/B(I)
dI/(I−∆n) , θ˜ =
∫ 1
I
am(i)di−
∫ 1
1−∆m γiam(i)di
φ(I,∆n,∆m) , Ωn =
γ(∆n)an
φ(I,∆n,∆m) ,Ωm =
B(I)γ(1−∆m)am(1−∆m)
φ(I,∆n,∆m) , and ζm =
am(1−∆m)∫ 1−∆m
I
am(i)di
]
From (C5), we can observe that the expression for the native wage impact of
immigration is very similar to (B12), except for the absence of ζ in the productivity
term and slightly different expressions for θ˜ and ε. Proposition 1 can be expressed
as before:
Proposition A1. The native wage impact of low-skilled immigration is negative
(positive) if (and only if) the productivity effect is small (large) relative to the price
effect. In both cases, if the difference between productivity parameter ε and price effect
α−1 is sufficiently large, a higher immigrant wage share magnifies the native wage
impact of low-skilled immigration, all else equal.
With regards to the effect of offshoring, as long as offshoring gives rise to wages
savings, γi > 0, the possibility of a native wage gain subsequent to either type of
offshoring exists. For native task offshoring, the price effect (α − 1)(1 − θ) ∆n
I−∆n
and comparative advantage effect εθ˜ ∆n
I−∆n θ are negative (for the latter–because na-
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tives are pushed to perform tasks in which they have less comparative advantage),
while the productivity effect is positive. On the other hand, for offshoring of immi-
grant tasks, price effect (α− 1)θζm∆m is negative, and comparative advantage effect
εθ˜θζm∆m (because natives now perform tasks in which they have greater compar-
ative advantage) and productivity effect Ωm∆m are positive. Naturally, the overall
effect depends on the balance of the three effects.
Proposition A2. Offshoring of native tasks increases native wages if the pro-
ductivity effect dominates the price/labor supply and comparative advantage effects,
and decreases them otherwise.
Analogously, offshoring of immigrant tasks increases native wages if the productivity
effect and comparative advantage effect dominate the price/labor supply effect, and
decreases them otherwise.
In summary, the overall native wage effects of offshoring are ambiguous, depend-
ing on the relative magnitudes of the price, comparative advantage and productivity
effects. Furthermore, since offshoring impacts the immigrant wage share, the precise
nature of offshoring has very nuanced implications on the native wage impact of
immigration:
Proposition A3. Offshoring of native tasks increases the immigrant wage share,
and reinforces the negative (positive) wage impact of immigration if the productivity
parameter  is sufficiently small (large) relative to the price effect (1− α).
Offshoring of immigrant tasks decreases the immigrant wage share, and mitigates
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against the negative (positive) wage impact of immigration if the productivity param-
eter  is sufficiently small (large) relative to the price effect 1− α.
Proposition 3A is more direct and less ambiguous than Proposition 3, as it is
certain that native task offshoring increases immigrant wage share and offshoring of
immigrant tasks–decreases it. On the other hand, the environment producing the
above result is more stylized than that in the general model in the main part of the
paper. This more stylized environment, by modeling offshored tasks as offshored
completely and exploiting assumptions about their location, is more similar to what
is commonly featured in the literature (Ottaviano, Peri and Wright (2013)). This
simpler environment produces insights very similar to those in the main theory sec-
tion, with the same mechanisms at work, and also helps understand factors likely
behind the empirical results.
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CHAPTER 2
DO IMMIGRANTS PROMOTE TRADE WITH THIRD PARTY
COUNTRIES? ON THE ROLE OF GEOGRAPHIC AND
LINGUISTIC PROXIMITY
2.1 Introduction
Since the seminal work of Gould (1994), there has been an explosion of interest
in studying the connection between immigration and trade. Previously, it had been
analyzed through the Heckscher-Ohlin Model, which treated production factor trade
and commodity trade as substitute processes (Mundell (1957)), implying movement
in the opposite directions for migration and trade. This meant that easier immigra-
tion would likely reduce trade. Gould’s work, which found that immigration increases
trade with immigrant countries of origin, helped shift the analysis framework to that
of immigrants as trade facilitators. Despite a large amount of additional evidence
supporting the finding that immigration promotes trade, with economically signif-
icant average elasticity of about 0.16 (Genc et al. (2011)), trade promotion role of
immigrants has not yet become a significant part of immigration or trade policy dis-
cussions. Yet proper accounting for immigrants’ trade promotion effect is potentially
important for policy formulation, since it is needed for more accurate understanding
of benefits and costs of immigration, of ways to reduce trade barriers, and in case
of the U.S., due to uneven public support for immigration and trade. Over 70% of
Americans think of trade positively–as an opportunity for growth–while only 25%
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think of it as a threat (Jones (2018)). In contrast, only 45% of Americans think
of immigrants as good for the economy, whereas 52% think they make it worse or
make no difference (McCarthy (2017)). A broader understanding among the public
of how immigration affects a process that is widely seen as economically beneficial
could potentially elicit more support for local and national policies that reflect trade
promotion effect of immigration. This paper accentuates potential importance of
immigration in trade promotion discussions and importance of trade-related effects
in immigration policy considerations by highlighting and thoroughly investigating
a heretofore scarcely explored direction of immigration-trade link–to countries ge-
ographically and linguistically proximate and distant from immigrant country of
origin.
The two main channels that are generally used to explain the immigrant trade
facilitation effect are networks and knowledge/information. The former refers to re-
ducing costs of searching for destination country business partners, negotiating and
enforcing contracts by drawing on business relationships and contacts that immi-
grants may have in home countries; these informal relationships may be particularly
important in countries with weak rule of law and institutions. The latter refers to
information about legal, institutional and cultural aspects of export markets as well
as language ability, as immigrants can improve communication and logistics and re-
duce search costs for foreign market information; this channel is especially important
for trade among countries with different predominant languages and most dissimilar
legal, institutional and cultural environment. While trade facilitation effect applies
to both exports and imports, there is a lesser third channel, home preference effect
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(whereby immigrants prefer certain commodities from their home countries), which
applies only to imports.
Although in nearly all empirical work to date the impact of immigrants has been
assessed with regards to exports to or imports from their countries of origin, the
above mechanisms suggest that the effect can also apply to trade with third party
countries, as anyone with a network in or relevant legal, institutional, cultural or
other knowledge of a given country c, or in possession of language skills that facili-
tate communication, can have a pro-trade effect with respect to that country. This
idea overlaps with the motivation for the small number of papers in the literature
that look specifically at cross-national ethnic networks. Rauch and Trindade (2002)
and Giovannetti and Lanati (2015) show that, respectively, larger Chinese and In-
dian immigrant communities bolster trade between countries where they reside, and
Felbermayr, Jung and Toubal (2010) show this also to be true for certain other
large ethnic groups. What this leaves unaddressed, however, is the possibility of
inter-ethnic networks or inter-ethnic spillover effect more generally.
To the best of our knowledge, Bratti, De Benedictis and Santoni (2014) is the
only paper in the literature to raise the possibility of inter-ethnic spillovers. They do
it mostly within the framework of discussion of omitted variable bias in estimation of
the direct bilateral migration-trade elasticity, which may arise if migration decisions
of “close” ethnic groups are correlated and spillover effect exists. They operationalize
“close” by 1) aggregating over immigrants from countries where the same language
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is spoken by over 9% of the population and 2) trade affinity.1 The findings suggest
positive inter-ethnic spillovers for exports but not imports and that the language-
based measure is significantly more important.2 Since the inclusion of inter-ethnic
spillovers is mainly to bolster confidence in the estimate of the own-country trade
elasticity, little effort is made to examine the channels through which inter-ethnic
spillovers operate (for example, whether the importance of linguistically proximate
immigrants is due to them also being geographically close) or what is the influence
of immigrants who are not a “close” ethnic group.
We address the above concerns, among others, and extend the analysis of immi-
gration effect on trade to third party countries in a number of ways. First, there is a
better way to find “close” ethnic groups than the “1)” above. To begin with, at the
lower threshold, if 9% of people in two countries speak the same language, the proba-
bility of randomly chosen two people from the respective countries speaking the same
language is less than 1% (0.81%, to be exact), but method “1)” would ascribe 100%
of immigrants from respective countries as being ethnically close. Additionally, it is
evident that speaking the same language is not indicative of belonging to the same
or close ethnic group. The two problems together may lead to both misidentifying
and overestimating ethnically close immigrants. Among many potential examples,
consider Cameroon and Austria; both meet the threshold for share of population
speaking French. The above methodology would suggest all Cameroonians are eth-
1Refer to Bratti, De Benedictis and Santoni (2014) for more details.
2The latter result is rationalized using the observation that countries with more “close” immi-
grants through language tend to be developing countries, for which migration-trade elasticity tends
to be higher.
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nically close to all Austrians. A more reasonable proxy is the percent of the popu-
lation who share a given native language, a criteria by which neither Cameroonians
nor Austrians are assigned French ethnicity, but by which, for example, 20% of Swiss
are ethnically close to 36% of Belgians on account of being native French speakers,
with 7.2% probability of randomly chosen two people from the two countries being
ethnically close. Second, the effect of ethnically close immigrants may be thought of
as “intra-ethnic” cross-country spillover rather than “inter-ethnic.” After all, “ethnic
networks” is how the literature treats the role of Chinese immigrants living in differ-
ent countries. What we may more accurately call “inter-ethnic” effect is the impact
of those who do not share the same native language. This includes, among others,
those who share the same spoken language but for whom it is not native. It also
includes those who are from geographically close countries and from countries with
the same official language but who do not have the same native language. Third,
when it comes to estimation of either “intra-ethnic” or “inter-ethnic” spillover trade
promotion effects, the fact that proximate immigrant groups defined by different
measures overlap is a serous threat to identifying whether it is the overlapping or
the non-overlapping segment or both that matter for trade.
To motivate the choice of proximity measures considered, we go back to the
channels through which immigrants are thought to affect trade. It is straightforward
enough to point out that immigrants are more likely to have business networks in
their home countries. It was insightful on the part of the studies mentioned above
to identify the trade effects of international networks of large ethnic groups, which
is related to the fact that diasporas may also form business networks. But certain
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immigrants may also be more likely than host country natives to have business con-
nections to entrepeneurs who are not part of their ethnic network and do not live
in their country of origin. In particular, trade tends to be greater between countries
that are closer (distance being the main barrier in the gravity equation) and share
a common border, which also means more business connections between people in
geographically close countries and those sharing a common border. Additionally,
countries that are closer and/or share a common border may be more likely to share
similar cultures, legal systems, institutional and market peculiarities that may make
immigrants from country j in host country h valuable for trade with country c that
borders country j–that is, the information channel may also be at work for geograph-
ically proximate countries.
The motivation for considering language as the source of immigrant proximity
is also strong. Same official language has been found to increase trade between
a country pair (Rauch and Trindade (2002), Aleksynska and Peri (2014), Egger,
Von Ehrlich and Nelson (2012), Blanes-Cristóbal (2008)). More importantly, same
official language between a country pair reduces trade promotion effect of immigrants,
as immigrant language skills become less relevant. This is consistent with empirical
findings from Aleksynska and Peri (2014) and Kandogan (2005), which suggests that
the immigration-trade elasticity is higher for linguistically more dissimilar countries.
This highlights the role of immigrant linguistic/cultural capital in trade promotion,
which may carry over to trade with countries other than the immigrant country
of origin. For example, if Ecuadorians can promote exports to Ecuador through
facilitation in negotiations and logistics/communication due to speaking Spanish,
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potentially so can the Colombians, the Spaniards, and so on. It is also possible that
native speakers of the same language from different countries develop relationships
that are closer to ethnic than inter-ethnic, in which case the effect of the same native
language spoken would be higher than non-native, which is consistent with Melitz
and Toubal (2014) finding that a higher probability of speaking the same native
language increases bilateral trade between two countries even when controlling for
the probability of speaking the same (native or non-native) language.
Of course, in a given host country there are both immigrants who are linguistically
or geographically proximate and those who are not. We term those who are not
proximate “distant.” The natural question is do they have any effect on trade with
country j and, if the do, what is the effect? We should expect them to promote trade
to some countries, at least their own countries of origin. This may or may not mean
that some of the trade is diverted from j in favor of other countries. To understand
the fuller picture of third country immigration effects on trade, we consider both
different proximate immigrant groups as well as distant.
Methodologically, the large degree of overlap between geographically and linguis-
tically proximate immigrants, as well as between those linguistically proximate due
to the same official, spoken or native language makes it difficult to identify the ef-
fect of each group; to tackle this problem, we identify groups that are proximate
by one measure but not others in addition to explicitly controlling for the number
of immigrants from other groups. Furthermore, we use shift-share instruments to
address other threats to identification, such as those related to reverse causality or
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omitted variables related both to immigration and trade. Because the data used
for the analysis is U.S. state exports and imports by industry to and from a large
number of foreign countries, annually over a number of years (2002-2016 for exports
and 2008-2016 for imports), we are also able to control for state-country trading
pair fixed effects. In addition to using the most recent data, we go beyond what
other studies with the U.S. as the host country have done methodologically, by both
including trading pair fixed effects and instrumenting for immigration, as Table 2.1
shows.
Empirically, we find that immigrants who are linguistically proximate to trading
partner country increase both exports and imports, even if they come from coun-
tries that are not geographically proximate. Focusing only on linguistically but not
geographically proximate immigrants, the role of spoken language appears to be im-
portant even when it is not spoken as a native language and when it includes only
immigrants from countries with different official languages. This finding extends
the literature by showing that third party (spillover) trade promotion effect of im-
migrants is not limited to ethnic diasporas, but also arises from immigrants across
different countries speaking the same language, the most likely mechanism for which
is communication/logistics facilitation and easier information acquisition. It also
means that part of the reason for the cross-country ethnic network trade promotion
effect is the same spoken language. In contrast, immigrants from countries with the
same official language but who do not speak the same language do not increase trade.
The implication of this finding is that the positive effect of common official language
on bilateral trade may be largely due to correlation with shared spoken and/or native
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language.
When it comes to the role of native language over and above spoken, it tends
to have an additional export- but not import-promotion effect. This finding pro-
vides further evidence for ethnic network effect found in Rauch and Trindade (2002),
Giovannetti and Lanati (2015), and Felbermayr, Jung and Toubal (2010); at the
same time, it hints that the trade promotion effect found in these three papers that
constitute cross-country ethnic network trade promotion literature may be due to
the export part of trade, as they rely on bilateral stocks and are not positioned to
distinguish between export-promotion and import-promotion effects.
In terms of geographic proximity, immigrants who come from countries that bor-
der trading partner country increase exports, but only if they are also linguistically
proximate, and they do not increase imports. Additionally, geographic proximity
increases the magnitude of export promotion effect of linguistically proximate im-
migrants. Lastly, we find that distant immigrants, those neither geographically nor
linguistically proximate, tend to decrease trade, which raises the issue of trade diver-
sion, which has been, for the most part, neglected by migration-trade link literature.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2.2 describes data and presents descriptive
statistics, while Section 2.3 outlines empirical methodology, Section 2.4 presents
results, and Section 2.5 concludes.
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2.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
To investigate how immigration affects trade, this study utilizes data on U.S.
state-industry level trade with foreign countries3 over the time period from 2002 to
2016 (from USA Trade Online), with export figures being available throughout and
imports–from 2008. The benefit of this data is that we can control for state-country
trading pair–which is fundamental to causal inference in this context, as trading
pairs can have unobserved characteristics affecting both trade and migration–and
still have enough variation in trade data left to explain by variables of interest. One
downside is that the trade data source has missing data for small volumes of trade;
rather than imputing exports based on missing values, we restrict analysis only to
state-country-industry-year observations with positive trade values, and focus on the
intensive margin of trade. We address the issue of zero trade in the results section.
State aggregate- and industry-level GDP4 is taken from County Business Patterns
of the U.S. Census Bureau, while country GDP and population are from World
Development Indicators of the World Bank. All GDP and trade data are in 2009
U.S. dollars, using GDP deflator from St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank.
The main source of individual-level data is American Community Survey Public
Use Microdata Sample (ACS PUMS) from the University of Minnesota Population
Center. As is common in the immigration-trade literature, we designate as immi-
3The total number of countries used in the analysis is 152.
4Some of the industries are grouped together in CBP GDP data, so we aggregate other data
across the same industries; the industries that were aggregated are presented as a range in Table
2.5 (ex., Agriculture and Livestock, NAICS 111-112).
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grants anyone who was born abroad not to American parents (not citizen at birth).
It is worth noting that country of origin is identified as country of birth, rather than
place of residence previously to arriving to the United States. We only consider adult
population with positive income, who are more likely to be involved in commercial
activity.
2.2.1 Immigrant Proximity
2.2.1.1 Geography
Since we want to explore how immigrants from third party countries affect trade
and the corresponding channels, we want to be able to calculate the number of
immigrants proximate to those from export destination/import origin country by
the relevant measures, and also distinguish those that are proximate by one measure
but not the other(s). The geographic proximity measure of choice should reflect
the likelihood of having business networks and knowledge of country characteristics
helpful for trade promotion. For geographic proximity measure we use a simple
rule of assigning a value of 1 to a pair of countries that share a border and 0 to
those that do not, and denote the value as B. It is certainly the case that there
may be some country j that does not border country c, but is closer to its economic
center than a country h that does border c, especially in the case of large countries;
most of the time, however, a common border is a good measure of proximity to
economically important areas, and is a more straightforward measure than arbitrary
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distance zone measures; furthermore, trade literature suggests that trade is greater
among bordering countries even controlling for distance.
The estimated number of immigrants in state s, at time t, in industry i, who are
from countries bordering country c, is calculated as follows:
Ibordscti =
∑
j∈C;j 6=c
Isjti ∗Bcj, (1)
where Bcj = 1 if c and j share a common border and 0 otherwise, Isjti is the number
of immigrants from country j, and summation is over all the countries other than c.
2.2.1.2 Language
Language proximity measure is more nuanced. It is an intuitive argument that
common spoken language is vital for communication associated with international
trade transactions, be it marketing, logistics or more informal communication. Yet
language usually enters the estimated gravity equation as a dummy for common of-
ficial language between trading countries and interacted with immigrant stock vari-
able. One limitation of this strategy is that it is not accurate to assume that people
from countries with the same official language will be able to communicate or that
people from countries with different official languages will not be able to communi-
cate. Realizing this, Melitz and Toubal (2014) further network specificity literature
by showing that not only common official language, but also all common native and
spoken languages, when spoken by a substantial portion of the population in each
110
country, matter for trade. Their results indicate that all relevant languages together
have double the effect of just the official language and that native language is es-
pecially important, since in addition to basic ability to communicate it allows more
nuanced communication and potentially ensures more trust. To obtain most inclu-
sive measure of linguistic proximity, we create a measure that captures both common
spoken language (which is greater or equal to native) probability and common official
language, but also provide separate analysis for each measure to better identify the
underlying mechanisms through which linguistic proximity operates. The combined
measure calculates the number of immigrants in state s, at time t, in industry i,
who are linguistically proximate to immigrants from country c. This is done by first
calculating the number of linguistically proximate immigrants for each country j and
then summing over all the countries in the following manner:
I langscti =
∑
j∈C;j 6=c
Isjti ∗max(COLcj, CSLcj), (2)
where COL takes the value of 1 if j and c share the same official language and CSL
is the estimated probability that a randomly taken person from country j speaks
the same language as a randomly taken person from country c. In constructing
CSL we use the methodology and data of Melitz and Toubal (2014) study. For a
large number of countries, they compiled data on the official language, the share
of people who report each language as native (with a 4% threshold) and the same
measure for spoken language. To create a value for linguistic proximity, we follow
their methodology to create a value for common spoken language (CSL) for each
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country pair, a measure that should be highly correlated with the true (unknown)
probability that any two randomly taken people from two countries would share the
same spoken language.5 Common spoken language score for a pair of countries is
calculated as
CSLcj = max
k
(LkcLkj) + (α−max
k
(LkcLkj))(1−max
k
(LkcLkj)), (3)
where Lkc is the share of people in country c that speak language k, α =
∑n
k=1 LkcLkj
is the sumproduct of shares of people who report speaking each language, and
max(LkcLkj) is the maximum product of the two shares.6 For example, if in coun-
try 1, 90 percent of people report speaking French, 50 percent report German, and
0 percent name Spanish, while in country 2, 80 percent report French, 90 percent
report German, and 10 percent report Spanish, then α = 0.72 + 0.45 + 0 = 1.17 and
CSL = 0.72 + (1.17− 0.72)(1− 0.72) = 0.09 + 0.05 ∗ 0.91 = 0.846; in practice, this
ensures CSL is always between 0 and 1. CNLcj calculation is analogous.
5Standard errors are not available for the spoken and native languages data used, which does
lead to underestimation of the true amount of noise.
6As in Melitz and Toubal (2014), English is included since as a common official language it may
be reflective of common colonial power and legal origin, which may be important for international
commerce, even though it may not be very valuable for communication in the U.S. as the host
country. However, the main results are very similar with and without including English as one of
the languages, so it does not drive any of the results.
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2.2.1.3 Geography versus Language
Since our measure of geographically proximate immigrants includes linguistically
proximate and vice versa, it does not allow a clear inference about which feature
matters (or matters more). Hence, we construct “exclusive” measures that only
capture people that meet one criteria but not the other. To estimate the requisite
number of linguistically proximate immigrants, we sum over only the non-bordering
countries:
I lang,exclscti =
∑
j∈CNB ;j 6=c;
Isjti ∗max(COLcj, CSLcj). (4)
For exclusive border-based measure, we first exclude countries that share the same
official language; then, we subtract the estimated number of those able to speak the
same language as immigrants from country c and sum over all countries j,
Ibord,exclscti =
∑
j∈C−o;j 6=c
Isjti ∗max(Bcj − CSLcj, 0), (5)
where C−o refers to countries that do not have the same official language as c. Ad-
ditionally, we construct a measure of distant immigrants, those neither linguistically
nor geographically proximate,
INB,NLscti =
∑
j∈C;j 6=c;
Isjti ∗ (1− (max(Bcj, COLcj, CSLcj))), (6)
where NB and NL refer to neither sharing a common border nor linguistically prox-
imate.
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2.2.1.4 Linguistic Channels
Because different measures of linguistic proximity are correlated, as shown in
Table 2.3, we need to take steps to tease out the separate effects of each type of
linguistic proximity. We focus on the exclusive measures to isolate the geographic
proximity effect. Because the share of people speaking a given language generally is
greater than or equal to the share speaking it as a native language, we can calculate
the (expected) number of people who speak the same non-native language in countries
with a different official language as
Icsl,−on,exclscti =
∑
j∈CNB∩C−o;j 6=c;
Isjti ∗ (CSNNLcj). (7)
where CSNNLcj refers to common spoken non-native language probability between c
and j, based on shares of people speaking the same language as non-native, which are
the differences between the share speaking a given language and the share reporting
it as native languages.
Additionally, because some of the people in countries with the same official lan-
guage (as trading partner country c) do not speak the same language, we can try to
get at the role of the same official language as separate from spoken,
Icol,−s,exclscti =
∑
j∈CNB∩Co;j 6=c;
Isjti ∗ (1− CSLcj). (8)
Unfortunately, we cannot identify people who share the same native but not spoken
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language (naturally), so the best we can do is control for the number of CSL speakers
in the same regression equation.
2.2.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.4 presents descriptive statistics for the main variables of interest. It is
clear that data is not normally distributed, with many observations clustered at
or near zero and overwhelmingly large values at the end of the right tail. This is
mitigated by taking logs of all the variables as part of the estimation of the gravity
equation (Table 2.2). One of the ways to account for the presence of zeros when
taking logs is to add one, with resulting zeros for the zero observations, which is
what we do here. This produces little distortion, especially for the trade and GDP
numbers7, as the lowest non-zero figures are at least in tens of thousands and more
often in tens of millions. Most of the immigration numbers are also large enough
that 1 has a negligible effect.
It is clear from Table 2.4 that the (unweighted) average import value is signif-
icantly larger than export value, partly reflecting trade imbalance and partly–the
fact that import numbers start from 2008 and exports are from 2002. In terms of
immigration numbers, we see that the average own-country immigrant number is
more than 10 times smaller than the number of those proximate based on language
and more than 2 times smaller that the number based on common border. Addi-
7GDP product numbers are zero in a few cases where industry-state production is 0, but imports
are positive.
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tionally, we can observe that the number of proximate immigrants based on common
spoken language is similar to that based on official language, but larger than that
based on common native language. The number of immigrants proximate in terms
of language but not geography is slightly lower than overall language-based estimate,
while the number of immigrants based on geography and not language is about half
that of the overall number based on geography. Immigrants proximate both in terms
of language and geography number about as many as own-country immigrants. The
number of distant immigrants, those neither proximate by language nor by geog-
raphy, constitute more than half of all the state-industry immigrants. The last 5
variables in the table summarize more granulated measures of linguistic proximity,
where it is notable that across countries with a different official language, there are
quite a few immigrants who speak the same non-native language (Immcsl,−on,exclscti ),
but few who speak the same native language (Immcnl,−o,exclscti ).
Table 2.5 breaks down descriptive statistics by industry (sorted by immigrant
employment share). The numbers presented are for the mid-point of the sample
period, 2009. There is a great deal of heterogeneity both in terms of industry immi-
grant labor share and export and import intensity. Apparel and leather employment
consists of 50% immigrant labor, while the number for Minerals and Ores is only
5%. Also notably, Apparel and Leather imports on average exceed state-industry
GDP ten times, by far the largest ratio, implying the highest comparative advantage
of trade partners in this industry. In contrast, the import (and export) GDP ratio
in Newspapers, Books and Other is less than 0.01. The highest export intensity
is observed for Transportation Equipment, at 3.25, which is similar to the import
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intensity of the industry. On average, import to GDP ratio is higher than export
to GDP, reflecting trade imbalance in goods. Overall, there is no clear relationship
between import and export intensity and immigrant employment share.
2.3 Empirical Strategy
2.3.1 Aggregate Exports
The foundation of the empirical strategy for estimating determinants of trade
is the gravity equation, which has both strong empirical support and theoretical
foundation (Anderson (1979), Bergstrand (1985)). It has the following general form:
Xsct = B0
(YstYct)βY
(Dsc)βD
, (9)
where Xsct is trade flow between state8 s and country c at time t, Yst and Yct are,
respectively, state and country GDP at time t, and Dsc is the distance between a
state and a country. Since we are interested in examining determinants of trade flows
at the industry level, we modify (9) to obtain the following:
Xscti = B0
(YstiYct)βY
(Dsc)βD
, (10)
8Or country, in case of country-country trade.
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where i indicates industry. Taking the log of equation (10), we can obtain the
following estimating equation:910
lnXscti = β0 + βY ln(YstiYct) + βDlnDsc + δscti, (11)
where β0 = log(B0). If we think of the denominator of (10) as not just distance but
also other trade inhibitors and facilitators, which can vary over time, we can add log
of immigrant stock (adding one to observations with zero immigrants) from country
c in state s at time t (and appropriate fixed effects), and obtain
lnXscti = β0 + βY ln(YstiYct) + βDlnDsc + βI lnIscti + FE + δscti, (12)
where the main FE = [ψst + ψct + ψsc + ψi], which accounts for trading pair fixed
effects, state-year and country-year effects and industry time-invariant differences,
although we do present results with other FE as well. Since we hypothesize that
immigrants proximate to those from country c may matter for trade with country c,
we include measures based on border, language and neither:
lnXscti = β0 + βY ln(YstiYct) + βDlnDsc + βI lnIscti + I langscti + Ibordscti +
INB,NLscti + FE + δscti.
(13)
9We look separately at determinants of export and import flows, for which the right-hand side
of the estimating equation is analogous to that for total trade flows.
10As mentioned, 1 is added before taking the log, which we omit from equations for ease of
notation.
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Additionally, since some of the geographically proximate immigrants are also prox-
imate linguistically, we separate I langscti and Ibordscti into I
lang,excl
scti + I
bord,excl
scti + I
bord,lang
scti ,
with the latter being those both geographically and linguistically proximate. Lastly,
we separate linguistic proximity into its components consisting of official, native and
spoken language, as discussed earlier, and estimate their separate effects on trade.
2.3.2 2SLS
Although we already control for more potential time-invariant unobservables than
any other study of the kind focused on the U.S. as the host country, we may still
be concerned about time-variant unobservables that affect both immigrant flows
between a country and a state and trade between the two. To address this po-
tential concern, we use the shift-share instrument of the type previously used by
Peri and Requena-Silvente (2010) and Bratti, De Benedictis and Santoni (2014) for
immigration-trade link studies and many others used for predicting immigrant stock
in other contexts (Altonji and Card (1991), Card (2001)). The instrument uses the
assumed orthogonality between immigrant stock at a sufficiently distant period in
the past–in our case, 1980–and shocks related to exports in the time period of inter-
est. The instrument for the stock of immigrants from country c in year t in state s
is the sum of the number of immigrants from that country in the state in 1980 plus
the product of the national share of immigrants from country c in 1980 in the state
and national change in the number of immigrants from c between 1980 and year t.
The following expression captures the procedure:
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ˆIsct = Isc80 + (Isct/Ict) ∗ (Ict − Ic80). (14)
To obtain the predicted immigrant number at the industry level, we use the same
general process as above, but modify it based on national industry composition of
immigrants from country c in year t, and obtain
ˆIscti = ˆIsct ∗ (Icti/Ict), (15)
where Icti is the total national number of immigrants from c in industry i in year t.
Although proximate and distant immigrant groups are less likely to be endogenous
in the equation, it may still happen if reverse causality of trade and immigration
has cross-country spillovers, so we use instruments for other immigrant groups con-
structed analogously to the above to account for this possibility.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Bilateral Trade Promotion
We begin by presenting regression results with just the main gravity equation
variables (GDP product11 and distance) and immigrants from the trading partner
11The coefficients on the main variables of interest are virtually the same if we separately include
state and country GDPs
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country. Table 2.6 Panel A presents OLS results of export determinants for differ-
ent, progressively more demanding, fixed effects. The first column shows results for
the specification with state, country, year, and industry fixed effects. As expected,
GDP product has a strongly positive effect, with elasticity of 0.5, while distance
has a strongly negative effect, with elasticity of -1.3. The coefficient on the num-
ber of own-country immigrants12 is 0.1, meaning a 10% increase in immigrants from
country c increases exports to it by 1%. The next three columns feature almost
identical coefficients on GDP product–0.53–and immigration–0.06–despite different
fixed effects, which include trading pair (state-country), industry, and, respectively,
year, country-year, or country-year and state-year (distance is omitted due to trad-
ing pair fixed effects). In columns 5 and 6 we also add state-industry fixed effects.
The coefficient on immigration decreases to 0.04 and that on GDP product decreases
about 10 times, to 0.05-0.07. Notably, the within variation explained by the model
decreases from 8% to less than 0.1%. The last two specifications control for state-
country-industry and year or country-year, so that only non-cross-section variation
is left to be explained by the model. The coefficient on immigration decreases to
about 0.005-0.006, but remains highly statistically significant.
To account for potential threats to identification not captured by the main gravity
equation variables and fixed effects, we use instrumental variable strategy discussed
previously and present results in panel B; as is evident from panel c, the instrument
is very strong (the standard error is consistently smaller than the coefficient on IV by
12Immscti corresponds to the shorter notation of Iscti in the earlier sections; the same is true for
other immigrant groups.
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about a factor of 100). Predictably, the coefficients on GDP product and distance do
not change significantly. The coefficient on immigration increases to about 0.28-035
for columns 1-6 and to 0.04-0.05 in columns 7 and 8. This may be because OLS
result was downward biased, because instrument is not actually exogenous, or due to
heterogenous effects, whereby the export-immigration elasticity on the observations
that are affected by IV is higher than for those that are not. It is nevertheless
reassuring that the sign and the level of statistical significance remain the same.
Table 2.7 presents the equivalent of Table 2.6 for import determinants. GDP
product coefficient is positive and significant throughout, but about half the mag-
nitude of the one for exports. Distance coefficient is negative and significant, but
almost 50% smaller than for exports. On the other hand, immigration coefficient
is larger by about 0.01-0.02 than for exports for the first 6 specifications; for the
last two specifications–with state-country-industry fixed effects–it is not statistically
significant, unlike for exports; notably, less than 0.1% of within variation is ex-
plained in these specifications. Panel B indicates that after instrumenting the effect
of immigration becomes even larger than that for exports at between 0.45 and 0.66.
Import elasticity being higher than export elasticity is consistent with the presence
of the additional “preference” channel and also consistent with common literature
findings. For specifications with state-country-industry fixed effects, the coefficient
on immigration remains insignificant after instrumenting.
In the two results tables discussed, the estimated coefficients on immigration are
very similar in the first 6 fixed effects specification. In what follows, we focus on
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the most demanding specification–column (4)–out of those that explain a non-trivial
amount of within variation (columns (1)-(4)).
2.4.2 Proximate Immigrants
Table 2.8 columns (1)-(4) present OLS and IV results for the effects of proxi-
mate and non-proximate immigrants on exports for the specification with trading
pair (state-country), state-year, country-year and industry fixed effects, as in col-
umn (4) in tables 2.6 and 2.7. The first thing to note is that the coefficient on
own-country immigrants remains similar to that in column (4) of table 2.6, sug-
gesting that own-country immigration is not endogenous due to correlation with
proximate immigrants. With regards to proximate immigrants, OLS coefficients on
both language-based and geography-based measures are positive and statistically
significant, both at about 0.03 (column (1)); the coefficient on non-proximate immi-
grants is also positive, at 0.016. Column (2) uses exclusive measures of language- and
geography-based proximate immigrants and includes the measure for those proximate
by both criteria. The coefficients on border-based measure decreases to 0.008, while
the language-based one increases to 0.032 and that on non-proximate decreases to
0.013. The largest elasticity is for immigrants proximate based both on language and
geography, at 0.046. Column (3) presents results for the same specification as 1 after
instrumenting for all the immigration variables. The coefficient on language-based
proximate immigrants increases to 0.066, while that on geography-based measure
remains at around 0.03. On the other hand, the coefficient on distant immigrants
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becomes negative, at -0.068, and statistically significant. Instrumenting for exclusive
measures in column (4), we find that the coefficient on language-based proximate
immigrants increases to 0.056, while that on border-based measure becomes nega-
tive, at -0.077, and statistically significant; the reason for the latter may be trade
diversion effect of border-based immigrants from countries with different official lan-
guage (than export destination country) and who do not speak the same language.
The coefficient on distant immigrants becomes -0.084. Notably, the coefficient on
immigrants proximate by both language- and border-based criteria increases to 0.21,
almost equal to the own-country immigration effect. Thus, linguistically proximate
immigrants increase exports, especially if they are geographically close, whereas geo-
graphically proximate immigrants increase exports if they are also linguistically close.
The estimated effects of proximate immigrants on import are presented in Ta-
ble 2.8 columns (5)-(8). The coefficients on own-country immigrants again do not
change much. Import elasticity with respect to language-based proximate immi-
grants is higher than in the case of exports, at 0.075, while that for border-based
immigrants is lower, at 0.013, and the coefficient on distant immigrants is -0.026.
Using exclusive measures, the coefficient on language-based proximate immigrants
increases to 0.082 and that on border-based proximate immigrants becomes close to
0 and not statistically significant; the coefficient on those proximate based on both
measures is not higher like in the case of exports, but in-between the language- and
border-based measures, at 0.034. Instrumenting affects the estimates significantly, as
the coefficient on language-based measure increases to 0.46, meaning a 10% increase
in language-based proximate immigrants bolsters imports by almost 5%. On the
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other hand, the effect of border-based immigrants becomes -0.1. This again, may
be due to trade diversion. The effect of distant immigrants becomes -0.4. When
using exclusive measures, language-based immigration measure becomes 0.5, while
the effect of border-based measure is -0.095, that of immigrants proximate by both
measures is 0 and distant immigrant coefficient is -0.435. Thus, like for exports,
linguistically-proximate immigrants increase imports even if they are not geographi-
cally proximate, but geographically-proximate immigrants do not increase imports in
either case.
2.4.3 Linguistic Proximity Components
We next want to examine whether the parts that compose language-based mea-
sure have different effects. The export effects of proximate immigrants by different
language measures are presented in Table 2.9. As before, using inclusive measure,
geographically proximate immigrants increase exports, except when controlling for
immigrants speaking the same native language. Both OLS and 2SLS coefficients
on all three language-based measures are positive and statistically significant; when
instrumenting, the largest effect is observed for the number speaking the same na-
tive language, followed by those from countries with the same official language as
trading partner and the number sharing the same spoken language, at 0.012, 0.096
and 0.082, respectively. Table 2.10 presents the equivalent of Table 2.9 for imports.
It shows that all three language-based measures are positive and significant in all
specifications, but that the one on CSL measure dwarfs the CNL and COL ones.
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After instrumenting, CSL-based measure coefficient is 0.58, compared to 0.17-0.18
for CNL- and COL-based ones.
Table 2.11 uses exclusive measures to examine the effects of different language
proximity measures on exports. In OLS specification, all the measures are positive
and statistically significant for proximate immigrants, except geographically proxi-
mate immigrants when controlling for those speaking the same language. When in-
strumenting, all the linguistic proximity measures increase exports, with that based
on native language being the largest. at 0.08. The largest overall effect, however,
is that of CSL-based proximate immigrants who are also from geographically proxi-
mate countries, with elasticity of 0.29. Table 2.12 shows that all language proximity
measures produce a positive effect on imports, but common spoken language-based
one by far the largest, at 0.6, compared to 0.17 and 0.08 for CNL and COL ones (in
IV specification). In sum, all three different linguistic proximity measures appear
to increase both exports and imports, but native language is more important for
exports and spoken language by far the most important for imports.
The previous results strongly suggest that linguistically proximate immigrants
increase both imports and exports, and that they do so even if they are geographically
distant. Separately, all measures of linguistic proximity appear to matter. However,
we know that they are all highly correlated (Table 2.3), which makes inference about
the role of any one more difficult. In what follows, we aim to identify the separate
effects of the three measures. The first question we address is whether native and
spoken languages matter if we isolate them from the role of the official language. In
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columns (1) and (2) (OLS) and (6) and (7) (2SLS) of Table 2.13 we test whether,
respectively, CSN- and CSL-based proximate immigrants increase exports when they
are not also from countries with the same official language (indicated by −o). The
results suggest that they do, with 2SLS coefficient of 0.24 for CSN and 0.36 for CSL.
The next question is whether native language has an additional effect compared to
spoken after isolating from official; again, we find that it does, with a 2SLS coefficient
of 0.19 (column (8)). This is consistent with Melitz and Toubal (2014) findings
that there is an additional effect of common native language for the level of trade
between a country pair. Next, we examine whether the number of immigrants who
are proximate based solely on spoken but not native or official language matters when
controlling for the other two; column (9) shows that the resulting coefficient on this
measure is 0.14 and statistically significant, suggesting that even if language spoken
is not native, it still matters for exports. Lastly, we test whether immigrants from
countries with the same official language but who do not speak the same language
increase exports, and it appears that they do not, and, in fact, decrease exports,
although only half as much as distant immigrants do, with a coefficient of -0.15
(column (10)).
We next examine the role of linguistic import determinants in Table 2.14. Sim-
ilarly to the effects on exports, immigrants speaking the same language increase
imports even if they do not speak it as a native language and if they are from coun-
tries with a different official language (with coefficient of 0.9 in column (9)). Also
similar to the case of exports is that immigrants from countries with the same official
language but who do not speak the same language tend to decrease imports (column
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(10)). Unlike in export results, however, native language does not seem to have an
independent effect when controlling for official and spoken languages (column (8)),
which indicates that the import promotion effect of native language identified earlier
was likely due to people who speak the same native language also (by definition)
speaking the same language, and not a special role of language as native.
Since import data is only available from 2008 while export from 2002, it may be
that the difference in results for exports and imports is partly due to the time period;
longer time period may make estimates more precise, allowing to identify statistically
significant results, or it may be that the more recent effect of ethnic networks has
been weaker. Nevertheless, Table 2.15 shows that export determinants results after
2008 are very similar to those for the entire time period available.
Finally, it is useful to recall that USA Trade Online does not record 0 values
of trade, so the sample only includes observations with positive trade values. It
is common to focus the analysis on the observations with positive trade numbers
(Aleksynska and Peri (2014), Bratti, De Benedictis and Santoni (2014)). Yet it is
important to recognize that omitting observations with no trade may introduce bias.
The more traditional way to address this is to assign zeros to missing observations,
add a small amount (usually 1) and take the log. Taking this approach (which is
potentially compromised by the fact that we cannot be sure missing trade data is
actually zeros) more than doubles the number of observations compared to exports
specification and increases it 6 times compared to the imports specifications. The
results (Table 2.16), however, are generally similar to those in the specification with
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positive trade, in the direction, scale and significance of the main coefficients of
interest. Spoken non-native language increases both imports and exports, native
language has and additional export- but not import-promotion effect, and those in
countries with the same official language but who do not speak the same language
decrease both exports and imports. Geographically proximate immigrants, again,
increase exports but not imports. The coefficient on immigrants from trading partner
country becomes a little smaller for imports and larger for exports, but remains highly
statistically significant. Another approach, proposed by Silva and Tenreyro (2006), is
to use Poisson maximum likelihood estimation (PMLE), which uses levels rather than
logs. It would still require assigning zeros to observations with zero trade, however,
which may not be accurate. More importantly, the large number of fixed effects
employed here introduces numerical problems that preclude convergence, similarly
to problems faced by Bratti, De Benedictis and Santoni (2014), who also have trading
pair fixed effects. Even if convergence problems were not an issue, Martin and Pham
(2015) show that in presence of a large number of zeros, PMLE may introduce serious
bias; here the share of zeros is over 80% for imports and about 60% for exports. Not
facing the same numerical problems, Aleksynska and Peri (2014) find PMLE results
to be generally similar to OLS results. On balance, including fixed effects to account
for unobserved heterogeneity is arguably more valuable than potential bias correction
through non-linear methods. Overall, observations with zero/missing trade likely do
not significantly affect the main findings here.
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2.5 Conclusion
Overall, the analysis in the study suggests that trade with foreign countries is
affected not only by immigrants from those countries, but also immigrants from third
party countries. Broadly, we find that immigrants from countries proximate to the
trading partner country increase trade and distant ones reduce it, but the effect differs
by the type of proximity and is not identical for exports and imports. The empirical
results suggests that exports are augmented by linguistically proximate immigrants.
Specifically, the number of immigrants who speak the same language as those in
the export destination country increase exports–more so if the language spoken is
native–even if they come from geographically distant countries with a different official
language; in contrast, those who are from countries with the same official language
yet do not speak the same language, tend to decrease exports. Geographically prox-
imate immigrants (from countries bordering trade partner country) bolster exports
only if they are also linguistically proximate. In part as a consequence, the largest
export promotion effect is found for immigrants who are both geographically and
linguistically proximate to the export destination. Lastly, distant immigrants–those
neither geographically nor linguistically proximate–tend to decrease exports.
With regards to import promotion, linguistically proximate immigrants again
turn out to be important, but mainly due to speaking the same language as those in
the import origin country, as native language does not have an additional independent
effect and those from countries with the same official language but who do not share
the same spoken language tend to reduce imports. Unlike for export promotion,
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geographically proximate immigrants do not increase imports, even when they do
include linguistically proximate immigrants. Just as they decrease exports, distant
immigrants tend to decrease imports.
The above results have important implications for understanding of ethnic and
inter-ethnic spillovers. First, we provide a new type of evidence for cross-country
ethnic spillover effect. Previous research has identified ethnic network effect of certain
immigrants groups (Rauch and Trindade (2002), Giovannetti and Lanati (2015),
Felbermayr, Jung and Toubal (2010)), but did not differentiate it from the role
of common spoken language. We show that at least for exports, groups speaking
the same native language do have additional trade promotion effect beyond sharing
the same spoken language. Additionally, we show that inter-ethnic effect also takes
place, as groups speaking the same non-native language also promote trade. We,
furthermore, demonstrate that ethnic and inter-ethnic spillover effects on exports
are particularly large for immigrants from geographically proximate regions.
Our main results reflect accounting for the high degree of overlap between the
different kinds of immigrant groups considered, which could otherwise lead to mis-
leading interpretations. This is manifested in geographically proximate immigrants
increasing exports, but not if they are linguistically distant. This is also reflected
in common official and native languages being important for imports, but not after
accounting for spoken language. By accounting for important category overlaps, we
are able to not just detect that third party country immigrants matter for trade, but
also better understand what drives the relationship.
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Tables for Chapter 2
Table 2.1: Studies with the U.S. as the Host Country
Author Data: # of Countries Years Export Elasticity Method
Bandyopadhyay, Coughlin and Wall (2008) 29 (from U.S. states) 1990-2000 0.14 OLS with FE (state-country)
Bardhan and Guhathakurta (2004) 51 (from 17 U.S. states) 1994-1996 0-0.26 OLS with FE (region)
Co, Euzent and Martin (2004) 28 (from U.S. states) 1993 0.29 OLS
Coughlin and Wall (2011) 29 (48 states; 19 industries) 1990-2000 0.19 OLS with FE (state-county)
Dunlevy (2006) 87 (from U.S. states) 1990-92 (0.24-0.47 ) 0.39 OLS with FE (state, country)
Dunlevy and Hutchinson (1999) 17 1870-1910 0.08 OLS
Gove (2017) Mexican states/U.S. states 2006-2010 0.07 OLS with FE (state)
Gould (1994)* 46 1970-1986 0.02* NLIN LS
Herander and Saavedra (2005) 36 1993-1996 0.18 Tobit (region FE)
Jansen and Piermartini (2009) > 100 1996-2005 0.01-0.25 Tobit, OLS with FE (time)
Millimet and Osang (2007) Canadian states/U.S. states 1993,1997 0.0 OLS with FE (state-state)
Mundra (2005) 47 1973-1980 Not estimated Semi-par with FE and IV
Mundra (2014) 63 1991-2000 0.25 2SLS
Tadesse and White (2010) 75 (from U.S. states) 2000 0.05 Tobit
White (2009a) 28 (from 48 U.S. states) 1993 0-0.57 OLS
White (2009b) 70 1980-1997 0.0 OLS
This study 152 (50 States; 29 industries) 2002-2016 0.06-0.34;0.07-0.57 2SLS with FE (state-country)
*Wagner et al. (2002) calculation. **Preferred estimate ranges (OLS-IV) for exports and imports, respectively.
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics (in logs)
Variable N Mean SD Min Max
Exports 1040053 12.88 2.58 9.21 23.89
Imports 413287 13.42 2.91 9.21 24.83
GDP Product 1102039 48.64 2.61 0.00 57.92
Distance 1111285 8.98 0.52 5.38 9.87
Immscti 1111285 0.46 1.52 0.00 12.54
Immcslscti 1111285 3.54 2.77 0.00 12.58
Immcolscti 1111285 2.21 3.08 0.00 12.59
Immcnlscti 1111285 1.56 2.54 0.00 12.49
Immlangscti 1111285 3.75 2.89 0.00 12.59
Immbordscti 1111285 1.04 2.19 0.00 12.57
ImmNB,NLscti 1111285 4.05 3.36 0.00 12.57
Immlang,bordscti 1111285 0.64 1.66 0.00 12.57
Immlang,exclscti 1111285 3.63 2.89 0.00 12.59
Immbord,exclscti 1111285 0.24 0.62 0.00 2.49
Immcol,−s,exclscti 1111285 1.51 2.37 0.00 11.41
Immcnl,−o,exclscti 1111285 0.13 0.60 0.00 9.16
Immcsl,−on,exclscti 1111285 1.87 2.13 0.00 10.36
Immcsl,−o,exclscti 1111285 2.53 2.38 0.00 11.07
Immcsl,o,exclscti 1111285 1.94 2.81 0.00 12.58
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Table 2.3: Correlation Coefficients for Proximity Measures
Immcslscti Imm
col
scti Imm
cnl
scti Imm
bord
scti
Immcolscti 0.673
Immcnlscti 0.672 0.780
Immbordscti 0.302 0.155 0.289
Immlangscti 0.980 0.735 0.638 0.278
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Table 2.4: Descriptive Statistics
Variable N Mean SD Min Max
Exports 1040053 14.97 151.75 0.01 23786.54
Imports 413287 40.68 490.01 0.01 60630.21
GDP Product 1102039 1.32e+09 7.55e+09 0.00 1.43e+12
Distance 1111285 8876.97 3566.36 216.37 19434.64
Immscti 1111285 46.97 1097.05 0.00 278549.00
Immcslscti 1111285 667.57 4574.50 0.00 290271.48
Immcolscti 1111285 658.60 4937.59 0.00 293591.00
Immcnlscti 1111285 383.90 3787.41 0.00 266940.99
Immlangscti 1111285 823.79 5025.24 0.00 294581.95
Immbordscti 1111285 108.65 1291.19 0.00 287869.00
ImmNB,NLscti 1111285 1705.62 8777.32 0.00 286876.76
Immlang,bordscti 1111285 49.15 1126.95 0.00 287869.00
Immlang,exclscti 1111285 774.64 4851.26 0.00 294353.65
Immbord,exclscti 1111285 59.50 620.19 0.00 66455.00
Immcol,−s,exclscti 1111285 143.48 1029.74 0.00 90448.47
Immcnl,−o,exclscti 1111285 1.75 38.27 0.00 9537.60
Immcsl,−on,exclscti 1111285 78.43 407.38 0.00 31433.06
Immcsl,−o,exclscti 1111285 158.25 736.88 0.00 63970.37
Immcsl,o,exclscti 1111285 502.38 4499.30 0.00 290132.56
Exports & imports in millions, GDP product in trillions (2009 $ and $2)
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Table 2.5: Industry Characteristics (2009)
Industry NAICS Obs Ind.
GDP
Ind.
Pop.
Exp./GDP Imp./GDP Imm.
Share
Apparel and Leather 315-316 3746 10 340 .58 9.17 .5
Agriculture and Livestock 111-112 3186 110 1790 .44 .23 .32
Textiles and Textile Prod. 313-314 3377 15 290 .57 1.19 .27
Computer and Electronic Prod. 334 5585 229 1380 .64 1.1 .27
Food and Beverages 311-312 4190 243 1920 .19 .2 .24
Misc. Manufacturing Comm. 339 4472 80 1210 .57 1 .21
Furniture and Fixtures 337 3089 23 520 .14 .9 .19
Forestry, Fishing and Other 113-115 2057 28 430 .18 .41 .18
Chemicals 325 4592 310 1370 .42 .46 .17
Plastics and Rubber Prod. 326 4016 62 520 .33 .43 .16
Electrical Equipment 335 4243 50 470 .58 1.09 .16
Nonmetallic Mineral Prod. 327 3224 37 480 .19 .34 .15
Wood Prod. 321 2787 21 460 .18 .47 .15
Petroleum and Coal Prod. 324 2097 115 190 .33 .43 .14
Fabricated Metal Prod. 332 4394 118 1270 .24 .32 .13
Printing and Related 323 2864 39 690 .14 .12 .13
Transportation Equipment 336 5016 48 2380 3.25 3.66 .12
Primary Metal Mfg 331 3149 40 560 .98 1.35 .12
Machinery, Except Electrical 333 5534 116 1400 .92 .74 .11
Paper 322 3039 59 420 .32 .31 .11
Newspapers, Books and Other 511 1236 174 790 0 0 .08
Oil and Gas 211 512 185 50 .04 1.11 .07
Minerals and Ores 212 1875 66 220 .16 .08 .05
Total/Average 78280 2176 19150 .42 .66 .18
Ind. GDP figures in billions ($2), population – in thousands.
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Table 2.6: Own-Country Immigration Effect on Exports
Panel A. OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
GDP Product 0.522*** 0.535*** 0.530*** 0.533*** 0.0661*** 0.0517*** 0.242*** 0.0860***
(0.00619) (0.00584) (0.00594) (0.00597) (0.00751) (0.00781) (0.00689) (0.00724)
Immscti 0.0964*** 0.0586*** 0.0583*** 0.0575*** 0.0358*** 0.0352*** 0.00595*** 0.00482***
(0.00230) (0.00209) (0.00210) (0.00211) (0.00179) (0.00179) (0.000888) (0.000868)
Distance -1.294***
(0.0392)
R-squared 0.593 0.633 0.637 0.638 0.686 0.687 0.847 0.852
R-sq within 0.0895 0.0817 0.0802 0.0805 0.00101 0.000923 0.00405 0.000466
Panel A. 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
GDP Product 0.481*** 0.484*** 0.479*** 0.481*** 0.0568*** 0.0397*** 0.240*** 0.0842***
(0.00635) (0.00618) (0.00627) (0.00632) (0.00757) (0.00789) (0.00689) (0.00724)
Immscti 0.331*** 0.337*** 0.343*** 0.344*** 0.284*** 0.285*** 0.0546*** 0.0413***
(0.00817) (0.0106) (0.0107) (0.0108) (0.0100) (0.0101) (0.00763) (0.00756)
Distance -1.087***
(0.0390)
R-squared 0.578 0.616 0.619 0.620 0.673 0.673 0.846 0.851
R-sq within 0.0562 0.0383 0.0344 0.0343 -0.0409 -0.0417 0.00150 -0.00101
First Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
GDP Product 0.158*** 0.164*** 0.167*** 0.168*** 0.0442*** 0.0519*** 0.0452*** 0.0493***
(0.00324) (0.00299) (0.00303) (0.00305) (0.00429) (0.00448) (0.00413) (0.00445)
IV (Immscti) 0.489*** 0.414*** 0.421*** 0.419*** 0.393*** 0.391*** 0.264*** 0.265***
(0.00454) (0.00389) (0.00396) (0.00397) (0.00371) (0.00372) (0.00293) (0.00298)
Distance -0.370***
(0.0284)
Year Yes Yes Yes
State and Country Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Year Yes Yes
State-Industry Yes Yes
State-Country-Ind. Yes Yes
Observations 1028702 1028600 1028600 1028600 1028598 1028598 1014043 1014041
R-squared 0.357 0.429 0.432 0.433 0.446 0.448 0.562 0.564
R-sq within 0.146 0.0785 0.0788 0.0784 0.0551 0.0546 0.0192 0.0183
+ p < 0.10,* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.010, *** p < 0.001. Standard errors in parenthesis. Standard errors clustered at
state-country-industry level.
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Table 2.7: Own-Country Immigration Effect on Imports
Panel A. OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
GDP Product 0.297*** 0.288*** 0.289*** 0.289*** 0.0723*** 0.0560*** 0.115*** 0.0954***
(0.0115) (0.0108) (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0150) (0.0155) (0.0126) (0.0131)
Immscti 0.107*** 0.0712*** 0.0715*** 0.0715*** 0.0684*** 0.0683*** -0.000145 0.000704
(0.00406) (0.00387) (0.00387) (0.00388) (0.00350) (0.00350) (0.00127) (0.00126)
Distance -0.782***
(0.0516)
R-squared 0.465 0.516 0.518 0.519 0.556 0.556 0.900 0.901
R-sq within 0.0245 0.0167 0.0168 0.0167 0.00218 0.00216 0.000571 0.000360
Panel A. 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
GDP Product 0.221*** 0.179*** 0.177*** 0.177*** 0.0652*** 0.0539** 0.115*** 0.0953***
(0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0119) (0.0120) (0.0161) (0.0166) (0.0126) (0.0131)
Immscti 0.455*** 0.551*** 0.563*** 0.563*** 0.659*** 0.659*** -0.0109 0.00582
(0.0140) (0.0195) (0.0199) (0.0199) (0.0202) (0.0202) (0.0107) (0.0109)
Distance -0.479***
(0.0532)
R-squared 0.434 0.467 0.467 0.467 0.485 0.485 0.900 0.901
R-sq within 0.000399 0.000321
First Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
GDP Product 0.202*** 0.215*** 0.216*** 0.217*** 0.0158+ 0.00838 0.0284** 0.0226*
(0.00492) (0.00459) (0.00462) (0.00464) (0.00945) (0.00984) (0.00938) (0.00977)
IV (Immscti) 0.549*** 0.475*** 0.479*** 0.479*** 0.446*** 0.446*** 0.294*** 0.292***
(0.00562) (0.00523) (0.00534) (0.00534) (0.00512) (0.00512) (0.00443) (0.00452)
Distance -0.314***
(0.0341)
Year Yes Yes Yes
State and Country Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Year Yes Yes
State-Industry Yes Yes
State-Country-Ind. Yes Yes
Observations 409311 408845 408834 408834 408829 408829 396948 396937
R-squared 0.399 0.474 0.475 0.476 0.494 0.494 0.628 0.629
R-sq within 0.151 0.0832 0.0828 0.0828 0.0562 0.0563 0.0175 0.0163
+ p < 0.10,* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.010, *** p < 0.001. Standard errors in parenthesis. Standard errors clustered at
state-country-industry level.
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Table 2.8: Proximate Immigrant Effect on Exports and Imports
Exports Imports
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
GDP Product 0.497*** 0.494*** 0.478*** 0.481*** 0.257*** 0.252*** 0.201*** 0.186***
(0.00601) (0.00602) (0.0104) (0.0103) (0.0114) (0.0115) (0.0224) (0.0218)
Immscti 0.0526*** 0.0520*** 0.320*** 0.299*** 0.0677*** 0.0668*** 0.545*** 0.536***
(0.00205) (0.00205) (0.0116) (0.0116) (0.00380) (0.00382) (0.0217) (0.0215)
Immlangscti 0.0276*** 0.0656*** 0.0749*** 0.462***
(0.00205) (0.0116) (0.00494) (0.0238)
Immbordscti 0.0283*** 0.0265** 0.0131*** -0.0992***
(0.00155) (0.00924) (0.00317) (0.0183)
ImmNB,NLscti 0.0155*** 0.0125*** -0.0678*** -0.0838*** -0.0256*** -0.0310*** -0.407*** -0.435***
(0.00172) (0.00174) (0.0102) (0.0105) (0.00384) (0.00389) (0.0223) (0.0226)
Immlang,exclscti 0.0316*** 0.0555*** 0.0819*** 0.498***
(0.00207) (0.0117) (0.00499) (0.0242)
Immbord,exclscti 0.00781*** -0.0773*** 0.00309 -0.0947***
(0.00217) (0.0106) (0.00465) (0.0209)
Immlang,bordscti 0.0464*** 0.209*** 0.0340*** 0.0310
(0.00227) (0.0140) (0.00498) (0.0274)
Observations 1028600 1028600 1028600 1028600 408834 408834 408834 408834
R-squared 0.639 0.639 0.621 0.617 0.520 0.520 0.435 0.432
R-sq within 0.0827 0.0834 0.0365 0.0268 0.0187 0.0192
F-Stat, Inst. 10032.5 8711.4 4349.5 3609.7
All regressions include trading pair, country-year, state-year, and industry effects. + p < 0.10,* p < 0.05, **
p < 0.010, *** p < 0.001. Standard errors in parenthesis. Standard errors clustered at state-country-industry level.
Immscti – immigrants from trading partner country, ImmNB,NLscti –no common border and no common language,
Immbordscti – geographically proximate, Imm
lang
scti – linguistically proximate, Imm
bord,excl
scti – geographically but not
linguistically proximate, Immlang,exclscti – linguistically but not geographically proximate, Imm
lang,bord
scti – linguistically
and geographically proximate.
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Table 2.9: Proximate Immigrant Effect on Exports (with Different Measures for Language)
OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDP Product 0.497*** 0.496*** 0.497*** 0.463*** 0.477*** 0.473***
(0.00600) (0.00601) (0.00599) (0.00980) (0.0103) (0.00944)
Immscti 0.0519*** 0.0526*** 0.0514*** 0.301*** 0.321*** 0.304***
(0.00204) (0.00205) (0.00204) (0.0118) (0.0116) (0.0117)
ImmNB,NLscti 0.0248*** 0.0128*** 0.0243*** -0.0481*** -0.0754*** -0.0509***
(0.00162) (0.00176) (0.00162) (0.00978) (0.0105) (0.00978)
Immbordscti 0.0290*** 0.0274*** 0.0251*** 0.0360*** 0.0219* 0.0151
(0.00155) (0.00155) (0.00156) (0.00908) (0.00935) (0.00929)
Immcolscti 0.0248*** 0.0959***
(0.00166) (0.00758)
Immcslscti 0.0341*** 0.0817***
(0.00228) (0.0127)
Immcnlscti 0.0366*** 0.117***
(0.00212) (0.00904)
Observations 1028600 1028600 1028600 1028600 1028600 1028600
R-squared 0.639 0.639 0.639 0.620 0.620 0.621
R-sq within 0.0829 0.0828 0.0831 0.0361 0.0361 0.0363
F-Stat, Inst. 9409.8 9992.0 10010.3
All regressions include trading pair, country-year, state-year, and industry effects.
+ p < 0.10,* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.010, *** p < 0.001. Standard errors in parenthesis.
Standard errors clustered at state-country-industry level. Immscti – immigrants from
trading partner country, ImmNB,NLscti –no common border and no common language, Immbordscti
– geographically proximate, Immcol,exclscti – those from countries with the same official
language, Immcsl,exclscti – those with the same spoken language, Imm
cnl,excl
scti – those with the
same native language.
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Table 2.10:
Proximate Immigrant Effect on Imports (with Different Measures for Language)
OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDP Product 0.269*** 0.254*** 0.270*** 0.322*** 0.183*** 0.351***
(0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0113) (0.0209) (0.0221) (0.0202)
Immscti 0.0671*** 0.0676*** 0.0667*** 0.506*** 0.556*** 0.520***
(0.00380) (0.00380) (0.00379) (0.0223) (0.0218) (0.0220)
ImmNB,NLscti 0.00285 -0.0330*** 0.00254 -0.288*** -0.454*** -0.295***
(0.00349) (0.00395) (0.00350) (0.0216) (0.0227) (0.0216)
Immbordscti 0.0179*** 0.0110*** 0.0139*** -0.0336+ -0.129*** -0.0681***
(0.00316) (0.00317) (0.00319) (0.0184) (0.0185) (0.0184)
Immcolscti 0.0340*** 0.178***
(0.00379) (0.0145)
Immcslscti 0.0921*** 0.578***
(0.00545) (0.0258)
Immcnlscti 0.0441*** 0.173***
(0.00481) (0.0176)
Observations 408834 408834 408834 408834 408834 408834
R-squared 0.519 0.520 0.519 0.449 0.426 0.448
R-sq within 0.0177 0.0191 0.0178
F-Stat, Inst. 3978.0 4318.9 4305.8
All regressions include trading pair, country-year, state-year, and industry effects.
+ p < 0.10,* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.010, *** p < 0.001. Standard errors in parenthesis.
Standard errors clustered at state-country-industry level. Immscti – immigrants from
trading partner country, ImmNB,NLscti –no common border and no common language, Immbordscti
– geographically proximate, Immcol,exclscti – those from countries with the same official
language, Immcsl,exclscti – those with the same spoken language, Imm
cnl,excl
scti – those with the
same native language.
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Table 2.11:
Proximate Immigrant Effect on Exports (with Different Exclusive Mea-
sures for Language)
OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDP Product 0.496*** 0.493*** 0.496*** 0.491*** 0.488*** 0.489***
(0.00601) (0.00602) (0.00600) (0.00984) (0.0103) (0.00965)
Immscti 0.0510*** 0.0520*** 0.0504*** 0.291*** 0.313*** 0.298***
(0.00204) (0.00204) (0.00203) (0.0119) (0.0115) (0.0117)
ImmNB,NLscti 0.0245*** 0.00948*** 0.0239*** -0.0577*** -0.0946*** -0.0585***
(0.00161) (0.00178) (0.00162) (0.00982) (0.0108) (0.00981)
Immcol,exclscti 0.0241*** 0.0283***
(0.00170) (0.00804)
Immbord,col,exclscti 0.0276*** -0.000672
(0.00181) (0.00987)
Immcol,bordscti 0.0432*** 0.208***
(0.00249) (0.0147)
Immcsl,exclscti 0.0384*** 0.0629***
(0.00230) (0.0129)
Immbord,csl,exclscti 0.00303 -0.138***
(0.00248) (0.0144)
Immcsl,bordscti 0.0490*** 0.287***
(0.00289) (0.0191)
Immcnl,exclscti 0.0380*** 0.0771***
(0.00219) (0.00976)
Immbord,cnl,exclscti 0.0241*** -0.0262*
(0.00187) (0.0121)
Immcnl,bordscti 0.0249*** 0.163***
(0.00302) (0.0193)
Observations 1028600 1028600 1028600 1028600 1028600 1028600
R-squared 0.639 0.639 0.639 0.618 0.614 0.620
R-sq within 0.0832 0.0835 0.0833 0.0307 0.0193 0.0346
F-Stat, Inst. 8104.4 8734.0 7729.2
All regressions include trading pair, country-year, state-year, and industry effects.
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.010, *** p < 0.001. Standard errors in parenthesis.
Standard errors clustered at state-country-industry level. Immscti–immigrants from trading
partner country, ImmNB,NLscti –no common border and no common language, Imm
col,excl
scti –with
common official language but no common border, Immbord,exclscti –with common border but
different official language, Immcol,bordscti –with the same official language and common border,
Immcsl,exclscti –with the same spoken language but no common border, Imm
bord,excl
scti –with
common border but different spoken language, Immcsl,bordscti –with the same spoken language
and common border, Immcnl,exclscti –with the same native language but no common border,
Immbord,exclscti –with common border but different native language, Imm
cnl,bord
scti –with the same
native language and common border.
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Table 2.12:
Proximate Immigrant Effect on Imports (with Different Exclusive Mea-
sures for Language)
OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDP Product 0.271*** 0.251*** 0.269*** 0.365*** 0.182*** 0.340***
(0.0114) (0.0115) (0.0114) (0.0207) (0.0222) (0.0209)
Immscti 0.0673*** 0.0671*** 0.0667*** 0.528*** 0.562*** 0.527***
(0.00380) (0.00381) (0.00378) (0.0225) (0.0218) (0.0220)
ImmNB,NLscti 0.00313 -0.0393*** 0.00285 -0.297*** -0.493*** -0.286***
(0.00349) (0.00401) (0.00349) (0.0218) (0.0231) (0.0219)
Immcol,exclscti 0.0272*** 0.0773***
(0.00392) (0.0155)
Immbord,col,exclscti 0.0227*** -0.0510*
(0.00356) (0.0199)
Immcol,bordscti 0.0142* 0.0140
(0.00565) (0.0300)
Immcsl,exclscti 0.0997*** 0.601***
(0.00551) (0.0268)
Immbord,csl,exclscti -0.00557 -0.180***
(0.00547) (0.0291)
Immcsl,bordscti 0.0406*** 0.115**
(0.00638) (0.0374)
Immcnl,exclscti 0.0467*** 0.172***
(0.00514) (0.0196)
Immbord,cnl,exclscti 0.0360*** 0.0495*
(0.00363) (0.0243)
Immcnl,bordscti -0.0376*** -0.222***
(0.00670) (0.0393)
Observations 408834 408834 408834 408834 408834 408834
R-squared 0.519 0.520 0.519 0.448 0.420 0.447
R-sq within 0.0174 0.0198 0.0180
F-Stat, Inst. 3344.5 3582.6 3311.9
All regressions include trading pair, country-year, state-year, and industry effects.
+ p < 0.10,* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.010, *** p < 0.001. Standard errors in parenthesis.
Standard errors clustered at state-country-industry level. Immscti–immigrants from trading
partner country, ImmNB,NLscti –no common border and no common language, Imm
col,excl
scti –with
common official language but no common border, Immbord,exclscti –with common border but
different official language, Immcol,bordscti –with the same official language and common border,
Immcsl,exclscti –with the same spoken language but no common border, Imm
bord,excl
scti –with
common border but different spoken language, Immcsl,bordscti –with the same spoken language
and common border, Immcnl,exclscti –with the same native language but no common border,
Immbord,exclscti –with common border but different native language, Imm
cnl,bord
scti –with the same
native language and common border.
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Table 2.13: Detailed Linguistic Proximity Effect on Exports
OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
GDP Product 0.496*** 0.488*** 0.488*** 0.488*** 0.486*** 0.485*** 0.452*** 0.460*** 0.468*** 0.448***
(0.00601) (0.00606) (0.00606) (0.00607) (0.00606) (0.00988) (0.00955) (0.00958) (0.00972) (0.00944)
Immscti 0.0516*** 0.0508*** 0.0507*** 0.0510*** 0.0506*** 0.318*** 0.292*** 0.301*** 0.313*** 0.299***
(0.00204) (0.00204) (0.00204) (0.00204) (0.00204) (0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0118)
ImmNB,NLscti 0.0229*** -0.0230*** -0.0222*** 0.00123 -0.0228*** -0.0699*** -0.269*** -0.277*** -0.126*** -0.296***
(0.00165) (0.00287) (0.00287) (0.00205) (0.00286) (0.00996) (0.0216) (0.0215) (0.0123) (0.0218)
Immbordscti 0.0316*** 0.0307*** 0.0304*** 0.0305*** 0.0275*** 0.0272** 0.0347*** 0.0216* 0.0192* -0.00258
(0.00153) (0.00153) (0.00153) (0.00153) (0.00156) (0.00936) (0.00931) (0.00941) (0.00944) (0.00991)
Immcol,exclscti 0.0250*** 0.0245*** 0.0246*** 0.0255*** 0.0587*** 0.0632*** 0.0606*** 0.0681***
(0.00172) (0.00172) (0.00172) (0.00172) (0.00749) (0.00748) (0.00747) (0.00746)
Immcnl,−o,exclscti 0.0447*** 0.0276*** 0.0459*** 0.237*** 0.189*** 0.234***
(0.00635) (0.00645) (0.00633) (0.0195) (0.0197) (0.0195)
Immcsl,−o,exclscti 0.0825*** 0.0792*** 0.0819*** 0.355*** 0.339*** 0.390***
(0.00459) (0.00467) (0.00457) (0.0269) (0.0271) (0.0273)
Immcsl,−on,exclscti 0.0597*** 0.142***
(0.00436) (0.0142)
Immcsl,o,exclscti 0.0248*** 0.222***
(0.00278) (0.0201)
Immcol,−s,exclscti 0.00797* -0.147***
(0.00327) (0.0213)
Observations 1028600 1028600 1028600 1028600 1028600 1028600 1028600 1028600 1028600 1028600
R-squared 0.639 0.639 0.639 0.639 0.639 0.619 0.618 0.616 0.618 0.612
R-sq within 0.0830 0.0837 0.0837 0.0837 0.0839 0.0318 0.0307 0.0247 0.0310 0.0152
All regressions include trading pair, country-year, state-year, and industry effects. + p < 0.10,* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.010, *** p < 0.001.
Standard errors in parenthesis. Standard errors clustered at state-country-industry level. Immscti – immigrants from trading partner country,
ImmNB,NLscti –no common border and no common language, Immbordscti – geographically proximate, Imm
col,excl
scti – those from countries with the
same official language, Immcnl,−o,exclscti – proximate by common native language from countries with a different official language, Imm
csl,−o,excl
scti –
proximate by common spoken language from countries with a different official language, Immcsl,−on,exclscti – proximate by common spoken
non-native language from countries with a different official language Immcsl,o,exclscti – proximate by common spoken language from countries with
the same official language, Immcol,−s,exclscti – those from countries with the same official language but not sharing the same spoken language.
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Table 2.14: Detailed Linguistic Proximity Effect on Imports
OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
GDP Product 0.271*** 0.248*** 0.248*** 0.237*** 0.244*** 0.359*** 0.240*** 0.234*** 0.222*** 0.233***
(0.0114) (0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0208) (0.0205) (0.0205) (0.0204) (0.0205)
Immscti 0.0673*** 0.0662*** 0.0663*** 0.0669*** 0.0654*** 0.526*** 0.532*** 0.529*** 0.555*** 0.539***
(0.00380) (0.00380) (0.00380) (0.00378) (0.00380) (0.0220) (0.0224) (0.0223) (0.0220) (0.0225)
ImmNB,NLscti 0.00267 -0.106*** -0.107*** -0.0794*** -0.106*** -0.298*** -1.167*** -1.165*** -0.658*** -1.187***
(0.00353) (0.00566) (0.00564) (0.00456) (0.00566) (0.0219) (0.0436) (0.0435) (0.0272) (0.0436)
Immbordscti 0.0215*** 0.0182*** 0.0185*** 0.0178*** 0.0163*** -0.0322+ -0.0785*** -0.0673*** -0.0792*** -0.128***
(0.00312) (0.00311) (0.00310) (0.00309) (0.00318) (0.0187) (0.0191) (0.0192) (0.0188) (0.0198)
Immcol,exclscti 0.0267*** 0.0255*** 0.0254*** 0.0282*** 0.0898*** 0.0839*** 0.0842*** 0.132***
(0.00398) (0.00396) (0.00397) (0.00395) (0.0142) (0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0142)
Immcnl,−o,exclscti 0.0147 -0.0226 0.0108 0.0480 -0.155*** -0.0187
(0.0143) (0.0144) (0.0142) (0.0410) (0.0416) (0.0411)
Immcsl,−o,exclscti 0.188*** 0.190*** 0.186*** 1.378*** 1.395*** 1.396***
(0.00869) (0.00873) (0.00866) (0.0517) (0.0521) (0.0520)
Immcsl,−on,exclscti 0.212*** 0.894***
(0.00873) (0.0289)
Immcsl,o,exclscti 0.0186** 0.354***
(0.00595) (0.0408)
Immcol,−s,exclscti 0.0288*** -0.233***
(0.00703) (0.0417)
Observations 408834 408834 408834 408834 408834 408834 408834 408834 408834 408834
R-squared 0.519 0.521 0.521 0.522 0.521 0.448 0.379 0.381 0.414 0.366
R-sq within 0.0174 0.0202 0.0203 0.0227 0.0207
F-Stat, Inst. 3226.5 3139.7 2622.3 2675.5 2526.6
All regressions include trading pair, country-year, state-year, and industry effects. + p < 0.10,* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.010, *** p < 0.001.
Standard errors in parenthesis. Standard errors clustered at state-country-industry level. Immscti – immigrants from trading partner country,
ImmNB,NLscti –no common border and no common language, Immbordscti – geographically proximate, Imm
col,excl
scti – those from countries with the
same official language, Immcnl,−o,exclscti – proximate by common native language from countries with a different official language, Imm
csl,−o,excl
scti –
proximate by common spoken language from countries with a different official language, Immcsl,−on,exclscti – proximate by common spoken
non-native language from countries with a different official language Immcsl,o,exclscti – proximate by common spoken language from countries with
the same official language, Immcol,−s,exclscti – those from countries with the same official language but not sharing the same spoken language.
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Table 2.15: Detailed Linguistic Proximity Effect on Exports (after 2008)
OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
GDP Product 0.503*** 0.496*** 0.496*** 0.497*** 0.495*** 0.512*** 0.485*** 0.493*** 0.501*** 0.479***
(0.00662) (0.00667) (0.00667) (0.00669) (0.00668) (0.0110) (0.0107) (0.0108) (0.0109) (0.0106)
Immscti 0.0503*** 0.0495*** 0.0495*** 0.0498*** 0.0493*** 0.313*** 0.288*** 0.300*** 0.310*** 0.295***
(0.00231) (0.00231) (0.00231) (0.00231) (0.00231) (0.0132) (0.0131) (0.0132) (0.0132) (0.0132)
ImmNB,NLscti 0.0235*** -0.0165*** -0.0156*** 0.00672** -0.0163*** -0.0814*** -0.233*** -0.238*** -0.120*** -0.260***
(0.00199) (0.00331) (0.00332) (0.00238) (0.00331) (0.0112) (0.0229) (0.0228) (0.0136) (0.0231)
Immbordscti 0.0318*** 0.0310*** 0.0307*** 0.0309*** 0.0271*** 0.00419 0.0166 0.00147 -0.00132 -0.0205+
(0.00175) (0.00175) (0.00174) (0.00175) (0.00179) (0.0103) (0.0102) (0.0103) (0.0104) (0.0108)
Immcol,exclscti 0.0276*** 0.0271*** 0.0272*** 0.0280*** 0.0470*** 0.0529*** 0.0490*** 0.0536***
(0.00201) (0.00201) (0.00201) (0.00201) (0.00805) (0.00804) (0.00804) (0.00803)
Immcnl,−o,exclscti 0.0443*** 0.0282*** 0.0448*** 0.246*** 0.208*** 0.244***
(0.00687) (0.00702) (0.00687) (0.0206) (0.0209) (0.0206)
Immcsl,−o,exclscti 0.0738*** 0.0700*** 0.0734*** 0.280*** 0.257*** 0.315***
(0.00532) (0.00543) (0.00530) (0.0282) (0.0285) (0.0286)
Immcsl,−on,exclscti 0.0476*** 0.0968***
(0.00501) (0.0151)
Immcsl,o,exclscti 0.0320*** 0.227***
(0.00328) (0.0216)
Immcol,−s,exclscti 0.00333 -0.161***
(0.00376) (0.0223)
Observations 646038 646038 646038 646038 646038 646038 646038 646038 646038 646038
R-squared 0.647 0.647 0.647 0.647 0.647 0.628 0.629 0.626 0.627 0.623
R-sq within 0.0848 0.0853 0.0854 0.0852 0.0856 0.0348 0.0380 0.0311 0.0342 0.0232
F-Stat, Inst. 4867.6 5003.9 4076.8 4053.4 3854.7
All regressions include trading pair, country-year, state-year, and industry effects. + p < 0.10,* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.010, *** p < 0.001.
Standard errors in parenthesis. Standard errors clustered at state-country-industry level. Immscti – immigrants from trading partner country,
ImmNB,NLscti –no common border and no common language, Immbordscti – geographically proximate, Imm
col,excl
scti – those from countries with the
same official language, Immcnl,−o,exclscti – proximate by common native language from countries with a different official language, Imm
csl,−o,excl
scti –
proximate by common spoken language from countries with a different official language, Immcsl,−on,exclscti – proximate by common spoken
non-native language from countries with a different official language Immcsl,o,exclscti – proximate by common spoken language from countries with
the same official language, Immcol,−s,exclscti – those from countries with the same official language but not sharing the same spoken language.
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Table 2.16: Detailed Linguistic Proximity Effect on Exports and Imports (Including Observations with Zero Trade)
Exports Imports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
GDP Product 0.0596*** 0.0518*** 0.0526*** 0.0568*** 0.0595*** 0.0225*** 0.0187*** 0.0176*** 0.0168*** 0.0173***
(0.00328) (0.00321) (0.00321) (0.00323) (0.00313) (0.00206) (0.00204) (0.00204) (0.00203) (0.00200)
Immscti 0.761*** 0.700*** 0.704*** 0.756*** 0.689*** 0.399*** 0.367*** 0.361*** 0.389*** 0.362***
(0.0125) (0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0124) (0.0122) (0.00876) (0.00859) (0.00864) (0.00861) (0.00861)
ImmNB,NLscti 0.0648*** -0.219*** -0.219*** 0.00476 -0.227*** 0.00531+ -0.185*** -0.185*** -0.111*** -0.185***
(0.00435) (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.00725) (0.0110) (0.00274) (0.00689) (0.00687) (0.00459) (0.00683)
Immbordscti 0.0368*** 0.0263*** 0.0226** 0.0306*** -0.0363*** -0.00704 -0.0225*** -0.0168*** -0.0192*** -0.0291***
(0.00700) (0.00684) (0.00698) (0.00702) (0.00709) (0.00465) (0.00459) (0.00467) (0.00464) (0.00480)
Immcol,exclscti 0.0597*** 0.0644*** 0.0642*** 0.0631*** -0.00823** -0.00574+ -0.00543+ -0.00169
(0.00463) (0.00459) (0.00458) (0.00461) (0.00305) (0.00303) (0.00303) (0.00302)
Immcnl,−o,exclscti 0.169*** 0.0509** 0.163*** 0.00170 -0.0776*** -0.00892
(0.0168) (0.0172) (0.0168) (0.0114) (0.0115) (0.0112)
Immcsl,−o,exclscti 0.483*** 0.479*** 0.495*** 0.314*** 0.321*** 0.310***
(0.0154) (0.0157) (0.0151) (0.00968) (0.00978) (0.00964)
Immcsl,−on,exclscti 0.132*** 0.256***
(0.0105) (0.00662)
Immcsl,o,exclscti 0.336*** 0.0442***
(0.0130) (0.00858)
Immcol,−s,exclscti -0.266*** -0.0399***
(0.0136) (0.00911)
Observations 2513802 2513802 2513802 2513802 2513802 2513802 2513802 2513802 2513802 2513802
R-squared 0.958 0.959 0.959 0.958 0.958 0.960 0.959 0.960 0.959 0.959
R-sq within 0.881 0.883 0.882 0.881 0.881 0.896 0.895 0.895 0.895 0.895
F-Stat, Inst. 17198.6 18134.4 14425.5 14318.9 14733.7 17352.3 18281.8 14548.0 14446.6 14779.8
All regressions include trading pair, country-year, state-year, industry, and trade participation effects. + p < 0.10,* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.010,
*** p < 0.001.Standard errors in parenthesis. Standard errors clustered at state-country-industry level. Immscti – immigrants from trading
partner country, ImmNB,NLscti –no common border and no common language, Immbordscti – geographically proximate, Imm
col,excl
scti – those from
countries with the same official language, Immcnl,−o,exclscti – proximate by common native language from countries with a different official
language, Immcsl,−o,exclscti – proximate by common spoken language from countries with a different official language, Imm
csl,−on,excl
scti – proximate
by common spoken non-native language from countries with a different official language Immcsl,o,exclscti – proximate by common spoken language
from countries with the same official language, Immcol,−s,exclscti – those from countries with the same official language but not sharing the same
spoken language.
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CHAPTER 3
FARM SIZE, POLICY DISTORTIONS, AND CROSS-COUNTRY
VARIATION IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY
3.1 Introduction
Why the measured labor productivity gap between rich and poor countries is
much larger in agriculture than in non-agriculture is a long-standing puzzle in devel-
opment economics. In fact, the gap is about two times larger in agriculture (Caselli
(2005), Gollin, Lagakos and Waugh (2014a), Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2014)).
Since more productive labor is key to higher standards of living and most of the
world’s poor working adults make a living through agriculture (Castaneda et al.
(2016)), increasing agricultural labor productivity in low-income countries could have
tremendous impact on poverty reduction. This has motivated a large body of work
dedicated to trying to understand the reasons why the cross-country differences in
agricultural labor productivity are as large as they are.
This paper aims to understand which potential explanations for the international
agricultural productivity differences are consistent with analysis herein and which
are not, as both failing to find the cause and misdiagnosing the true cause of the
differences is undesirable. Because smallholders constitute the majority of farmers
and are poorer, and since the role of smallholders in structural transformation is a
broader question in development economics, we are particularly interested in investi-
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gating what role farm size plays in explaining international differences in agricultural
productivity. One type of evidence for the role of farm size is what is known as inverse
relationship (IR) between farm size and land productivity (yield) with accompanying
positive relationship between farm size and labor productivity within farms. This
relationship seems to suggest that reallocating labor to larger farms should both
decrease land productivity and increase labor productivity.
While the above line of reasoning does not necessitate total factor productivity
advantage of large farms, Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2014) argue that larger farms
are more productive even for the same level of input use, and further that one of the
chief reasons for the vast agricultural labor productivity differences between rich and
poor countries is size-dependent policies, especially tax policies, that disproportion-
ately favor small farms and lead to production factor misallocation. They attribute
as much as 3 quarters of the differences in agricultural labor productivity between
top and bottom quintiles of countries in terms of per capita income to policy in-
terventions and market distortions that lead to fewer large farms and more small
farms; in particular, one-quarter of the variation is explained by crop-specific price
distortions in poor countries that favor small farms. According the model that their
paper is built on, a farmer draws productivity from a lognormal distribution, and this
productivity parameter directly enters the production function. The implications are
somewhat similar to those in the industrial organization and trade literature, in that
exogenous (usually Pareto or lognormal) productivity distribution results in a small
number of large, more productive firms and a large number of less productive firms.
Importantly, the large firms with a higher productivity draw will have higher pro-
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ductivity even when using the same amount of inputs as the smaller firms. If this is
also the case in agriculture, it is a strong argument to identify and consider removing
policies that incentivize creating and maintaining small farms. If these policies are
more prevalent in poorer countries, this could be a major source of the agricultural
labor productivity disparity between rich and poor countries. Here, we test both
whether average farm size and size distribution explain cross-country productivity
differences and whether crop-specific price distortions affect average farm size.
There are other explanations for the lower labor productivity of smaller farms,
such as bimodal production structure (especially in developing countries), whereby
large farms have a cost advantage in purchasing non-labor primary and intermediate
inputs and small farms have an advantage in purchasing labor inputs/using family
labor; if these are true, focusing on alleviating disadvantages faced by small farmers
may potentially be a better strategy efficiency- and welfare-wise. If these distortions
are more prevalent in developing countries, this may be a large part of the explanation
for the large agricultural labor productivity differences between high-income and low-
income countries.
A different type of explanation for the larger gap in agriculture is misallocation
between broad sectors–agriculture and non-agriculture. Market failures in a number
of markets, but in particular, labor market, may lead to difficulty in relocating from
agriculture to non-agriculture. Additionally, policies that favor agriculture over non-
agriculture may be subsidizing the inefficient sector and keeping more labor therein.
Here, we test whether absolute and relative rates of assistance to agriculture in poor
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countries make agriculture labor relatively less productive there. Other explanations
include different rates of use of intermediate inputs, selection into agriculture and
measurement error. We are able to test the first reason, but not the latter two,
although we keep them in mind.
To explore what explains international differences in agricultural productivity, we
compile data on agricultural output per worker, primary and intermediate inputs,
institutional setting and development level proxies, and farm size using a variety of
sources, including many individual country agricultural censuses. We also calculate
GINI index of farm size inequality and a measure of farm size distortion similar to
that used by Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2014)–correlation between crop specific
nominal rate of assistance (NRA) and average farm size by crop–and include measures
for overall nominal and relative rates of assistance to agriculture. To our, knowledge
this is the most extensive and recent dataset compiled for this purpose.
In our analysis, we opt for a reduced form estimation rather than calibration. In
this way, we obviate some of the strong assumptions and limitations of structural
models, such as that in Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2014) study, admittedly at the
cost of others. One assumption that we want avoid making is taking optimal farm
size in every country as being a function of the same managerial ability distribution,
based on the data from the United States. For one, managerial ability may be a
function of relevant education and experience (i.e. not randomly drawn from the
same lognormal distribution common to all countries). It may also be a result of
U.S. agricultural policies, which Cai (2015) find favor large farms. Additionally, it
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may be complimentary to available capital inputs. Importantly, it is difficult to test
for accuracy of this assumption.
Another reason to pursue a reduced-form approach is to decrease reliance on the
U.S. as the benchmark economy. A number of calibration-based studies have relied on
this approach, likely due to availability of reliable and detailed agricultural statistics
for the United States and due to assumption of fewer distortions in the U.S. On the
flip side, relying on one country seems more likely to bias results due to idiosyncratic
factors than relying equally on information from all countries with available data; for
the former, we only need the U.S. to systematically differ from all other countries,
whereas for the latter, we need systematic differences across countries not accounted
for in the model.
We follow aggregate production function estimation approach similar to Vollrath
(2007), but look at labor instead of land productivity and also examine the effect of
agricultural tax policy, as a measure of potential distortions, both with regards to
average farm size and productivity. Other deviations from Vollrath (2007) methods
include simultaneous estimation of average farm size and agricultural labor produc-
tivity determinants, to account for their potentially simultaneous determination, and
variance decomposition. The latter is an especially apt approach here, since 1), there
may be various channels of influence between the nominally independent variables,
complicating regression coefficient interpretation, and 2), we are interested in looking
at how much of the agricultural output per worker variation is explained by the main
farm size distortion variable as well as the other variables of interest.
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Overall, we find that controlling for primary and intermediate inputs, the evidence
for average farm size affecting agricultural labor productivity is weak. This does
not mean that factors are not misallocated between different farms–different levels
of primary and intermediate input use may already be a result of that–but it is
inconsistent with larger farms having higher total factor productivity, suggesting
the effects of misallocation may be less severe. As further evidence inconsistent with
misallocation away from large farms, we find that neither the share of large farms nor
farm size inequality increase labor productivity. Additionally, even if average farm
size were to independently affect productivity, we find that it is implausible that
crop-specific price distortions decrease average farm size in countries of the poorest
quintile, as beginning with the 2000 World Census of Agriculture the correlation
between nominal rate of assistance and farm size per crop has been positive in this
group of countries.
In terms of other explanations for the productivity gap, there is little evidence of
overall price support for agriculture as the culprit, as 1) neither nominal (NRA) nor
relative (RRA) rates of assistance seem to affect output per worker and 2) it is the
rich rather than the poor countries that appear to be subsidizing agriculture both in
absolute and in relative terms; this does not mean there is no sectoral misallocation,
however, as agricultural land per worker may already reflect some misallocation and
it increases labor productivity, but it is unlikely to be due to taxes/subsidies. In
addition to land per worker, primary inputs, such as machinery and livestock, also
increase labor productivity; the results indicated that agricultural inputs explain
most of the labor productivity variation, but we cannot tell if they are misallocated
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to begin with.
Variance decomposition results echo marginal effects results, in that less than
10% of the variation in output per worker is explained by average farm size and
most of it is explained by primary and intermediate inputs. Most of the variation
in average farm size is also explained by primary and intermediate inputs, with over
30% attributable to agricultural land per worker.
The paper proceeds as follows: the next section provides brief discussion of re-
lated literature, Section 3.3 describes data used for empirical analysis and presents
descriptive statistics, Section 3.4 explains empirical strategy, Section 3.5 presents
results and Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Related Literature
The literature related to farm size distribution and agricultural productivity can
be divided into studies on international farm size distribution differences, studies
on international agricultural labor productivity gap (that is, the tendency for agri-
cultural productivity differences to be much higher than for non-agriculture), and
studies on within-country farm size and productivity relationship. The first kind of
literature is usually descriptive and is rather scarce. The second kind of literature
is less scarce and generally uses macroeconomic variables and calibration approach
to explain the differences between countries at the extremes of income distribution.
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The third kind of literature is quite prolific, usually based on micro data, but gen-
erally does not directly attempt to explain international differences in farm-size or
agricultural labor productivity.
3.2.1 International Farm Size Differences
It is useful to consult literature on international farm size differences because it
reveals some of the chief factors associated with larger farm sizes, which are gen-
erally related to factors other than government policies leading to size distortion.
One of the first efforts to compare and examine international differences in average
farm size was made by Grigg (1966), who primarily used data from the FAO’s 1950
World Census of Agriculture. Farm land area was chosen as a measure of size, given
scarce availability of total value of output or other alternative estimates. Some of
the differences identified in the study continue to be observed today. The largest
average farm size was observed in more recently settled and less densely populated
regions, such as Australia, North America, parts of South America and the Soviet
Union (which had socialized agriculture, complicating the comparison). The small-
est average farm size was found in the densely populated areas of East Asia, South
Asia, Africa, parts of Central and Southern Europe. The regions in-between were
in Central America, parts of South America, and Western and Northern Europe.
The first observational inference was of a negative correlation between (agricultural)
land scarcity/(rural) population density and farm size, especially important at the
extremes. Another was the importance of inheritance laws, specifically primogeni-
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ture versus partible inheritance. The third notable issue was measurement reliability,
stemming from sources such as uncertain land tenure, especially in parts of Africa.
Farm activity type was found to be another important determinant/correlate of farm
size, with livestock farms having the largest area and horticulture activities and “self-
sufficing” the least. Lastly, a variety of economic factors, such as relative scarcity of
capital and market access where posited to be potentially important. No statistical
estimate of any of these factors was provided, however.
In a more recent study, Eastwood, Lipton and Newell (2010) show that between
1930 and 1990, average farm size in Europe and North America has increased, and in
South America, Asia and Africa (since 1970)–declined; consequently the gap in av-
erage farm size between large parts of Africa and Asia and the other regions (except
South America) increased compared to Grigg’s study. They also find a positive rela-
tionship between average farm size and GINI measure of (farm size) inequality. As
determinants of farm size distribution, Eastwood, Lipton and Newell (2010) discuss
importance of concerted human effort, such as “colonial land grab” or land reforms,
market interventions, such as taxes and subsidies, and the effects of liberalization
and economic development, where the latter is positively related to the farm size.
162
3.2.2 Agricultural Productivity Differences
International differences in agricultural labor productivity are significantly larger
than non-agricultural productivity differences. Caselli (2005) observes that the dif-
ference between the 10th and 90th labor productivity percentiles to be a factor of
22 in non-agriculture and 45 in agriculture. Similarly, Adamopoulos and Restuccia
(2014) find a 47-fold agricultural productivity difference between the average of the
rich and poor country quintiles (in 1990 World Census), compared to a factor of 20
for non-agriculture. Gollin, Lagakos and Waugh (2014a) look at physical-output-
based productivity differences (based on rice, wheat, and maize), and find the top
to bottom decile differences to be on average around 50.
Because the difference in labor productivity between rich and poor countries
is about twice as large in agriculture as in non-agriculture, this suggests that some
feature (or features) of agriculture in poor countries makes it especially unproductive
(over and above factors that affect labor productivity in other sectors). Several
plausible explanations have been put forth in the literature.
One potential reason is lower rates of use of intermediate inputs in poorer coun-
tries; of course, this is more of an intermediate reason, as the reason(s) for differential
use is(are) the ultimate cause. Potential causes for lower intermediate input use in-
clude risk aversion in the face of agriculture-specific shocks, higher prices, and other
direct or indirect barriers (Donovan (2012); Restuccia, Yang and Zhu (2008)). Po-
tentially because these aspects are more characteristic of developing countries, the
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share of intermediate inputs in rich-country agriculture is estimated to be around
0.4, compared to estimates of 0.04-0.12 in poor countries.
Another potential explanation for agricultural productivity differences is selec-
tion into agriculture, as discussed by Lagakos and Waugh (2013), whereby in poor
countries, those relatively less productive in agriculture select in, whereas in the
rich countries those relatively more productive in agriculture select in; subsistence
constraint is one of the possible reasons for the selection into agriculture in poor
countries.
A broad potential explanation is misallocation of labor between agriculture and
non-agriculture. McMillan, Rodrik and Verduzco-Gallo (2014) and Vollrath (2009),
among others, have argued that reallocation of labor from agriculture to non-
agriculture would substantially increase labor productivity. There is strong evidence
of benefits of structural transformation, whereby low-income societies with large
share of labor in agriculture become high-income societies with smaller but more
productive agriculture, but some disagreement persists about the way to achieve it,
including the role of small vs. large farms (Barrett et al. (2017)).
Misallocation within agriculture has also been examined as one of the potential
sources of productivity gaps, particularly in regard to allocation between farms with
heterogeneous productivity, leading to farm size distribution distortion. This idea is
related to the study of size-distorting effect of taxes that are positively correlated
with productivity, discussed in the case of manufacturing in Restuccia and Rogerson
(2008). In case of agriculture, the basic principle for the explanation is that larger
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farms are more productive and policies that distort farm size distribution towards
lower average size and more smaller farms diminish productivity (Adamopoulos and
Restuccia (2014)). Using micro-level data from Malawi, Restuccia and Santaeulalia-
Llopis (2017) find that removing farm-size distortions has a potential of tripling
agricultural labor productivity. Using cross-country data calibrated to observed U.S.
indicators, Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2014) find that aggregate factors, such as
capital, land, and economy-wide productivity, account for one quarter of observed
differences between rich and poor countries in size and labor productivity, with poli-
cies and institutions that misallocate resources across farms potentially accounting
for the rest. More specifically, their results indicate that crop-specific price distor-
tions correlated with farm size account for 25% of cross-country differences in size
and productivity.
A different kind of explanation is measurement error. Gollin, Lagakos and Waugh
(2014b) find that taking sector differences in hours and human capital per worker
into consideration jointly reduces the size of the average agricultural productivity
gap from around four to around two. They also look at the alternative measures
of value-added, sectoral differences in labor’s share of value-added, urban-rural dif-
ferences in the cost of living and other factors, but these factors do not seem to
explain more of the agricultural productivity gap. Relatedly, using detailed data on
4 African economies, McCullough (2017) finds that accounting for hours worked, gen-
erally much smaller in agriculture, reduces the productivity gap by half. In line with
these two studies, Vollrath (2013) finds that taking into account better estimates
of labor effort and human capital reduces the estimate of productivity gap by half.
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Herrendorf and Schoellman (2015) show that even in the U.S.–where severe misal-
location is unlikely–there is a significant labor productivity gap between agriculture
and non-agriculture, that measured through wages rather than labor productivity,
gaps are much smaller, and that a big part of the explanation is that productivity
in agriculture is severely mismeasured in the U.S. and several foreign countries of
varying income levels. Using detailed data from three African countries, Gollin and
Udry (2017) find that once one takes into account idiosyncratic shocks, measurement
error, and heterogeneity in land quality, the importance of misallocation in account-
ing for productivity dispersion across farms drops substantially, whereby optimal
reallocation would increase aggregate output by 15% in Ghana and 50% in Uganda
(compared to 200% improvement Restuccia and Santaeulalia-Llopis (2017) find for
Malawi).
Overall, it is likely that multiple factors affect the agricultural labor productivity
gap, and that it is probably overstated without accounting for measurement error.
3.2.3 Inverse Size-Productivity Relationship
A related strand of literature concerns not inter- but intranational relationship
between farm size and productivity. These studies generally focus on yield and farm
size (not average farm size) relationship. In particular, explanation of the appar-
ent inverse relationship (IR) between farm size and land productivity has been the
topic of a number of articles. Some of the explanations for the apparent relation-
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ship include price risk (Barrett (1996)), unobserved land quality (Benjamin (1995)),
labor market imperfections (Barrett, Bellemare and Hou (2010); Foster and Rosen-
zweig (2011); Binswanger and Rosenzweig (1986); Feder (1985)), different “mode of
production” (Carter (1984)) and others. It has been suggested that bimodal produc-
tion, with different utilization of resources by large and small farms is one possible
result of factor market imperfections (Cornia (1985); Vollrath (2007)). While most of
these studies do not attempt to directly explain international farm size distribution
differences, if the within-country factors that affect both farm size and productiv-
ity systematically differ between countries, they may be part of the explanation of
international differences in farm size distribution.
One problem trying to connect the IR literature to that on cross-country dif-
ferences is that the most often former focuses on land productivity and the latter
on labor productivity. Some of the more recent papers alleviate this problem by
focusing on total factor productivity and using detailed farm-level panels. Rada
and Fuglie (2018) summarize the findings in 5 special issue studies that examine
a number of countries of varying income levels by concluding that, “The evidence
suggests that the relationship between farm size and productivity evolves with the
stage of economic development. In conjunction with economic growth and market
development, initial productivity advantages of small farms appear to gradually at-
tenuate over time, moving toward constant and eventually increasing returns to size.
Nonetheless, the small farm sector can be quite dynamic, and need not be a drag
on agricultural growth until perhaps well into the development process.” (Rada and
Fuglie (2018), p. 2). One implication of these results is that if true, they make in-
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ferences about misallocation in low-income countries based on the U.S. (a developed
country) as a benchmark economy potentially misguided.
The present study aims to address the question of international farm size distri-
bution and agricultural productivity differences in a way more consistent with the
literature on international agricultural labor productivity differences, that is, using
macro level variables. However, we opt for a reduced-form approach, obviating some
of the assumptions associated with structural models used for this purpose, especially
those that depend on the U.S. as a benchmark economy, admittedly, at the cost of
others.
3.3 Data
To examine what explains cross-country differences in agricultural labor produc-
tivity, we combine data from several sources. The data on yield, area harvested,
number of agricultural workers, labor productivity, agricultural inputs, arable and
total land per capita comes from FAOSTAT. Estimates of nominal rate of assistance
for specific crops and for agriculture on average are from the World Bank’s Distor-
tions of Agricultural Incentives Database. Data on average farm size, farm size by
crop, and farm size distribution is from the FAO’s World Census of Agriculture and
country agricultural census websites. Non-agricultural productivity, employment,
population and other country characteristics are from Penn World Tables 8.0. Land
quality estimates come from Wiebe (2003). Institutional quality is the average of six
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measures of institutional quality compiled by Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido (2002).
Legal origin is from La Porta et al. (1999).
3.3.1 Descriptive Statistics
We present descriptive statistics for the cross-section and panel specifications in
Table 3.1 and Table 3.2. The first set of variables is comprised of the latest observa-
tions for 89 countries with data available to estimate specifications (1) through (4)
in Table 3.1. The next set includes variables used in the estimation with GINI and
tax distortion variables, which is the set of the latest observations from 44 countries.
For panel data, the number of observations for variables in the regressions without
farm size distribution and policy variables is 285, but it is reduced to 147 for the
set where all the variables are present. Table 3.1 shows that the mean of average
farm size is 42 hectars, but it ranges from 0.47 to over 779. NRA/average farm size
correlation is on average negative, which means that crops with smaller average farm
size tend to benefit from greater assistance. NRA average is positive, meaning that
the net effect on prices is on average a subsidy, while small but positive RRA means
assistance to agriculture is generally slightly greater than to non-agriculture.
To form an idea of sources of differences in agricultural productivity between rich
and poor countries, it is informative to look at the means of the key variables by
quintile of GDP per capita by each WCA decade, shown in Table 3.4. Starting with
agricultural output per worker, we can see that in 2010 WCA, the top quintile showed
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output per worker valued at about 31,000 in 2005 dollars, compared to about 3,444 for
the bottom quintile, a difference of a factor of 10, significantly larger than the factor of
6 difference for non-agricultural productivity. It should be pointed out that this is an
underestimate of what the differences would be if all countries were included, since the
table only includes countries with key data available (340 observations over 5 decades,
an average of 68 per decade). Compared to 1970, we see about the same difference
in non-agricultural productivity and a somewhat smaller differences in agricultural
productivity. The average difference in the ratio of nonagricultural to agricultural
productivity (which is not equal to the ratio of the average nonagricultural and
agricultural productivity), has remained roughly the same, at 2. The share of labor in
agriculture in every decade is strictly decreasing with respect to the income quintile.
Additionally, it almost always decreases from one decade to the next for each quintile.
It decreased more for the top quintile than for the bottom, but it decreases the most
for the second-highest quintile .
The difference in average farm size depends significantly on the countries in the
sample, especially the ones with the largest farm size (Australia has been excluded
from all analysis as an outlier). The difference between the top and bottom quintiles
ranges from a factor of 10 in 1980 to almost 100 in 2010, and is about 50 on average,
significantly larger than difference in productivity. The growing difference in average
farm size is consistent with findings elsewhere, however, that average farm size has
grown in North America and parts of Europe, but decreased in most of Africa and
Asia, exacerbating international differences. The GINI measure of inequality of farm
size distribution does not seem to have changed significantly over the five decades,
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nor is it dramatically different between the top and bottom quintiles; in fact it seems
to be the largest in the middle quintile.
Turning to the tax variables, we see an increase in nominal rate of assistance
(increase in subsidy rates) between 1970 and 1990, but a sharp decrease from 1990
to 2010, consistent with trade liberalization in most of the world in 1990’s and 2000’s.
Relative rate of assistance saw the same general pattern of change. Notably, however,
the rich countries still subsidize agriculture, both in absolute terms and compared to
nonagriculture, whereas the poor countries have on average negligible subsidies for
agriculture, less than other sectors, for a negative RRA.
Looking at the main variable meant to capture farm size distortion, correlation
between crop-specific farm size and crop-specific NRA, we find that in the 1990
WCA, the decade in Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2014) study, there is indeed a
much stronger negative correlation for the countries in the lowest income quintile, 12
times larger than in the top quintile, at -0.47 compared to -0.038, which means that
they subsidized less or taxed more the crops with larger farm size. In 2000 and 2010,
however, the correlation switched to positive for the poor countries and became even
more negative for the rich countries, which suggests that if the mechanism played a
role in explaining productivity differences in 1990 (as well as in 1980 and 1970), this
may no longer be the case for 2000 and 2010.
Perhaps the most dramatic difference between rich and poor countries is in the
use of intermediate inputs. The differences in aggregate capital stock per worker,
livestock per worker, agricultural machinery per worker and fertilizer use per worker
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are at least a factor of 10 in almost every decade for every variable, but go as high as
70 for agricultural machinery. This is likely a key source of difference in agricultural
labor productivity.
That countries with greater output per worker and larger average farm size tend
to to be more intensive in non-labor input use is further demonstrated in Table 3.3.
The correlation between output per worker, average farm size and the main inputs
is extremely high, at least 0.5 and generally higher, with correlation between output
per worker and agricultural machinery use at 0.865. We further illustrate the three-
way relationship between output per worker, average farm size and agricultural land
per worker in Figure 3.1. At all levels of the variables, there is an obvious, and not
unexpected, positive relationship (notably, output per hectar tends to be lower with
more land per worker). Whereas land per worker increases with average farm size
throughout the distribution, Figure 3.2 shows that capital use per worker seems to
rise only after log of average farm size exceeds 2; it also appears to begin to rise after
land per worker reaches a threshold. Overall, Figures 3.1 and 3.2 suggests that at
least part of the reason for the strong correlation between output per worker and
average farm size is likely to be the tendency of countries with larger farm size to
also use more primary and intermediate inputs. Another thing to note in Figure 3.2
is that three countries, Canada, New Zealand and, notably, USA, have significantly
more capital per worker compared to other countries, deviating substantially from
the fitted values line, which should prompt caution in using any of the three as a
benchmark economy for a comparative study.
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Further exploring the relationship between farm size distribution and agricultural
labor productivity, we look at the top two graphs in Figure 3.2. As previously found
by Vollrath (2007), GINI seems to be positively and rather strongly correlated with
average farm size. Whereas it was found to be negatively correlated with output
per hectar in Vollrath (2007), it is positively, but weakly correlated with output per
worker. As an alternative measure of distribution, we look at the share of small
(<5 Ha) and large (>20 Ha) farms in Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4. There is a clear
tendency for countries with a larger share of small farms to have lower output per
worker and the countries with higher share of large farms to have higher output per
worker, but only above initial threshold (about 0.1), consistent with Rada and Fuglie
(2018) analysis that posits different farm sizes may be optimal at different levels of
development. Analogously to previous findings, capital and land per worker tend to
be positively related to the share of large farms and negatively to the share of small
farms, with USA and New Zealand deviating from the overall trend (share of small
and large farms not available for Canada).
In Figure 3.5 we look at the general direction of correlation between the crop-
specific price distortion measures (correlation between nominal rate of assistance
per crop and average size per crop)–CORR and CORR2–and average farm size and
output per worker. There appears to be essentially no unconditional correlation
between output per worker and CORR, and a slightly negative one between output
per worker and CORR2. Average farm size is positively correlated with CORR, which
suggests higher subsidies for crops with larger farm size may indeed be leading to
larger average farm size and more negative CORR–to smaller average farm size.
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3.4 Empirical Strategy
Moving from examining unconditional relationships between variables considered,
we motivate empirical methodology by following the approach of Vollrath (2007) in
examining how farm size distribution can affect average productivity, applying it to
labor rather than land productivity. Initially, if we take all farms as sharing the same
production function per unit of labor, total agricultural output for a country can be
written as
Y = A[Mfav(X)] = A[QfNfav(X)], or (1)
Y = A[Lgav(X)] = A[Qf (L/M)Ngav(X)], (2)
where A is total factor productivity (TFP), M is total agricultural land, Qf is an
average farm size, N is the number of farms, L is total agricultural labor, and fav(.)
and gav(.) are production functions per hectar and per unit of labor, respectively,
for a farm of an average size, and X is a vector of input used. To get output per
hectar or per worker, we can divide both sides by total land area or the agricultural
labor force, respectively. It the production function does not vary by farm size, then
output per worker is
YL = A[gav(X)] (3)
and is independent of average farm size. But if production function varies by farm
size, such that ∂g(.)/∂Qf 6= 0, total output per worker (and, analogously, per hectar)
may differ in countries with different average farm sizes. Consider the case where
production functions differ by farm size and farm size distribution is characterized by
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a certain degree of inequality. To proxy for inequality of farm size, Vollrath (2007)
shows that average output per hectar can be expressed as follows:
yM = A[(1− λ)θsfs(Xs) + λθlfl(Xl)], (4)
where λ is the share of large farms, Qs and Ql are average farm sizes for small
and large farms, and fs and fl are the corresponding production functions. For our
purposes, we can multiply both sides by agricultural area per worker by M/L and
express f(.) in terms of g(.) to obtain
yL = (M/L)A[(1− λ)θs(L/M)sgs(Xs) + λθl(L/M)lgl(Xl)], (5)
which can be further simplified if we assume worker to land ratio to be the same
across farms, but this is rarely the case empirically. Because Ll/Nl > Ls/Ns is likely
to hold (more overall labor per large farm), a negative regression coefficient on the
share of larger farms or GINI suggests gs(.) > gl(.), while a positive coefficient does
not necessarily indicate the opposite (it needs to be sufficiently large).
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3.4.1 Cross-Section
To transform (3) to estimable equation, we can take logs of both sides.1 This
approach follows the literature in expressing partial productivity as a function of in-
put quantity and quality (human capital proxies, land quality). Additionally, to test
whether labor productivity is affected by average farm size, GINI, and tax/subsidy
distortions (for example, through decreasing TFP), we add terms that capture these
factors, obtaining the following estimating equation (CRS form most similar to Voll-
rath (2007)):
lnyLi = βo + β1gi + β2lnli + βxlnXwk,i + βzZwk,i + βNRANRA
5yr
i +
βCORRCORR
5yr
i + i,
(6)
where yLi is output per worker in country i, li is land per holding (average farm size),
gi is the GINI coefficient of farm sizes, Xi is a vector of inputs in per worker terms,
Zi is a vector of other country-specific controls expected to affect labor productivity;
NRA5yri is the average nominal rate of assistance for the previous five years and
CORR5yri is the correlation between farm size per crop and the average nominal rate
of assistance per crop over the previous five years; X includes livestock per worker,
value of agricultural machinery per worker, fertilizer inputs per worker, and land
per worker. Z controls include input quality and type, including land quality index,
percent of land irrigated, and share of land in pasture. It also contains quality of
1A production function of a generally acceptable type, such as Cobb-Douglas, is amenable to
this operation
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labor indicators, with life expectancy and fertility rate as proxies. These variables are
highly correlated with other indicators of human capital, such as levels of education,
but are characterized by higher availability. Z also contains a measure of institutional
quality and indicator for legal origin. Research and development is another relevant
variable but its availability in FAO data is limited, and cannot be used in most
specifications. Finally, i is a potentially heteroskedastic error term.
We expect all of the inputs in production as well as land quality to have positive
effect on output. Similarly, better institutions should positively affect productivity,
through better property rights, better contract enforcement, less corruption and fewer
distortionary government interventions (although we are not directly interested in
the coefficients on institutional controls). Similarly we expect labor quality/human
capital variables to positively affect labor productivity.
The fist of the main variables of interest is average farm size. Because the evidence
for unconditional positive correlation between farm size and labor productivity is
strong, we should expect larger average farm size to have a positive correlation when
not controlling for input use. Controlling for input use and country TFP-related
controls, however, we should see a positive coefficient on average farm size if larger
farms have productivity advantage from a source other than the use of main primary
and intermediate inputs, such as through exogenously given managerial ability that
is higher for larger farms. Absence of such an effect would suggest that that smaller
average farm size, given the same input use, would lead to the same agricultural
output per worker.
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When discussing the expected GINI coefficient effect, it is useful to consider the
potential sources for higher or lower GINI. Generally, a small number of big farms
in conjunction with a large number of very small farms should lead to higher GINI.
Higher GINI may reflect lower barriers to efficient reallocation of land from smaller,
potentially less-productive farms to larger, potentially more productive farms; this
is the case consistent with the hypothesis of Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2014). In
fact, if the American farm size distribution with GINI of 0.8 is optimal, the average
for the countries considered, at 0.62, is more than 1 standard deviation lower than
optimal. We should then expect a positive coefficient on GINI (which, as (5) suggests,
does not necessarily mean that larger farms have higher TFP). On the other hand,
higher GINI coefficient may reflect market failures preventing efficient allocation of
land from larger farms to more efficient smaller farms. A negative coefficient on GINI
is indicative of smaller farms being more productive in terms of TFP.
The first policy variable, correlation between average farm size per crop and the
crop-specific nominal rate of assistance, interests us in two ways. First, we want to
see if small-size-favoring policy leads to lower agricultural labor productivity directly,
such as through lower efficiency manifested in lower TFP. We observe this if the
coefficient on CORR variable is positive–that is, the lower the relative preference
for small farms, the higher the productivity. If there is no effect of CORR other
than through farm size distribution, it should not be significant in the regression.
We also want to see if CORR affects productivity through its impact on average
size, so we test whether larger relative preference for larger farms increases average
farm size. Since it is possible that any distortions, rather than distortions in one
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particular direction matter, we construct a CORR-squared variable, which reflects
the deviation from no distortion.
The other two policy variables of interest are NRA and RRA. With regards to the
NRA, the predicted coefficient is ambiguous, without controlling for non-agriculture
tax, since farms of all sizes are affected the same way and NRA does not tell us
about reallocation to/from agriculture. For this reason, we also include Relative
Rate of Assistance, RRA, which reflects ratio of agriculture to non-agriculture NRA.
Subsidizing (less taxation) of the agricultural sector should lead to reallocation of
mobile factors (labor and capital) to agriculture (or slower reallocation out of it); if
this means misallocation of labor to the sector with lower productivity, larger RRA
should have a negative effect on labor productivity. The results of cross-section
regression are presented in Table 3.5.
3.4.2 Panel
Panel specification has the advantage of allowing us to control for country fixed
effects, which is especially useful in cross-country analysis, as there is a large degree
of heterogeneity across countries on a number of accounts, some of which may intro-
duce omitted variable bias by affecting both labor productivity and one or more of
the explanatory variables. We cannot solve this problem completely, but we can go
at least part of the way by accounting for the heterogeneity that is time-unvarying.
Additionally, panel specification has the advantage of allowing us to use significantly
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more data points, which may decrease noise in the estimation and increase the ro-
bustness of results. The downside is that a lot of the relevant variation may be
between countries rather than within. So, we rely on combined insights from cross-
section and panel results. We drop the “5yr” superscript for notational clarity and
obtain the following panel regression:
lnyLit = βo + β1git+ β2lnlit + βxlnXwk,it + βzZ
′
it + βNRANRAit+
βCORRCORRitvi + ωt + it,
(7)
where t is World Agricultural Census decade and Z’ are the variables in Z that are
time-varying. Panel results are presented in Table 3.6.
3.4.3 2SLS, SUR and 3SLS
There are reasons to believe that average farm size may be endogeneous, for
example, due to inheritance practices or land reforms that also affect productivity.
To account for this, we instrument for it using the total country area per capita,
which is assumed to be exogenous. In the first stage, we regress average farm size
on the explanatory variables used in the the OLS regression and total country area
per worker:
lit = αo + α1gi + α2lnCAWit + αxlnXit + αzZ
′
it + αNRANRAi + αCORRCORRi + δi,
(8)
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where CAWit is country area per capita in WCA decade t. In the second stage, we
obtain the following specification:
lnyLit = βo + β1git + β˜2 ˆlnlit + βxlnXit + βzZ
′
it + βNRANRAit + βCORRCORRit + it,
(9)
where ˆlnli are predicted values from the first stage. Since there may be correlation
between errors of the first stage and the second stage, to increase efficiency, we also
use seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) to increase efficiency of the estimation.
The results of these estimations are presented in Table 3.7.
3.4.4 Variance Decomposition
Finally, since our interpretation of marginal effects may be complicated by mul-
tiple pathways through which variables on the right hand side potentially influence
each other, and since we are interested in comparing the share of variation in agricul-
tural labor productivity explained by tax policy to the Adamopoulos and Restuccia
(2014) figures, we also use a variance decomposition approach. We look both at the
variance explained directly by the tax policy other than though average farm size
and also through average farm size. We use the following Shapley-based R−squared
decomposition approach:
Mk = R2[y = a+
∑
j∈S
bjxj + bkxk + e]−R2[y = a∗ +
∑
j∈S
b∗jxj + e∗] (10)
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where Mk is the lower bound for the contribution to R-squared of factor k and the
two terms, in order, are R−squared with and without variable k, but with the other
variables present. We estimate this for each of the variables of interest from the
pooled OLS specification; decomposition is conducted both for output per worker
R2 and average farm size R2.
3.5 Results
In Table 3.5, we start by regressing output per worker on average farm size. The
elasticity of output per worker with respect to farm size, not conditional on other
variables, is 0.68 and is highly statistically significant. Additionally, more than half
the variation in output per worker is explained by average farm size. As we progres-
sively add agricultural inputs, land quality controls and labor quality/human capital
controls, the elasticity shrinks to about 0.2. In specifications (5)-(9), we limit the
sample to countries with farm size GINI coefficient, nominal rate of assistance and
correlation between NRA and crop-specific farm size data available. In all speci-
fications with the reduced sample average farm size is not statistically significant,
whereas the point estimate stays close to 0.2. Neither the farm size distribution
inequality nor the tax policy variables appear significant. Livestock per worker and
agricultural machinery per worker are positive and significant throughout. Since col-
umn (5) suggests that lack of statistical significance may be due to smaller sample size
rather than additional controls, we shift attention to panel results with significantly
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more observations.
In Table 3.6, we start with a pooled OLS model. The main changes from the
cross-section results are that the correlation between crop-specific farm size and
crop tax is negative and significant and land per worker is now highly significant.
The sign on NRA/Size Corr. is contrary to expectation, since it suggests higher
subsidies for crop with larger average farm size lead to lower output per worker. In
column (2), we present fixed effects regression results including only average farm
size, and, again, find it to be highly significant, although with an elasticity of 0.35,
about half that of cross-section result. Column (3) includes input use and land
quality controls, but not GINI coefficient or the tax variables. The output elasticity
estimate is similar to cross-section results and statistically significant. When we add
the GINI coefficient and tax policy variables, neither these variables nor average farm
size appear significant. We experiment with a more efficient random effects model
(column (8)), but Hausman test suggests random effects estimator is not consistent
here. The main variable that seems to be driving the change in output per worker is
the use of agricultural land per worker, with an average elasticity across specifications
of around 0.5. We also experimented with including RRA instead of NRA, but it
did not significantly alter the results.
Since average farm size may be endogenous, in Table 3.7 we instrument for it
using country area per capita. Although the Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2014)
theory predicts tax policy operates though altering farm size, it is evident from farm
size determinants regression in first stage that NRA/Size correlation does not affect
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average farm size; first stage also reveals that the explanatory power of country
area per capita is not sufficient. This results in large standard errors on average
farm size in the second stage. Consequently, we take steps to increase efficiency
of estimation. First, we do not instrument for average farm size, but estimate the
regression with farm size as the dependent variable simultaneously with the main
regression. In regression with farm size as the dependent variable, standard errors
on country area per capita decrease to the point where it has a statistically significant
effect on average farm size. Additionally, agricultural land per work and livestock per
worker appear to be positively correlated with farm size and machinery–negatively
correlated. Neither average NRA nor correlation with average farm size significantly
affect farm size. In the main regression, we again see an elasticity of output with
respect to land per worker of above 0.5. Average farm size effect is negative and
not statistically significant. Lastly, we combine both 2SLS and SUR approaches
in the 3SLS model. The results are very similar to SUR. None of these attempts
indicate tax policy operating through farm size, as neither the impact of tax policy
nor the impact of average farm size on agricultural labor productivity are statistically
significant. F-statistic on the instrument is around 6, below the threshold where we
would be comfortable with instrument strength, but given that the effect of average
farm size on output per worker is negative and close to being statistically different
from zero, it is unlikely that lack of positive effect is due to weak instrument.
For alternative specifications, we separately use share of small farms and share
of large farms instead of average farm size and GINI and find essentially equivalent
results, in that unconditionally, the share of small farms is negatively and share
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of large farms positively correlated with agricultural output per worker (Figure 4),
but controlling for inputs, land and institutional quality, the relationship completely
disappears. Table 3.8 presents only the main pooled OLS and fixed-effects results
of this approach. Neither share of large nor share of small farms affect output per
worker. We again see a negative effects of NRA and RRA in pooled OLS but not
the fixed-effects model. Agricultural land per worker and share of land irrigated are
the main variables affecting output per worker in the fixed-effects specification.
Because of multiple pathways between independent variables and since we are
interested in the share of variation in agricultural labor productivity explained by
farm size, tax policy and other variables, we conduct R-squared decomposition for
output per worker as well as for average farm size. Looking at the results in Table 3.9,
we confirm findings from marginal effects estimation. We find that almost one third
of total explained variation (which, in turn, accounts for 80 percent of total variation)
in average farm size can be attributed to the amount of arable land per capita and
almost two thirds–to agricultural input use and labor quality covariates, with tax
policy and GINI of land distribution accounting for around 6%. For agricultural labor
productivity variation, we find that about 10 percent of R-squared (of overall 0.9)
is explained by farm size and farm size inequality and potential policy distortions,
with the rest being accounted for by input quantity and quality and TFP proxies.
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3.6 Conclusion
Multiple reasons for low agricultural labor productivity in poor countries com-
pared to rich have been proposed by economics literature. By examining deter-
minants of international differences in agricultural labor productivity, we present
evidence consistent with some explanations but not others. Motivated by the obser-
vation that larger farms generally have lower land and higher labor productivity, one
explanation suggests that intrasector factor misallocation in form of lower average
farm size in poor countries is directly responsible for low agricultural labor produc-
tivity in low-income countries. A particular position argued by Adamopoulos and
Restuccia (2014) is that policies that distort farm size distribution towards lower
mean account for as much as three quarters of the agricultural labor productivity
gap between rich and poor countries, and that crop-specific price distortion favoring
small farms accounts for one quarter. The reason is that larger farms are more pro-
ductive, everything else equal, due to being managed by more productive managers,
and misallocation of labor away from the most productive farms reduces productiv-
ity. Most specifically, we find that it is implausible that crop-specific price distortions
favoring small farms affect productivity through lowering average farm size in poor
countries because 1) beginning with 2000 World Census of Agriculture, crop-specific
price distortions in poor countries favor larger farms and 2) we find no evidence of
such distortions affecting average farm size. More broadly, despite unconditional
positive relationship, we find that average farm size has no independent effect on
labor productivity when controlling for input quantity and quality, suggesting larger
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farms do not systematically have higher TFP.
Another potential explanation is factor misallocation across sectors, with one
reason being preferential treatment of agriculture. While we cannot rule out mis-
allocation across sectors, we do not fine evidence that it is due to over-subsidizing
of agriculture in poor countries, as analysis suggests 1) high-income countries sup-
port agriculture more, both in absolute terms and compared to other sectors and
2) neither nominal nor relative rates of assistance appear to markedly impact pro-
ductivity. Additionally, some of the recent literature suggests much of the measured
labor productivity difference between agriculture and non-agriculture may be due to
measurement error.
This does not rule out other common explanations, including misallocation. Most
of the variation in output per worker is explained by primary and intermediate input
use, which is consistent with previous findings in the literature that explain agricul-
tural labor and land productivity differences between large and small farms through
differences in prices and availability of factors of production and intermediate in-
puts, credit access, price risk and land quality, among others. On the other hand,
some recent studies (Rada and Fuglie (2018)) suggest that optimal operational size
and input ratio may differ across stages of development, suggesting differential input
intensity need not mean misallocation.
In sum, we find that there is little evidence of cross-country differences in agri-
cultural labor productivity being explained by distortions of agricultural incentives
(of the type considered), including nominal and relative rates of assistance, overall
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and crop-specific, and especially through affecting farm size. Instead, most of the
variation is explained by differential input quantity and quality, which may or may
not mean misallocation. If it does mean misallocation, especially between large and
small farms, the causes of it matter. If the reason for smaller average farm size is
that large farms do not grow larger because of disincentives they face or that small
farms are incentivized to stay small, the implications are different than if the reason
is that small farms cannot grow bigger because of credit constraint, uninsurable risk,
higher input prices or other reasons preventing them from acquiring more and better
quality inputs and making productivity-enhancing investments. This paper suggests
need for caution in interpreting ostensible correlation between average farm size and
agricultural labor productivity as evidence of innate advantages of larger farms that
poor countries are unable to make use of due factor misallocation caused by policy
and institutional barriers.
188
References for Chapter 3
Adamopoulos, Tasso, and Diego Restuccia. 2014. “The Size Distribution of
Farms and International Productivity Differences.” American Economic Review,
104(6): 1667–97.
Anderson, Kym. 2009. Distortions To Agricultural Incentives: A Global Perspec-
tive, 1955-2007. World Bank Publications.
Barrett, Christopher B. 1996. “On Price Risk and the Inverse Farm Size-
Productivity Relationship.” Journal of Development Economics, 51(2): 193–215.
Barrett, Christopher B, Luc Christiaensen, Megan Sheahan, and Abebe
Shimeles. 2017. “On the Structural Transformation of Rural Africa.” Journal of
African Economies, 26(suppl_1): i11–i35.
Barrett, Christopher B, Marc F Bellemare, and Janet Y Hou. 2010. “Re-
considering Conventional Explanations of the Inverse Productivity--Size Relation-
ship.” World Development, 38(1): 88–97.
Benjamin, Dwayne. 1995. “Can Unobserved Land Quality Explain the Inverse
Productivity Relationship?” Journal of Development Economics, 46(1): 51–84.
Binswanger, Hans P, and Mark R Rosenzweig. 1986. “Behavioural and Mate-
rial Determinants of Production Relations in Agriculture.” The Journal of Devel-
opment Studies, 22(3): 503–539.
189
Boserup, Ester. 1965. “The Conditions of Agricultural Growth.” Chicago: Aldine
Publishing Company, 1965.
Cai, Wenbiao. 2015. “Technology, Policy Distortions and the Rise of Large Farms.”
The University of Winnipeg, Department of Economics.
Carter, Michael R. 1984. “Identification of the Inverse Relationship between Farm
Size and Productivity: An Empirical Analysis of Peasant Agricultural Production.”
Oxford Economic Papers, 131–145.
Caselli, Francesco. 2005. “Accounting for Cross-Country Income Differences.”
Handbook of economic growth, 1: 679–741.
Castaneda, Andres, Dung Doan, David Newhouse, Minh Cong Nguyen,
Hiroki Uematsu, and Joao Pedro Azevedo. 2016. “Who Are the Poor in the
Developing World?” Working Paper No. 7844. The World Bank.
Cornia, Giovanni Andrea. 1985. “Farm Size, Land Yields and the Agricultural
Production Function: An Analysis for Fifteen Developing Countries.” World De-
velopment, 13(4): 513–534.
Donovan, Kevin. 2012. “Agricultural Risk, Intermediate Inputs, and Cross-
Country Productivity Differences.” Job Market Paper.
Eastwood, Robert, Michael Lipton, and Andrew Newell. 2010. “Farm Size.”
Handbook of agricultural economics, 4: 3323–3397.
190
Feder, Gershon. 1985. “The Relation between Farm Size and Farm Productiv-
ity: The Role of Family Labor, Supervision and Credit Constraints.” Journal of
Development Economics, 18(2-3): 297–313.
Feenstra, Robert C, Robert Inklaar, and Marcel Timmer. 2015. “The Next
Generation of the Penn World Table.” American Economic Review, 105(10): 3150–
3182.
Food and Agriculture Organization. 2014a. “FAOSTAT Database.” United Na-
tions. Available at http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/data.
Food and Agriculture Organization. 2014b. “World Census of Agriculture.”
United Nations.
Foster, Andrew D, and Mark R Rosenzweig. 2011. “Are Indian Farms Too
Small? Mechanization, Agency Costs, and Farm Efficiency.” Econojmic Growth
Center, Yale University, New Haven, CT.
Gollin, Douglas, and Christopher Udry. 2017. “Heterogeneity, Measurement
Error, and Misallocation: Evidence from African Agriculture.” Department of In-
ternational Development, Oxford University, Mimeo.
Gollin, Douglas, David Lagakos, and Michael E Waugh. 2014a. “Agricul-
tural Productivity Differences Across Countries.” The American Economic Review,
104(5): 165–170.
Gollin, Douglas, David Lagakos, and Michael E. Waugh. 2014b. “The Agri-
cultural Productivity Gap.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129(2): 939–993.
191
Grigg, David. 1966. “The Geography of Farm Size A Preliminary Survey.” Eco-
nomic Geography, 205–235.
Herrendorf, Berthold, and Todd Schoellman. 2015. “Why Is Measured Produc-
tivity So Low in Agriculture?” Review of Economic Dynamics, 18(4): 1003–1022.
Israeli, Osnat. 2007. “A Shapley-Based Decomposition of the R-Square of a Linear
Regression.” The Journal of Economic Inequality, 5(2): 199–212.
Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay, and Pablo Zoido. 2002. “Governance Matters
II: Updated Indicators for 2000-01.” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper,
No. 2772.
Lagakos, David, and Michael E Waugh. 2013. “Selection, Agriculture,
and Cross-Country Productivity Differences.” The American Economic Review,
103(2): 948–980.
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert
Vishny. 1999. “The Quality of Government.” Journal of Law, Economics, and
Organization, 15(1): 222–279.
McCullough, Ellen B. 2017. “Labor Productivity and Employment Gaps in Sub-
Saharan Africa.” Food policy, 67: 133–152.
McMillan, Margaret, Dani Rodrik, and Íñigo Verduzco-Gallo. 2014. “Glob-
alization, Structural Change, and Productivity Growth, With An Update on
Africa.” World Development, 63: 11–32.
192
Pardey, Phillip G. 2011. “African Agricultural Productivity Growth and R&D
in a Global Setting.” Stanford Symposium Series on Global Food Policy and Food
Security in the 21st Century.
Rada, Nicholas E, and Keith O Fuglie. 2018. “New Perspectives on Farm Size
and Productivity.” Food Policy, Forthcoming.
Restuccia, Diego, and Raul Santaeulalia-Llopis. 2017. “Land Misallocation
and Productivity.” National Bureau of Economic Research.
Restuccia, Diego, and Richard Rogerson. 2008. “Policy Distortions and Ag-
gregate Productivity With Heterogeneous Establishments.” Review of Economic
Dynamics, 11(4): 707–720.
Restuccia, Diego, Dennis Tao Yang, and Xiaodong Zhu. 2008. “Agriculture
and Aggregate Productivity: A Quantitative Cross-Country Analysis.” Journal of
Monetary Economics, 55(2): 234–250.
Vollrath, Dietrich. 2007. “Land Distribution and International Agricultural Pro-
ductivity.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 89(1): 202–216.
Vollrath, Dietrich. 2009. “How Important Are Dual Economy Effects for Aggregate
Productivity?” Journal of Development Economics, 88(2): 325–334.
Vollrath, Dietrich. 2013. “Measuring Aggregate Agricultural Labor Effort in Dual
Economies.” Eurasian Economic Review, 3(1): 39–58.
193
Wiebe, Keith Daniel. 2003. Land Quality, Agricultural Productivity, and Food
Security: Biophysical Processes and Economic Choices At Local, Regional, and
Global Levels. Edward Elgar Publishing.
194
Figures and Tables for Chapter 3
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics for Cross-Section
Variable N Mean SD Min Max
Output/worker (1000$ 2005) 89 13.69 20.55 0.14 94.27
Avg. Farm Size (HA) 89 41.02 119.97 0.47 778.69
Farm Size Gini 49 0.62 0.17 0.25 0.94
NRA/Size Corr. 57 -0.14 0.39 -1 0.67
NRA/SizeCorr.2 57 0.17 0.25 0 1
Average NRA 58 0.11 0.27 -0.26 1.4
Average RRA 55 0.03 0.32 -0.47 1.61
Livestock/wk (Cow equivalents) 89 0.09 0.16 0.00 0.98
Fertilizers/wk (Tons) 89 1.9 4.07 0.00 24.79
Ag. Machinery/wk (1000s $ 2005) 89 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.2
Ag. Land/wk (ha) 89 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.25
Land Quality 89 6.74 1.25 3.04 9.86
Percent of Agr. Land Irrigated 89 8.73 13.15 0 67.12
Agr. Land Share in Pasture 89 53.33 28.43 1.44 98.65
Fertility Rate 89 3.75 2.08 1.25 7.71
Average Life Expectancy 89 66.21 12.61 37.02 82.34
Quality of Institutions 89 0.08 0.83 -1.88 1.72
Legal Orig. UK 89 0.29 0.46 0 1
Legal Orig. French 89 0.54 0.5 0 1
Legal Orig. Socialist 89 0.08 0.27 0 1
Legal Orig. German 89 0.04 0.21 0 1
Legal Orig. Scand 89 0.04 0.21 0 1
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics for Panel
Variable N Mean SD Min Max
Output/worker (1000$ 2005) 285 14.71 19.09 0.14 116
Avg. Farm Size (HA) 285 42.24 95.76 0.47 778.69
Farm Size Gini 188 0.63 0.17 0.1 0.94
NRA/Size Corr. 186 -0.11 0.4 -1 0.98
NRA/SizeCorr.2 186 0.17 0.23 0 1
Average NRA 191 0.29 0.5 -0.36 3.55
Average RRA 186 0.21 0.55 -0.65 3.44
Livestock/wk (Cow equivalents) 285 0.1 0.14 0.00 0.98
Fertilizers/wk (Tons) 285 2.82 4.87 0.00 45.43
Ag. Machinery/wk (1000s $ 2005) 285 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.55
Ag. Land/wk (ha) 285 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.25
Percent of Agr. Land Irrigated 285 9.84 13.62 0 67.12
Agr. Land Share in Pasture 285 45.9 28.27 0.6 98.65
Fertility Rate 285 3.28 1.92 1.15 8.36
Average Life Expectancy 285 68.56 9.58 34.61 82.34
Table 3.3: Correlation Between Ag. Output/wk, Avg. Farm Size and Inputs/wk (2000)
Ag. Land/wk Livestock/wk Fertilizer/wk Machinery/wk Average Farm Size
Ag. Land/wk 1
Livestock/wk 0.609 1
Fertilizer/wk 0.505 0.806 1
Machinery/wk 0.592 0.801 0.870 1
Average Farm Size 0.775 0.638 0.614 0.656 1
Ag. Output/Wk 0.608 0.845 0.864 0.865 0.696
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Table 3.4: Variable Means by Decade and GDP/cap. Quintile
Avg. Farm Size (HA)
WCA Decade 1 2 3 4 5 Total
1970 2.439 7.021 17.202 108.442 51.954 39.501
1980 3.508 14.427 32.667 43.044 36.094 28.262
1990 2.615 12.816 80.241 17.363 66.864 39.083
2000 2.927 28.235 17.444 57.03 51.414 33.909
2010 6.936 87.952 41.358 137.431 688.909 217.248
Total 3.606 29.532 35.402 73.652 158.645 68.803
GINI
WCA Decade 1 2 3 4 5 Total
1970 0.494 0.522 0.792 0.658 0.551 0.6
1980 0.578 0.763 0.66 0.646 0.572 0.631
1990 0.593 0.688 0.653 0.574 0.604 0.621
2000 0.47 0.621 0.611 0.672 0.672 0.626
2010 0.671 0.783 0.746 0.583 0.606 0.66
Total 0.542 0.67 0.679 0.628 0.608 0.628
NRA/Farm Size Corr.
WCA Decade 1 2 3 4 5 Total
1970 -0.197 -0.098 0.249 0.107 -0.159 -0.069
1980 -0.498 -0.388 -0.257 -0.094 -0.157 -0.241
1990 -0.417 -0.716 0.104 -0.047 -0.038 -0.131
2000 0.02 -0.04 -0.209 0.003 -0.112 -0.067
2010 0.108 -0.068 -0.167 -0.126 -0.142 -0.111
Total -0.166 -0.182 -0.118 -0.043 -0.117 -0.119
NRA 5yr Average
WCA Decade 1 2 3 4 5 Total
1970 0.001 -0.089 0.066 0.339 0.541 0.242
1980 -0.049 -0.138 0.119 0.499 0.735 0.299
1990 0.075 0.062 0.266 0.444 0.922 0.493
2000 -0.034 0.144 0.288 0.419 0.364 0.249
2010 0.038 0.023 0.091 0.232 0.219 0.149
Total 0.008 -0.005 0.171 0.383 0.542 0.28
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(Continued)
RRA 5yr Average
WCA Decade 1 2 3 4 5 Total
1970 -0.309 -0.282 -0.107 0.315 0.398 0.089
1980 -0.308 -0.4 -0.017 0.438 0.681 0.199
1990 -0.052 -0.051 0.156 0.342 0.887 0.422
2000 -0.176 0.058 0.201 0.349 0.342 0.18
2010 -0.087 -0.042 0.005 0.227 0.193 0.102
Total -0.165 -0.139 0.063 0.329 0.488 0.196
Agriculture Employment Share
WCA Decade 1 2 3 4 5 Total
1970 0.794 0.558 0.302 0.251 0.15 0.352
1980 0.733 0.534 0.439 0.196 0.188 0.382
1990 0.649 0.417 0.32 0.184 0.155 0.318
2000 0.568 0.374 0.206 0.139 0.115 0.263
2010 0.556 0.247 0.235 0.077 0.071 0.219
Total 0.64 0.421 0.304 0.167 0.137 0.304
Output/wk (1000$ 2005)
WCA Decade 1 2 3 4 5 Total
1970 1.151 2.478 6.905 9.959 19.342 8.815
1980 1.259 2.063 4.868 13.403 10.934 7.039
1990 2.502 4.599 7.135 15.598 19.026 10.885
2000 3.931 11.492 15.55 24.806 28.718 18.114
2010 3.444 18.532 20.963 32.377 30.952 22.272
Total 2.54 7.943 11.197 19.342 21.859 13.548
WCA Decade 1 2 3 4 5 Total
Nonag. Output/wk (1000$ 2005)
1970 9.205 12.629 18.814 31.373 53.615 29.825
1980 15.111 11.058 21.353 29.756 37.14 24.475
1990 9.859 14.122 23.675 36.255 44.609 27.954
2000 7.642 18.25 29.619 33.374 51.849 30.648
2010 10.163 23.04 33.14 52.973 65.919 39.725
Total 10.179 16.066 25.656 36.54 50.414 30.519
Ratio of Nonag./Ag. Output/wk
WCA Decade 1 2 3 4 5 Total
1970 11.479 7.839 4.021 4.758 5.438 6.158
1980 16.259 6.546 7.779 3.039 7.934 7.912
1990 8.01 5.836 6.356 4.114 5.277 5.781
2000 3.717 4.849 3.413 2.837 4.136 3.801
2010 6.72 3.191 3.356 2.778 3.177 3.662
Total 8.507 5.57 5.03 3.453 5.177 5.372
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(Continued)
Capital Stock/wk (1000$ 2005)
WCA Decade 1 2 3 4 5 Total
1970 0.005 0.015 0.027 0.058 0.139 0.056
1980 0.008 0.009 0.043 0.13 0.077 0.057
1990 0.008 0.015 0.05 0.068 0.177 0.076
2000 0.009 0.047 0.074 0.084 0.152 0.081
2010 0.011 0.073 0.135 0.214 0.179 0.129
Total 0.009 0.032 0.067 0.108 0.143 0.079
Livestock/wk (Cow equivalents)
WCA Decade 1 2 3 4 5 Total
1970 0.005 0.009 0.066 0.048 0.149 0.062
1980 0.008 0.014 0.048 0.093 0.123 0.065
1990 0.008 0.051 0.062 0.144 0.127 0.085
2000 0.03 0.049 0.117 0.129 0.215 0.117
2010 0.026 0.07 0.104 0.232 0.194 0.131
Total 0.016 0.038 0.08 0.126 0.164 0.093
Ag. Machinery/wk (1000s $ 2005)
WCA Decade 1 2 3 4 5 Total
1970 0 0 0.005 0.007 0.04 0.013
1980 0 0.001 0.006 0.031 0.031 0.016
1990 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.025 0.069 0.026
2000 0.001 0.016 0.03 0.03 0.047 0.027
2010 0.001 0.018 0.054 0.102 0.074 0.053
Total 0.001 0.008 0.021 0.038 0.051 0.026
Fertilizer/wk (Tons)
WCA Decade 1 2 3 4 5 Total
1970 0.036 0.1 0.731 1.075 4.086 1.408
1980 0.125 0.288 0.967 4.015 2.931 1.806
1990 0.233 0.272 0.818 3.493 6.377 2.697
2000 0.185 1.411 2.883 2.177 5.606 2.708
2010 0.22 2.443 5.439 4.901 6.623 4.284
Total 0.155 0.911 2.234 3.005 5.061 2.543
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Figure 3.1: Output/wk, Output/Ha, Land/wk and Avg. Size (2000)
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Figure 3.2: Output/wk, GINI, Avg. Size, Capital/wk and Land/wk (2000)
201
Figure 3.3: Output/wk, Output/Ha, Share of Small (<5 Ha) and Large (>20 Ha) Farms (2000)
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Figure 3.4: Capital/wk, Land/wk, Share of Small (<5 Ha) and Large (>20 Ha) Farms (2000)
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Figure 3.5: Avg. Size and Size/NRA Correlation (2000)
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Table 3.5: Cross-Section Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Avg. Farm Size 0.681∗∗∗ 0.155 0.194∗ 0.219∗ 0.205 0.209 0.192 0.192 0.201
0.055 0.082 0.090 0.098 0.148 0.180 0.197 0.192 0.185
Livestock/wk 0.417∗∗∗ 0.379∗∗∗ 0.324∗∗ 0.454∗∗ 0.453∗∗ 0.459∗∗ 0.466∗∗ 0.478∗∗
0.087 0.097 0.105 0.139 0.142 0.151 0.150 0.152
Fertilizers/wk 0.071 0.017 0.011 0.037 0.035 0.042 0.051 0.063
0.054 0.064 0.065 0.099 0.112 0.121 0.122 0.119
Ag. Machinery/wk 0.222∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗ 0.261∗ 0.261∗ 0.252∗ 0.248 0.250∗
0.041 0.041 0.062 0.112 0.115 0.121 0.121 0.112
Ag. Land/wk -0.165∗∗∗ 0.049 0.047 -0.006 -0.004 0.005 -0.004 -0.033
0.045 0.095 0.102 0.178 0.193 0.201 0.201 0.206
Land Quality 0.128∗ 0.084 0.155 0.158 0.139 0.131 0.122
0.051 0.054 0.076 0.087 0.102 0.096 0.097
Percent Irrigated 0.015 0.012 0.018∗ 0.019∗ 0.018 0.018 0.018
0.009 0.010 0.008 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.010
Share in Pasture -0.005 -0.006 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001
0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005
Farm Size Gini -0.055 -0.041 -0.041 -0.106
0.763 0.795 0.784 0.746
NRA/Size Corr. -0.024 -0.045
0.279 0.279
Average NRA -0.130
0.334
Average RRA -0.232 -0.187
0.264 0.261
NRA/SizeCorr.2 -0.483
0.526
R-squared 0.558 0.869 0.885 0.890 0.941 0.941 0.941 0.942 0.944
N 89 89 89 89 44 44 44 44 44
Institutions, Legal Origin, Fertility, Life Expectancy Included (4)-(9)
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3.6: Panel Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS FE FE FE FE FE FE RE
Avg. Farm Size -0.076 0.350∗ 0.242∗ 0.113 0.045 0.037 0.033 -0.063
0.044 0.156 0.120 0.058 0.101 0.089 0.088 0.056
Farm Size Gini 0.155 -0.340 -0.329 -0.304 -0.004
0.269 0.340 0.517 0.517 0.320
NRA/Size Corr. -0.353∗∗∗ -0.019 0.032
0.102 0.075 0.125
Average NRA -0.174∗ -0.109 -0.080 -0.086 -0.138
0.082 0.087 0.095 0.097 0.088
Livestock/wk 0.403∗∗∗ -0.188 0.067 0.108 0.061 0.069 0.273∗
0.059 0.119 0.114 0.130 0.147 0.148 0.116
Fertilizers/wk 0.140∗ 0.095∗ 0.075 0.060 0.034 0.033 0.111
0.058 0.044 0.060 0.067 0.075 0.075 0.065
Ag. Machinery/wk -0.030 0.147 -0.037 -0.034 -0.097 -0.106 -0.027
0.042 0.109 0.071 0.092 0.096 0.100 0.072
Ag. Land/wk 0.353∗∗∗ 0.557∗∗ 0.526∗∗∗ 0.522∗∗ 0.627∗∗∗ 0.628∗∗∗ 0.455∗∗∗
0.080 0.174 0.119 0.163 0.170 0.163 0.119
Percent Irrigated -0.000 0.015 0.012 0.017 0.019∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.004
0.003 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.007 0.007 0.005
Share in Pasture -0.002 -0.003 -0.010 -0.010 -0.011 -0.011 -0.004∗
0.002 0.007 0.006 0.008 0.006 0.006 0.002
NRA/SizeCorr.2 -0.157 -0.252
0.198 0.154
R-squared 0.902 0.073 0.482 0.709 0.639 0.713 0.715
Observations 147 285 285 186 188 147 147 147
Standard errors clustered at country level; Hausman P(RE vs FE)<0.01; Human capital controls included, except (2)
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3.7: 2SLS, SUR, 3SLS
2SLS SUR 3SLS
1st Stage 2nd Stage Farm Size Main Farm Size Main
Farm Size Gini -0.5 -2.125 -0.472 -0.383 -0.5 -2.125
0.723 1.745 0.344 0.399 0.344 1.35
NRA/Size Corr. -0.035 -0.072 -0.035 0.029 -0.035 -0.072
0.066 0.305 0.079 0.093 0.079 0.236
Country Area/Capita 0.523 0.602* 0.523*
0.281 0.244 0.245
Average NRA 0.025 0.061 0.021 -0.075 0.025 0.061
0.082 0.272 0.069 0.08 0.069 0.211
Livestock/wk 0.364* 0.909 0.370*** 0.086 0.364*** 0.909
0.156 0.671 0.096 0.115 0.096 0.519
Fertilizers/wk 0 -0.011 0.002 0.033 0 -0.011
0.071 0.161 0.043 0.049 0.043 0.125
Ag. Machinery/wk -0.325* -0.923 -0.326*** -0.122 -0.325*** -0.923
0.131 0.62 0.074 0.092 0.074 0.48
Ag. Land/wk 0.311 1.692* 0.297* 0.658*** 0.311* 1.692*
0.205 0.858 0.133 0.153 0.133 0.664
Percent Irrigated 0.001 0.02 0.001 0.019* 0.001 0.02
0.01 0.028 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.022
Share in Pasture -0.006 -0.021 -0.007 -0.011* -0.006 -0.021
0.009 0.018 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.014
Avg. Farm Size -2.601 -0.042 -2.601
1.769 0.096 1.369
R-squared 0.494 0.966 0.793
Observations 147 147 147 147 147 147
Standard errors clustered at country level
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3.8: Panel Results: Share of Small/Large Farms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS OLS OLS OLS FE FE FE FE
Share of Sm. Farms 0.150 0.090 0.646 0.651
0.243 0.260 0.527 0.548
NRA/Size Corr. -0.259 -0.239 -0.061 -0.030
0.139 0.144 0.102 0.124
Average NRA -0.300∗ -0.300∗ -0.079 -0.051
0.117 0.120 0.081 0.091
Livestock/wk 0.404∗∗∗ 0.426∗∗∗ 0.408∗∗∗ 0.423∗∗∗ 0.090 0.095 0.152 0.153
0.095 0.095 0.104 0.102 0.132 0.153 0.138 0.159
Fertilizers/wk 0.207∗ 0.201∗ 0.211∗ 0.217∗ -0.019 0.011 -0.044 -0.012
0.077 0.080 0.082 0.083 0.066 0.064 0.070 0.064
Ag. Machinery/wk 0.051 0.042 0.033 0.026 -0.120 -0.097 -0.153 -0.126
0.068 0.069 0.078 0.076 0.081 0.082 0.082 0.083
Ag. Land/wk 0.151 0.179 0.144 0.179 0.569∗∗ 0.521∗ 0.503∗∗ 0.442∗
0.098 0.098 0.105 0.103 0.170 0.197 0.169 0.201
Percent Irrigated 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.020∗∗ 0.022∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗
0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
Share in Pasture -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.009 -0.010 -0.009 -0.010
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007
Share of Lg. Farms -0.378 -0.413 0.001 0.099
0.249 0.240 0.477 0.519
NRA/SizeCorr.2 -0.264 -0.261 0.122 0.072
0.224 0.214 0.170 0.169
Average RRA -0.251∗ -0.254∗ -0.073 -0.032
0.114 0.114 0.080 0.085
R-squared 0.904 0.903 0.898 0.900 0.743 0.737 0.734 0.727
Observations 146 145 143 143 146 145 143 143
Standard errors clustered at country level
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3.9: Variance Decomposition. Pooled OLS
Output/Worker Average Farm Size
Coeff. Std.Err. Shapley %R2
Avg. Farm Size -0.075* 0.044 7.602
Farm Size Gini 0.1546 0.269 1.526 0.5863 0.533 2.842
NRA/Size Corr. -0.352*** 0.102 1.024 0.3379* 0.203 2.239
Average NRA -0.173** 0.082 1.313 0.0094 0.163 0.891
Livestock/wk 0.4034*** 0.059 21.985 -0.191* 0.115 10.269
Fertilizers/wk 0.1403** 0.058 15.514 0.2880** 0.111 10.320
Ag. Machinery/wk -0.029 0.042 12.748 -0.121 0.081 10.497
Ag. Land/wk 0.3528*** 0.080 15.590 0.7791*** 0.152 30.167
Percent Irrigated -0.000 0.003 2.697 -0.015** 0.006 10.968
Share in Pasture -0.002 0.002 1.295 -0.002 0.004 5.208
Fertility -0.065 0.062 8.206 0.3080** 0.119 3.968
Life Expectancy 0.0059 0.012 10.502 0.0699*** 0.022 5.671
Country Area/Cap. 0.0329** 0.015 6.961
Intercept 11.923 1.090 -0.793 2.149
Observations 147 147
Overall R2 0.9015 0.7788
Root MSE 0.3809 0.7434
F-stat. Model 102.20*** 39.317***
Log Likelihood -59.92 -158.1
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A Note on Imputed Values
We attempted to keep imputations to the minimum. Some imputations did take
place, however, due to data availability limitations.
Share of Land: For Ireland only, share of land irrigated in all decades was
missing in all examined sources and was taken as the average of the oldest 12 EU
members.
Agricultural Labor: For countries for which agricultural labor was not present
in FAO data until 1980, we used the ratio of agricultural labor to population in 1980
and multiplied by the population in the given year (Li,t = (Li,1980/Popi,1980)/Popi,t).
This only affects a small number of countries in the WCA 1970 decade, and should
not significantly affect the results.
Average Farm Size per Crop and NRA Correlation: As mentioned before,
the strategy was to normalize average farm size per crop in the United States and
in the world, and combine them for maximum coverage. If there are reasons no-tax
farm size by crop ordering differs between the United States and world average, this
may not be an ideal strategy to use. Perhaps predicting farm size by crop in a given
country based on crop-specific farm size regression would be a better strategy. We
have not attempted this.
Average 5-year NRA: In a few cases we moved the 5-year period of calculation
by 1-5 years due to unavailability of the most recent NRA data for some countries.
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